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INTRODUCTION

For almost a century, American broadcasting has received a lesser
degree of constitutional protection than the print medium. It has been
subject to Federal Communications Commission (FCC or the Commission)
regulation under an expansive public interest standard.I Technological
change, including the growth of cable and the Internet, has increasingly
intensified competitive pressures on broadcasting. To some, it has also
heightened the irrationality of broadcast exceptionalism. 2 When the FCC's
enhanced indecency prohibitions swept up U2 frontman Bono's fleeting
expletive during a live broadcast of a music awards show, 3 broadcasters
finally thought they had found a vehicle to force revolutionary changes to
the second-class status of broadcast media.4

1. Communications Act of 1934, Pub. L. No. 73-416, § 312(b), 48 Stat. 1064, 1087
(codified as amended at 47 U.S.C. §§ 151-613 (2000)).
2. For a recent argument that technological change has completely undermined
justifications for lesser First Amendment protection for broadcasting, see generally Thomas W.
Hazlett, Sarah Oh & Drew Clark, The Overly Active Corpse of Red Lion, 9 Nw. J. TECH. &
INTELL. PROP. 51 (2010).
3. Memorandum Opinion and Order, In re Complaints Against Various Broadcast
Licensees Regarding Their Airing of the "Golden Globe Awards" Program, 19 FCC Rcd. 1,
4975-76 (2004).
4. See, e.g., John Eggerton, Tech Policy Groups Call on Supreme Court to Overturn Pacifica
Decision, BROAD. & CABLE (Nov. 14, 2011, 1:35 PM), http://www.broadcastingcable.com/
article/476688-
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However, in the broadcasters' first challenge to the Commission's
fleeting expletive policy, the Supreme Court in FCC v. Fox Television Stations,
Inc. (Fox 1) rejected a challenge under the Administrative Procedure Act
against the Commission's process for changing its indecency policies.5 The
broadcasters' second challenge-to the Commission's indecency policy in
its entirety (and potentially to the whole edifice of broadcast regulation) in
FCC v. Fox Television Stations, Inc. (Fox II) 6-was no more successful. On
June 21, 2012, in a profoundly anti-climactic opinion, the Supreme Court
refused to address the First Amendment status of broadcasters and simply
absolved the petitioners of liability for indecency on narrow due process
grounds of fair notice.7
Nevertheless, the Court's silence speaks volumes. Its reticence to reach
the broader regulatory questions percolating in the Fox cases implicitly
suggests that a majority is not unduly troubled by continuing the
exceptional treatment of indecent broadcasting. The Fox I and Fox II
opinions reveal a Court unlikely to overrule its prior broadcast indecency
precedent-FCC v. Pacifica Foundation-orto find the Commission's overall
indecency regime unconstitutional.
At the same time, the Court in Fox II invited the Commission to consider
its approach in light of the public interest.9 After a lengthy silence, the
FCC recently issued a Public Notice seeking comment "on whether the full
Commission should make changes to its current broadcast indecency
policies or maintain them as they are."' 0 The Notice indicated that, in the

TechPolicyGroupsCall_onSupremeCourt toOverturn PacificaDecision.php;
see
also Christopher S. Yoo, Technologies of Control and the Future of the First Amendment, 53 WM. &
MARY L. REv. 747, 749 (2011) (suggesting that the Fox II Court "will finally be in a position
to address the underlying First Amendment issues" and offering "a qualified defense of the
libertarian vision of free speech associated with classical liberal theory," in support of
revising the First Amendment status of broadcasting); cf Brief for Amici Curiae Former
FCC Officials in Support of Respondents, Federal Communications Commission (FCC) v.
Fox Television Stations, Inc., 132 S. Ct. 2307 (2012) (No. 10-1293), 2011 WL 5544813
[hereinafter Brief for Former FCC Officials].
5. FCC v. Fox Television Stations, Inc. (Fox 1), 556 U.S. 502 (2009).
6. FCC v. Fox Television Stations, Inc. (Fox 11), 132 S. Ct. 2307 (2012).
7. Id. at 2317-18, 2220.
8. FCC v. Pacifica Found., 438 U.S. 726 (1978).
9. Fox II, 132 S. Ct. at 2310 ("[TWhis opinion leaves the Commission free to modify its
current indecency policy in light of its determination of the public interest and applicable
legal requirements[.]").
10. FCC Reduces Backlog of Broadcast Indecency Complaints by 70% (More than One Million
Complaints); Seeks Comment on Adopting Egregious Cases Policy, Public Notice, DA 13-581, 2013
WL 1324503 (Apr. 1, 2013) [hereinafter 2013 Indecency Notice]. The 2013 Indecency Notice was
published in the Federal Register on April 19, 2013. 78 Fed. Reg. 23,457, 23,563 (Apr. 19,
2013). Thereafter, at the request of the National Association of Broadcasters, the
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interim, the Commission's Enforcement Bureau had focused on
"egregious" cases and reduced its backlog of pending indecency complaints
While the focus on "egregious" cases hints that
by seventy percent."
indecency enforcement might not have been the former FCC Chairman's
top priority,12 the current public comment proceeding officially opens the
issue for public discussion. Over 100,000 responsive comments-most
urging stringent indecency enforcement-had been filed with the
Commission as ofJune 19, 201313 and close to 100 groups recently sought
to put congressional pressure on the FCC to oppose changes weakening

Commission extended the deadline for filing comments in the proceeding. FCC Extends
Pleading Cycle for Indecency Cases Policy, Public Notice, DA 13-1071, GN Docket No. 13-86
(May 10, 2013), available at http://www.fcc.gov/document/fcc-extends-pleading-cycleindecency-cases-policy.
11. 2013 Indecency Notice, supra note 10. The agency originally made an unofficial
statement that the Chairman had asked the staff to focus on the most egregious cases. See
Doug Halonen, FCC to Back Away from a Majority of Its Indecency Complaints, THE WRAP (Sept.
24, 2012, 10:20 AM), http://www.thewrap.com/tv/column-post/fcc-back-away-majorityThe 2013 Indecency Notice explained that more than a
its-indecency-complaints-57766.
million complaints had been dismissed "principally by closing pending complaints that were
beyond the statute of limitations or too stale to pursue, that involved cases outside FCC
jurisdiction, that contained insufficient information, or that were foreclosed by settled
precedent." 2013 Indecency Notice, supra note 10.
12. Regarding the place of indecency on former Chairman Julius Genachowski's
agenda, see Kenneth Jost, Indecency on Television, 22 CQ RESEARCHER 967, 982 (2012)
(reporting media lawyers' views that "the indecency issue ranks low on the FCC's list of
priorities"); Brendan Sasso, FCC Shows Little Interest in PolicingIndecency on TV, THE HILL (Feb.
3, 2013, 7:00 AM), http://thehill.com/blogs/hillicon-valley/technology/280679-fcc-showslittle-interest-in-policing-tv-indecency (reporting that some predict Chairman Genachowski
"will leave the issue for his successor to handle"). Indeed, after a Boston Red Sox player
responded to the Boston Marathon massacre by saying "this is our f-ing city, and nobody
is going to dictate our freedom," at a broadcast game, Chairman Genachowski tweeted
"David Ortiz spoke from the heart at today's Red Sox game. I stand with Big Papi and the
Genachowski Tweets on David
people of Boston -Julius." Elizabeth Titus, FCC Chairman
Ortiz F-bomb, PouiTico (Apr. 20, 2013, 8:36 PM), http://www.politico.com/story/2013/
04/fcc-julius-genachowski-david-ortiz-twitter-90376.html.
In addition, the Department ofJustice dismissed a case against Fox for an episode of
the reality show Married by America featuring pixelated nudity and sexual situations in scenes
of bachelor and bachelorette parties. See John Eggerton, DOJ, FCC Drop Pursuit of Fox
'Married by America' Indecency Fine, BROAD. & CABLE (Sept. 21, 2012), http://www.broadcastingcable.com/article/489505-DOJ.FCCDropPursuit-of FoxMarriedbyAmerica
IndecencyFine.php.

Julius

13.

See FEDERAL COMMUNICATIONS

COMMISSION ELECTRONIC COMMENT FILING

SYSTEM, http://apps.fcc.gov/ecfs/comment search/paginate?sortColumn=dateRcpt&sort

Direction= (last visited July 30, 2013); David Alan Coia, Passions Flare in Public Comments on
FCC's Indecency Policy, NEWSMAX (June 20, 2013), http://www.newsmax.com/US/fccindecency-policy-comments/2013/06/20/id/511020.
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indecency enforcement.' 4 Incidents such as those at Super Bowl XLVIIBaltimore Ravens quarterback Joe Flacco's declaration that his team's
victory "is fucking awesome" and his teammate's audible "holy shit" after
the game-will doubtless keep the issue on the public and administrative
agenda.15 Indecency complaints-many generated by and made into
causes cel6bres by conservative groups' 6-have been holding up license
renewals, some for almost a decade.' 7 Despite its reduced indecency
backlog, the Commission is still facing hundreds of thousands of pending
complaints.' 8
Unfortunately, the 2013 Indecency Notice explicitly seeks comment only on

14. John Eggerton, PTC, Others Push Hill to Pressure FCC on Indecency, BROAD. & CABLE
(May 8,2013), http://www.broadcastingcable.com/article/493336-PTCOthersPushHilltoPressureFCConIndecency.php (describing letter sent by public interest groups to
committee overseeing FCC); John Eggerton, FCC's Indeceng Policy Takes Some Heat, BROAD. &
CABLE (May 1, 2013), http://www.broadcastingcable.com/article/493193-FCC-sIndecency-PolicyTakes.SomeHeat.php (noting letter to FCC Chairman from House
Republicans critical of decision to focus on "egregious" cases).
15. See, e.g.,John Eggerton, Ravens On-Air Swearing Comes During Live Portion of Super Bowl
Coverage, BROAD. & CABLE (Feb. 4, 2013, 1:21 AM), http://www.broadcastingcable.com/
article/491679-RavensOnAirSwearingComesDuringive-Portion-of Super Bowl_
Coverage.php; Brendan Sasso, Parents Group Urges FCC to Crack Down on CBS over Super Bowl
Profanity, THE HILL (Feb. 4, 2013, 1:09 PM), http://thehill.com/blogs/hilliconvalley/technology/28087 1-parents-group-urges-fcc-to-crack-down-on-cbs-over-super-bowlprofanity. Complaints were also raised with the FCC over rapper M.I.A.'s obscene gesture
during the halftime show of Super Bowl XLVI in 2012; Amy Schatz & Christopher S.
Stewart, Super Bowl's Big TVScore, WALL ST.J. (Feb. 7, 2012), http://online.wsj.com/article
/SB10001424052970204369404577206571361934132.html.
16. See Lili Levi, The FCC's Regulation of Indecency, FIRST REPORTS, 2008 FIRST AMEND.
CTR., 1, 4, 28, 36, 45 [hereinafter Levi, FIRST REPORTS]; Lili Levi, ChairmanKevin Martin on
Indecency: EnhancingAgency Power, 60 FED. COMm. LJ. 19 (2008), http://www.law.indiana.edu
/fclj/pubs/v60/no 1/LeviForumFinal.pdf [hereinafter Levi, Enhancing Agency Power]; see
also BroadcastIndecency, PARENTS TELEVISION COUNCIL (PTC), http://w2.parentstv.org/main/Campaigns/Indecency.aspx (last visitedJuly 30, 2013).
17. See, e.g., David Oxenford, As License Renewal Cycle Approaches - Dealingwith Last Cycle's
Applications Held Up by Indecency Complaints, BROAD. L. BLOG (Mar. 2, 2011, 6:43 PM),
http://www.broadcastlawblog.com/2011/03/articles/indecency/as-license-renewal-cycleapproaches-dealing-with-last-cycles-applications-held-up-by-indecency-complaints/.
18. Former Commissioner McDowell testified before a congressional committee that
the agency had reduced its pending backlog of approximately 1.5 million complaints against
9,700 programs, and had remaining 500,000 complaints about 5,500 programs. Hearing on
Oversight of the Fed. Commcns Comm'n, Before the Subcomm. on Commc'ns and Tech. of the H. Comm.
on Energy and Commerce,, 112th Cong. 7 (2012) (statement of Commissioner Robert M.
McDowell, FCC). More recently, the 2013 Indecency Notice, supra note 10, asserted a seventy
percent reduction in the Commission's indecency backlog, leaving thirty percent of the
complaints in play. The Notice also explicitly stated that the Enforcement Bureau was
"actively investigating egregious indecency cases and [would] continue to do so." Id.
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the appropriate treatment of fleeting expletives and nudity.19 Both judicial
and scholarly attention has focused on the Commission's about-face
regarding the acceptability of fleeting expletives. 20 The Commission,
however, should take this opportunity to assess its overall indecency
regime. 21 The first step in that assessment must be to reveal the
fundamental-indeed, revolutionary-ways in which the Commission's
approach to the regulation of indecency has changed in the past decade.
Indeed, the changes in doctrine, process, context, and regulatory
justifications have been far more extensive than were either recognized by
the Supreme Court or generally perceived in scholarship.
First, the Commission has significantly extended its regulation of
broadcast indecency both substantively and procedurally. 22
From
procedural changes designed to lessen complainants' burdens, to milliondollar fines, to turning contextual analysis from a shield into a sword, to the
development of what amounts to liability for negligent indecency, the
agency's indecency regime has extended far beyond the fleeting expletives
19. 2013 Indecency Notice, supra note 10.
20. A Westlaw search on January 17, 2013 revealed over 1,200 articles mentioning
"FCC" and "indecency." For a sampling of post-2004 scholarship on indecency, see, for
example, CHRISTOPHER M. FAIRMAN, FUCK: WORD TABOO AND PROTECTING OUR FIRST

AMENDMENT LIBERTIES (2009); Jerome A. Barron, FCC v. Fox Television Stations and the
FCC'sNew Fleeting Expletive Polig, 62 FED. COMM. LJ. 567 (2010); Clay Calvert & Robert D.

Richards, The Parents Television Council Uncensored: An Inside Iook at the Watchdog of the Public
Airwaves and the War on Indeceng with Its President, Tim Winter, 33 HASTINGS COMM. & ENT.
L.J. 293, 312 (2011); Terri R. Day & Danielle Weatherby, Bleeeeep! The Regulation ofIndecency,

IsolatedNudity, and Fleeting Expletives in BroadcastMedia: An Uncertain Futurefor Pacifica v. FCC, 3
CHARLOTTE L. REV. 469 (2012); W. Wat Hopkins, When Does F***Not Mean F***?: FCC v.
Fox Television Stations and a Callfor Protecting Emotive Speech, 64 FED. COMM. LJ. 1 (2011);
Robert D. Richards & David J. Weinert, Punting in the First Amendment's Red Zone: The Supreme
Court's "Indecision" on the FCC's Indecency Regulations Leaves Broadcasters Still Searchingfor Answers,
76 ALB. L. REV. 631 (2013); Jessica C. Collins, Note, The Bogeyman of "Harm to Children":

Evaluating the Government Interest Behind Broadcast Indecency Regulation, 85 N.Y.U. L. REv. 1225,
1244 (2010).
21. Statement of Commissioner McDowell, supra note 18 ("We owe it to American
families and the broadcast licensees involved to carry out our statutory duties by resolving
the remaining complaints with all deliberate speed. Going forward, the Commission must
ensure that its indecency standards are clear, that broadcasters have the requisite notice and
that Americans, especially parents such as myself, are secure in their knowledge of what
content is allowed to be broadcast."); see also FCC COMMISSIONER AJIT PAI ON THE U.S.
SUPREME COURT'S DECISION (FCC v. Fox TELEVISION STATIONS, INC.), available at
http://www.fcc.gov/document/fcc-commissioner-ajit-pai-us-supreme-courts-decision
(last
visitedJuly 30, 2013) ("Today's narrow decision by the U.S. Supreme Court does not call
into question the Commission's overall indecency enforcement authority or the
constitutionality of the Commission's current indecency policy. Rather, it highlights the
need for the Commission to make its policy clear.").
22. See, e.g., Levi, FIRST REPORTS, supra note 16, at 17-27.
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and instances of nudity at issue in the Fox cases.
Second, a bird's-eye view reveals that the Commission's indecency
regime has ripple effects far beyond its official scope.
Voluntary
commitments by broadcasters to "zero tolerance" indecency regimes, as
part of negotiated deals with the Commission, have effectively outsourced
the agency's investigative and enforcement roles.23 The Commission's
enhanced attention to indecency has doubtlessly lent weight to pressures
from interest groups on advertisers, resulting in at least some sponsor-based
censorship.2 4 Moreover, even though the Commission has not asserted
jurisdiction to enforce its indecency rules beyond broadcasting, the reality
of content distribution in media today, as well as the FCC's own must-carry
rules, might well lead to their indirect impact in non-broadcast media.
That most of these developments have evaded judicial review is itself
notable and troubling.
Third, the FCC's articulated rationales for regulating indecencyassisting parents and promoting an independent governmental interest in
the protection of children-have also been quietly transformed. The
rationale of assisting parents has shifted from temporal channeling designed
to eliminate daytime indecency to "moral zoning" designed to provide a
safe media space. The protection of children rationale has shifted focus
from protecting individual children's psyches to the prevention of broader
social harm. Most notably, the Commission has used the indecency context
as a platform to float a proto-contractual regulatory rationale whose impact
could be felt far beyond indecency regulation.
In total, the doctrinal and justificatory changes amount to a sub rosa
transformation in FCC regulation. This Article argues that, whatever its
constitutional status, this transformation is deeply problematic as a matter
of policy.
The FCC's substantive changes have quietly increased
unaccountable administrative discretion to define aesthetic and journalistic
necessity. The agency has conscripted broadcasters' own standards to
bootstrap liability and adopted a presumptively inculpatory approach to the
The new regime has sacrificed
contextual assessment of indecency.
expressive freedom in the service of a national cultural policy insulated
from judicial review. The procedural changes have amplified the impact of
pressure by advocacy groups, structurally increased the likelihood of
indecency findings, and significantly heightened the chilling effect of
indecency regulation. The Commission's penchant for resolution by

23. Id. at 32 (citing to Clear Channel "zero tolerance" policy).
24. See, e.g., Press Release, Parents Television Council, PTC Releases Annual Ranking
of Best and Worst TV Sponsors (Nov. 19, 2012), http://w2.parentstv.org/Main/News
/Detail.aspx?doclD=2609.
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settlement has imposed a private indecency regime more extensive than
one that could legitimately be adopted regulatorily, while simultaneously
leaving the public at the mercy of broadcasters' presumably changeable
decisions on private enforcement.
The Commission's approach is likely to entail some real and important
social costs. Perhaps most importantly, today's indecency system is likely to
chill the public interest documentary programming of public radio and
television.2 5 Given the public benefit of programming created by entities
unhampered by profit considerations, such a chilling effect on the alreadybeleaguered public broadcasting system is particularly troubling. Even on
the commercial side, it is likely that at least some small-market stations will
choose to avoid live local programming-such as news and sports-due to
the expense of time-delay technology. Such a result cuts against the FCC's
touted commitments to localism.
Similarly, the Commission's revised regulatory justifications raise more
questions than they answer. Touted as a moderating move responsive to
technological reality today, the safe-zone approach is in fact an unrealistic
attempt to wrest victory from the jaws of technological defeat. The
Commission has not sufficiently addressed whether the notion of broadcast
safe zones still makes sense in light of program-delivery convergence, and, if
it does, whether less editorially invasive approaches could be cultivated
through technological means. As for the commitment to forestall social
harms, the Commission's approach is not, as touted, either neutral or truly
grounded on protecting children. Instead, it reflects the government
engaging in cultural regulation-choosing a particular side in contested
moral and political terrain. This choice is justified neither by concerns
about government endorsement nor by a focus on the educative role of
television. The Commission's attempt to send a symbolic message about
appropriate social discourse is either ineffective or, where effective, unduly
captured by the views of narrow ideological interests.
Finally, the
Commission's use of indecency as the platform for revival of a proto25. There are lessons to be learned, for example, from the fact that PBS advised its
producers to self-censor after the FCC found indecent The Blues: Godfathers and Sons, a Martin
Scorsese documentary on blues musicians. Notices of Apparent Liability and Memorandum
Opinion and Order, In re Complaints Regarding Various Television Broadcasts Between
February 2, 2002 and March 8, 2005, 21 FCC Rcd. 2664, 2683 72 (2006); Courtney
Livingston Quale, Hear an [Expletive], There an [Expletive], But[t] ... the Federal Communications
Commission Will Not Let rou Say an [Expletive], 45 WILLAMETTE L. REv. 207, 257 (2008). Only
fourteen of 300 public television stations aired an unedited documentary on the Iraq war
because of soldiers swearing under fire. See J. Gregory Sidak & Hal J. Singer, Evaluating
Market Power with Two-Sided Demand and Preemptive Offers to Dissipate Monopoly Rent: Lessons for
High-Technology Industriesfrom the Antitrust Division's Approval of the XM-Sirius Satellite Radio
Merger, 4J. COMPETITION L. & EcoN. 697, 718 (2008).

518

ADMImISTRATIVEL4 wREVIEW

[65:3

contractual justification for regulation demonstrates the dangers of such a
justification. The rationale fails to serve as an independent regulatory
ground distinct from the careworn notions of broadcast scarcity and
pervasiveness. It also lacks any inherent boundary and implicates concerns
That the
underlying the doctrine of unconstitutional conditions.
government's articulation of this regulatory justification garnered apparent
approval from some members of the Court in the Fox litigation raises the
unfortunate possibility that the justification might be extended even beyond
indecency.
The Commission might respond that its regulatory stance will remain
reasonable in practice and that the enlargement of its powers in the abstract
is not likely to have much practical importance-that its shadow regulatory
transformations will remain in the shadows. But this subjects broadcasters
to the potentially changeable whims of the censor. Broadcasters claim that
deregulation will not lead to increased indecency on the airwaves. Yet the
effectiveness of broadcaster self-regulation doubtless depends on the
following factors: the competitive conditions in the industry as a whole,
including cable; the broadcasters' assessments of the FCC's power and
appetite for enforcement at any given point; and the effectiveness over time
of sponsor boycotts. Regardless of broadcaster and FCC promises, it is far
from clear that the market will effectively constrain either.
In sum, the regulatory regime for indecency constitutes bad
communications policy. Yet wholly deregulatory solutions advocated by
broadcasters and some free speech proponents are not politically viable.
This does not necessitate maintenance of the status quo, however. Instead,
the FCC should return to a policy of restraint. Engaging in an exploration
of the second-best, this Article makes three categories of suggestions in that
spirit. It does so by focusing on each of the three central players in the
indecency regulatory context-broadcasters, the FCC, and consumers.
First, with a view to minimizing the chilling effect of indecency rule
violations for broadcasters, this Article proposes that the Commission revise
its forfeiture policies and return to proportionality in the amounts of
forfeitures assessed for indecency violations.
Second, this Article recommends institutional adjustments designed to
improve the FCC's internal processes regarding indecency. Procedurally,
the Commission should: 1) improve and make more transparent the ways
in which it processes indecency complaints; 2) explore a clear rule
regarding how to count and report complaints; and 3) revise its approach to
indecency consent decrees. With regard to substantive standards, this
Article recommends that the FCC consider: 1) adopting a presumption of
no liability in close cases; 2) reversing the new "negligent indecency"
approach and the broadcaster standards bootstrap; 3) dismissing complaints
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not submitted by actual program viewers; 4) using context to exculpate; 5)
adopting a news exemption (or reversing news-related changes under the
current standards); 6) limiting the aesthetic necessity inquiry; and 7)
considering economic hardship and whether the broadcaster is a public
station.
Third, with a view to consumer empowerment, this Article suggests that
the Commission explore the viability of methods designed to enhance
public knowledge and transparency. Recognizing that consumer-oriented
recommendations might ultimately be less effective than the other two
categories of proposals, this Article nevertheless pushes the Commission to
resolve its long-pending fact-finding inquiry on ratings and blocking
mechanisms. It also suggests that greater transparency with respect to the
Monitoring Board that assesses the existing parental TV guidelines could
bear fruit.
These suggestions might lead a reader to wonder whether there is not an
inevitable tension between critiquing an administrative policy and making
recommendations for increasing its efficiency. If the recommendations
work, won't they ill-advisedly improve the enforcement of an untenable
policy? If, on the other hand, they are inconsequential, then why bother?
This Article attempts to straddle this tension because the first-best result is
currently unlikely. In selecting among second-best recommendations,
however, this Article does not seek simply to increase the efficiency of the
indecency system. Instead, it attempts to find ways to improve the regime,
lessen its coercive impact on speech, and promote regulatory reticence.
Section I sketches out the history of the FCC's approach to indecency on
the air, describes the Supreme Court's responses-from Pacificato Fox I and
II, and attempts to assess the implications of what the Court did and did
not say in its most recent decisions. Section II details not only the latest,
most obvious policy changes addressed by the Supreme Court in the Fox
cases but also the far less noted (and potentially more consequential)
procedural and substantive changes to the FCC's indecency scheme.
Section III reveals the fundamental changes in the FCC's regulatory
justifications for its indecency regime and lays out the complex political
picture against which these evolutions have taken place. Section IV
recommends a policy of FCC restraint on indecency enforcement and
makes practical recommendations to serve as directions for the new
restraint-guided by the goals of reducing the chilling effect of indecency
enforcement on broadcasters, improving the indecency regulation process
at the FCC, and empowering parents.
I.

THE FCC'S INDECENCY REGIME

The Commission is authorized to regulate broadcast indecency under
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the criminal code's Section 1464.26 It does so by channeling to late-night
hours "material that, in context, depicts or describes, in terms patently
offensive as measured by contemporary community standards for the
broadcast medium, sexual or excretory activities or organs. "27
A finding of broadcast indecency can have significant consequences.
The FCC can revoke station licenses, reject renewal applications, grant
short-term license renewals, issue warnings and cease-and-desist orders, and
impose monetary fines for violation of § 1464.28 Violation of § 1464 can
also lead to criminal penalties.29
A. History ofIndecency Regulation
The FCC has sought to regulate broadcast indecency since the 1920s.30
At the beginning, the Commission operated informally, chastising
broadcasters for indelicate programming via letters using terms of ringing
condemnation. 3' NBC's banning of Mae West from the air for a suggestive
reading of a radio skit indicates that such informal reprimands were
sufficient to maintain decorum on the air.32 The Commission's informal
26. Section 1464 provides that "whoever utters any obscene, indecent, or profane
language by means of radio communication shall be fined under this title or imprisoned not
more than two years, or both." 18 U.S.C. § 1464 (2006). The statute does not define the
terms "obscene, indecent, or profane," leaving that obligation to the FCC.
27. Policy Statement, In re Industry Guidance on the Commission's Case Law
Interpreting 18 U.S.C § 1464 and Enforcement Policies Regarding Broadcast Indecency, 16
FCC Red. 7999, 8000 4 (2001) [hereinafter 2001 Policy Statement] (identifying 10 PM to 6
AM as the safe harbor for broadcast indecency).
28. As the Court pointed out in Fox II, a finding by the FCC that a licensee has violated
the agency's indecency rules can also have significant reputational harms for broadcasters.
See Fox II, 132 S. Ct. 2307, 2319 (2012).
29. See 47 U.S.C. § 501 (2006) (describing criminal penalties for willful violations of the
Communications Act).
30. For descriptions of the history of indecency regulation, see, for example, FAIRMAN,
supra note 20; MARJORIE HEINS, NOT IN FRONT OF THE CHILDREN: "INDECENCY,"
CENSORSHIP, AND THE INNOCENCE OF YOUTH 89-108 (2001); THOMAS G. KRATrENMAKER
& LUCAS A. POWE, JR., REGULATING BROADCAST PROGRAMMING 103-141 (1994); LUCAS
A. PowE, JR., AMERICAN BROADCASTING AND THE FIRST AMENDMENT 162-190 (1987);
WILLIAM RAY, THE UPs AND DowNs OF RADIO-TV REGULATION (1990); Levi, FIRST

REPORTS, supra note 16, at 10-14; Lili Levi, The Hard Case of BroadcastIndecency, 20 N.Y.U.
REv. L. & Soc. CHANGE 49, 86-97 (1992) [hereinafter Levi, The Hard Case].
31. There is no evidence of formal enforcement actions. Levi, FIRST REPORTS, supra
notel6, at 10-11.
32. The transcript of the skit-about Adam and Eve in the Garden of Eden-had
passed muster with the network's program censors. When it aired on the popular Edgar
Bergen show, however, Mae West's insinuating delivery highlighted all the innuendo in the
text. Complaints were made to the FCC, and the Commission wrote the network a strongly
worded reprimand. Ms. West was not to appear on NBC stations for decades thereafter. See
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directives were paralleled by codes of conduct adopted by the National
Association of Broadcasters prohibiting the broadcast of "offensive
language, vulgarity, illicit sexual relations, sex crimes, and abnormalities
during any time period when children comprised a substantial segment of
the viewing audience." 33 Broadcaster self-regulation and informal FCC
pronouncements apparently kept radio indecency in check until the 1970s.
In 1970, however, the FCC was faced with complaints about a small,
non-profit Philadelphia station's airing of a pre-recorded interview in which
Grateful Dead frontman Jerry Garcia peppered his answers with
expletives.34 Hoping to develop a test case, the Commission imposed a
Notice of Apparent Liability for the broadcast on the basis of a broad
definition of indecency that it had explicitly adopted for the first time.35
However, because the station chose not to contest the Commission's action
in the courts and simply paid the fine, judicial review of the Commission's
developing approach to indecency had to wait until nonprofit Pacifica
Foundation station WBAI (FM) aired the live show of comedian George
Carlin's 12-minute "Filthy Words" monologue-with its repeated litany of
"words you couldn't say on the public ... airwaves ... the ones you
definitely wouldn't say, ever"-at 2:00 PM on October 30, 1973.36
Complaining that "the problem [of indecent broadcasts] has not abated
and the standards set forth [in WGBH, the Jerry Garcia case] apparently
have failed to resolve the issue," 37 the Commission saw the Pacifica
broadcast as an opportunity to clarify the extent of its jurisdiction and
ensure its regulatory power. 38 In response to a single complaint by a
member of Morality in Media,3 9 the Commission found that WBAI's
generally Steve Craig, Out of Eden: The Legion of Decency, the FCC, and Mae West's 1937 Appearance
on The Chase & Sanborn Hour, 13 J. oF RADIO STUD. 232 (2006). Private industry
regulations on broadcast content, however, began to take hold in the 1950s and 1960s. See
Keith Brown & Adam Candeub, The Law and Economics of Wardrobe Malfnction, 2005 B.Y.U.
L. REv. 1463, 1481-82; see also HEINS, supra note 30.
33. HEINS, supra note 30 at 92; Brown & Candeub, supra note 32, at 1483 (citing BRUCE
A. LINTON, SELF-REGULATION IN BROADCASTING 11-15 (1967)).

34. Notice of Apparent Liability, In re WUHY-FM, Eastern Education Radio, 4548
Market Street, Philadelphia, Pa., 24 F.C.C.2d 408, 409 3 (1970).
35. Levi, The Hard Case, supra note 30, at 88.
36. FCC v. Pacifica Found., 438 U.S. 726, 729-30 (1978).
37. Memorandum Opinion and Order, In re Citizen's Complaint Against Pacifica
Foundation Station WBAI (FM), New York, N.Y., 56 F.C.C.2d 94, 94 1 2 (1975)
[hereinafter Pacifica Order]. The agency characterized the Garcia broadcast as only one of an
increasing number of complaints of broadcast indecency. Id.
38. See Adam M. Samaha, The Stoy ofFCC v. Pacifica Foundation (and Its Second Ife), in
FIRST AMENDMENT STORIES (Richard W. Garnett & Andrew Koppelman eds., 2012).
39. See Adam Candeub, Creating a More Child-FriendlyBroadcast Media, 3 MICH. ST. L.
REv. 911, 921 (2005) (noting that the Pacificacomplainant was apparently a member of the
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broadcast of the Carlin show had violated § 1464.40 Defining "indecency"
as extending beyond obscenity, the Commission adopted the patent
offensiveness test-whereby "language that describes, in terms patently
offensive as measured by contemporary community standards for the
broadcast medium, sexual or excretory activities and organs, at times of the
day when there is a reasonable risk that children may be in the audience" 4 1
would be deemed indecent under the statute.
Nevertheless, the
Commission chose not to impose punitive sanctions in the Pacifica Order
42
The U.S.
(and prior § 1464 cases) and actively sought judicial review.
Court of Appeals for the D.C. Circuit reversed the FCC, holding that its
action constituted censorship prohibited by § 326 of the Communications

Act of 1934.43
The Supreme Court reversed the D.C. Circuit and narrowly upheld the
agency's authority to channel indecency against First Amendment
challenge in FCC v. Pacifica Foundation in 1978.44 Reversing the D.C.
Circuit's conclusion that the FCC order violated the anti-censorship
provision in § 326 of the Communications Act of 1934,45 the Court upheld
the Commission's indecency policy as applied in the Carlin case. The
Pacifica Court spoke of the narrowness of its holding, 46 but it also explained
the lesser constitutional status of broadcasting. Because broadcasting had a
"uniquely pervasive presence" 47 and because it was "uniquely accessible to
children," 48 regulation that channeled speech to late-night hours should not
be deemed inconsistent with the First Amendment.
Despite the FCC's ultimate win in Pacifica, the Commission retreated
immediately thereafter, and chose to use its regulatory power over
indecency sparingly for the next decade. 49 It simply focused on pre- 10 PM
National Planning Board of conservative interest group Morality in Media); see also
KRATTENMAKER & POWE, supra note 30 (characterizing the complaint as possibly part of a
political strategy and suggesting that the complainant may not in fact even have heard the
broadcast).
40. Pacfica Order, 56 F.C.C.2d 94.

41. Id. at 98 11.
42. Robert Corn-Revere, FCC v. Fox Television Stations, Inc.: Awaiting the Next Act,
2008-2009 CATO SUP. CT. REv. 295, 301 (2008).
43. Pacsfica Order, 56 F.C.C.2d 94, rev'd sub nom. Pacifica Found. v. FCC, 556 F.2d 9
(D.C. Cir. 1977). For an extensive description of the Pacifica story, see generally AngelaJ.
Campbell, Pacifica Reconsidered: Implicationsfor the Current Controversy over Broadcast Indecency, 63
FED. COMM. LJ. 195 (2010).
44. FCC v. Pacifica Found., 438 U.S. 726 (1978).
45. FCCv. Pacifica, 556 F.2d 9.
46. FCCv. Pacifica, 438 U.S. at 750.
47. Id. at 748.
48. Id. at 749; see also Brief for Former FCC Officials, supra note 4, at 6-8.
49. Corn-Revere, supra note 42, at 305. Indeed, the Commission itself had argued to
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broadcast uses of the "seven dirty words" identified in Pacifica.SO This was
consistent with the Commission's announced policy of restraint even in the
Pacica case, where the agency stated that it was concerned only with
"clear-cut, flagrant cases." 5 '
The late 1980s led to a change. Conservative groups and White House
interest, as well as the development of "shock jock" radio programming,
put pressure on the Commission to expand indecency enforcement beyond
the seven dirty words.52 In three decisions, the Commission revealed that it
would begin to enforce a "generic" definition of indecency harking back to
the original Pacifica administrative decision.53 The agency also established
midnight-as opposed to 10 PM-as the start of the indecency safe
harbor. 54 Despite its definitional expansion beyond the seven dirty words,
the Court in the Pacifica appeal that its decision should be read narrowly. See id. at 303 n.39
(citing Brief for FCC, FCC v. Pacifica, 438 U.S. 726 (No. 77-528), 1978 WL 206838, at *44).
The Commission expressed its intention "strictly to observe the narrowness of the Pacifica
holding." Memorandum Opinion and Order, In re Application of WGBH Educational
Foundation, 69 F.C.C.2d 1250, 1254 10 (1978).
50. See, e.g., Levi, FIRST REPORTS, supra note 16, at 11, n.18; Levi, The Hard Case, supra
note 30, at 90-91; see also Glen 0. Robinson, The Electronic FirstAmendment: An Essay for the
New Age, 47 DuKE LJ. 899, 949 (1998) ("[W]hat followed Pacifica was less a reign of terror
than a season of silliness.").
51. See, e.g., Memorandum Opinion and Order, In re "Petition for Clarification or
Reconsideration" of a Citizen's Complaint Against Pacifica Foundation, Station WBAI(FM),
New York, N.Y., 59 F.C.C.2d 892, 893 n.1 (1976).
52. See, e.g., Levi, FIRST REPORTS, supra note 16, at 11-12 and sources cited therein.
53. Memorandum Opinion and Order, In re Pacifica Foundation, Inc., Los Angeles,
California, 2 FCC Rcd. 2698 (1987) [hereinafter Pacifica, Los Angeles Order], recons. grantedsub
nom. Memorandum Opinion and Order, In re Infinity Broadcasting Corporation of
Pennsylvania (Infinity Order A), 3 FCC Red. 930 (1987), affd in part, vacated in part sub nom.
Action for Children's Television v. FCC (AC7), 852 F.2d 1332 (D.C. Cir. 1988);
Memorandum Opinion and Order, In re Regents of the University of California, Licensee of
KCSB-FM, Santa Barbara, California, 2 FCC Red. 2703 (1987), affd in part, vacated in part
sub nom. ACT, 852 F.2d 1332; Memorandum Opinion and Order, In re Infinity Broadcasting
Corporation of Pennsylvania, 2 FCC Red. 2705 (1987), affd in part, vacated in part sub nom.
ACT, 852 F.2d 1332. See also Brown & Candeub, supra note 32, at 1488-90. The
Commission explained that the three cases simply warned the broadcasters, without
including fines, because the Commission was announcing new standards to clarify when it
would exercise its enforcement authority. Public Notice, New Indecency Enforcement Standards
To Be Applied to All Broadcast and Amateur Radio Licensees, 2 FCC Red. 2726 (1987).
54. Infinity OrderA, 3 FCC Red. 930, affd in part, vacatedin partsub nom. Action for Children's
Television v. FCC [ACT 1], 852 F.2d 1332 (1988). In ACT I, the D.C. Circuit Court of
Appeals rejected the assertion that this change was overly broad and unconstitutionally
vague. Id. at 1338-40. The court concluded that the Commission's indecency definition
had already passed constitutional muster in the Supreme Court's Pacifica decision and that
vagueness was inherent in any attempt to define indecency. The court remanded the case so
that the Commission could further support the particular timeframe it had chosen for the
indecency "safe harbor." Id. at 1341, 1344. Congress responded by adopting a requirement
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however, the Commission issued assurances that it would nevertheless wield
5 The D.C. Circuit's approval of the
its regulatory power with restraint.3
Commission's revised approach to indecency in the 1980s appeared to
hinge on the agency's continuing regulatory moderation.36
Indeed, in the following decade, television programming escaped
indecency regulation altogether,5 7 and sex-themed programming flourished
on shock radio so long as it did not go as far as the antics of the infamous
Howard Stern. The Commission released an industry guidance document
on indecency in 2001, describing the two-step inquiry required in § 1464
cases.58 Despite the language of the 1987 decisions announcing increased
indecency enforcement, and the extensive illustrative examples in the 2001
Policy Guidance document, the period from 1987 to 2001 only led to the
issuance of fifty-two fines for indecency.59 Other than a $1.7 million dollar
settlement by Infinity Broadcasting in exchange for the dismissal of thenpending actions against Howard Stern radio programming,60 fines for
that the Commission enforce its indecency rules twenty-four hours per day. On appeal, the
D.C. Circuit struck down the regulations adopted by the FCC in response to the twenty-four
hour ban. Action for Children's Television v. FCC (ACT 1l), 932 F.2d 1504 (D.C. Cir.
1991). In further response, Congress enacted the Public Telecommunications Act of 1992,
pursuant to which the FCC was required to establish a safe harbor from midnight to 6 AM
for indecency (except for public broadcasters, whose safe harbor would begin at 10 PM).
The D.C. Circuit held in the third of the ACT cases-Action for Children's Television v.
FCC (ACTII)-that even though the midnight to 6 AM safe harbor could pass the First
Amendment narrow tailoring requirement standing alone, it would have to be struck down
because of the public broadcaster exception. Action for Children's Television v. FCC (ACT
Ill), 58 F.3d 654 (D.C. Cir. 1995) (en banc).
55. See, e.g., FAIRMAN, supra note 20; Levi, FIRST REPORTS, supra note 16, at 1-2, 11,
43, 55 n.18.
56. The court in ACT I specifically relied upon the Commission's continued
commitment to a "restrained enforcement policy." ACTI, 852 F.2d at 1340 n.14; see also
Brief for Former FCC Officials, supra note 4, at 9 ("[he [ACTI] court was alert to the
dangers that a policy of reining in a small number of broadcast provocateurs could easily
become a vehicle for an unconstitutional morals crusade against the entire industry.").
57. Brown & Candeub, supra note 32, at 1493.
58. 2001 Policy Statement, supra note 27.
59. See Brown & Candeub, supra note 32, at 1492-93 n.180 and sources cited therein.
60. Until he left terrestrial radio for satellite radio, Stern used his program to attack the
FCC and contend that he had been punished by indecency fines for having taken political
views unpopular with the government. See, e.g., Geoffrey Rosenblat, Stern Penalties: How the
Federal Communications Commission and CongressLook to Crackdown on Indecent Broadcasting, 13 VILL.
SPORTs & ENT. L.J. 167, 188-89 & n.107 (2006); Anne Marie Squeo, FCC to Penalize Clear
Channelfor Stern Show, WALL ST.J., Apr. 8, 2004, at B 1; Editorial, The Silent Media, BROAD. &
CABLE (Apr. 12, 2004), http://www.broadcastingcable.com/article/CA409709.html
(describing Stern's claim that the FCC focused on him because of his opposition to President
Bush); see also Sarah McBride &Joe Flint, Radio's Howard Stern Leaps to Satellite in $500 Million
Deal, WALL ST.J., Oct. 7, 2004, at Al.
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indecent programming ranged only from $25,500 to $49,000 during the
second Clinton Administration. 61 This led some Commission-watchers to
characterize the agency's pre-2003 indecency efforts as quite restrained. 62
By contrast, 2003 became a watershed year in indecency regulationbeginning the most aggressive indecency enforcement effort in the FCC's
history. 63 During the 2002 Billboard Music Awards program, Cher had
responded to receiving an award by saying: "I've also had critics for the last
40 years saying that I was on my way out every year. Right. So fuck
'em." 64 In the 2003 version of the show, award presenter Nicole Richie,
star of the then-airing television series The Simple Life, quipped: "Have you
ever tried to get cow [shit] out of a Prada purse? It's not so [fucking]
simple."65 These incidents, as well as Janet Jackson's infamous millisecond
"wardrobe reveal" during the 2004 Super Bowl telecast,6 6 led to waves of
indecency complaints filed by members of the Parents Television Council
(PTC) advocacy group.6 7 Although the FCC staff had previously indicated
that fleeting or isolated expletives would not be deemed to violate the
agency's indecency policy, 68 the Commission reversed course in 2004 and
found actionably indecent U2 frontman Bono's comment during the
61. Brown & Candeub, supra note 32, at 1493; see also John Dunbar, Indecency on the Air:
Shock-Radio Jock Howard Stern Remains 'King of All Fines', CTR. FOR PUB. INTEGRITY (Apr. 9,
2004, 12:00 AM), http://www.publicintegrity.org/telecom/report.aspx?aid=239&sid=200.
62. See, e.g., Brief of Former FCC Officials, supra note 4, at 5-9; CBS Corp. v. FCC,
No. 06-3575 (3d Cir. Nov. 29, 2006). These analysts contend that while the agency did
enforce its indecency rules after 1987, the Commission's actions were directed to the most
provocative kind of programming by "rogue" broadcasters at the time. Id. at 9.
63. Candeub, supra note 39, at 922-23 and sources cited therein; see also Notice of
Apparent Liability for Forfeiture, In re Clear Channel Broadcasting Licenses, Inc., Licensee
of Stations WPLA(FM), Callahan, Florida, and WCKT(FM), Port Charlotte, Florida, 19
FCC Rcd. 1768, 1815 (2004) [hereinafter Clear Channel Notice] (providing the separate
statement of Chairman Michael K. Powell).
64. Fox 1, 556 U.S. 502, 510 (2009). For an extended factual description of the cases at
issue, see id. at 511.
65. Id. at 510.
66. CBS Corp. v. FCC, 535 F.3d 167, 172 (3rd Cir. 2008) (observing that the image of
Jackson's bare breast lasted one-sixteenth of one second).
67. Id. (describing claims about complaints); see also Christopher M. Fairman, Fuck, 28
CARDozO L. REv. 1711, 1740-41 (2007) (explaining that 217 of the 234 complaints
initiated were by the PTC after an expletive was said at the 2003 Golden Globe Awards);
Levi, FIRST REPORTS, supra note 16, at 28-29 (reiterating that most of the complaints given
to the FCC are generated by the PTC); Adam Thierer, Why Regulate Broadcasting? Toward a
Consistent FirstAmendment Standardfor the InformationAge, 15 CommLAW CONSPEcTUS 431, 460
(2007) (indicating that the decrease in complaints written by the PTC led to the decline of
complaints received by the FCC in 2005).
68. Fox I, 556 U.S. at 508. Staff guidance until 2004 had suggested that fleeting
expletives needed to be repetitive in order to trigger sanctions under the indecency policy.
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Golden Globes Awards program that receiving his prize was "really, really
fucking brilliant." 69
The change in policy articulated in the Golden Globes order then served as
the basis for the Commission's issuance of notices of apparent liability to
Fox and those of its affiliates that had aired the Billboard Music Awards
shows of 2002 and 2003 featuring the Cher and Nicole Richie expletives. 70
The Commission issued an Omnibus Order resolving multiple indecency
complaints against television broadcasters in an effort to "provide
substantial guidance to broadcasters and the public about the types of
programming that are impermissible under our indecency standard." 7'
CBS's broadcast of the 2004 Super Bowl program triggered a $550,000
forfeiture in 2006 for direct and vicarious liability under § 1464.72
The Commission characterizes its indecency analysis as requiring "at
least two fundamental determinations." 73 First, the agency determines
whether the challenged material fits into the proscribable category of sexual
or excretory depictions or descriptions. 74 Second, if the first prong has led

69. Memorandum Opinion and Order, In re Complaints Against Various Broadcast
Licensees Regarding Their Airing of the "Golden Globe Awards" Program, 19 FCC Red.
4975, 4982 $ 17 (2004); see also id. at 4980 (reversing its own Enforcement Bureau's Golden
Globes order and overruling its prior approach to the permissibility of broadcasts of fleeting
expletives). The Commission's Enforcement Bureau originally dismissed the Bono case
because, under existing precedent, fleeting and isolated expletives were not deemed to
violate § 1464 and the star's utterance did not describe or depict sexual or excretory
activities or organs. Memorandum Opinion and Order, In re Complaints Against Various
Broadcast Licensees Regarding Their Airing of the "Golden Globe Awards" Program, 18
FCC Red. 19,859, 19,861-62 (2003). Media watchers explained the Commission's reversal
as responding to "significant pressure from Congress." Corn-Revere, supra note 42, at 308.
70. Notices of Apparent Liability and Memorandum Opinion and Order, In Re
Complaints Regarding Various Television Broadcasts Between February 2, 2002 and
March 8, 2005, 21 FCC Rcd. 2664 (2006) [hereinafter Omnibus Order].
71. Id. at 2665 2. In addition to the Cher and Nicole Richie instances, the Omnibus
Order found indecent and profane ABC's broadcast of scripted expletives in various
episodes of "NYPD Blue" and a CBS broadcast of "The Early Show" in which a guest used
an unscripted expletive during a live interview. Id. at 2690-99
101, 112 n.164, 125, 137.
As in the Golden Globes, the Commission did not issue forfeiture orders against any of the
licensees because the offending broadcasts occurred when then-existing precedent
permitting fleeting expletives would have permitted the broadcasts. Id. at 2692-2700 TT
111, 124, 136, 145.
72. Forfeiture Order, In re Complaints Against Various Television Licensees
Concerning Their February 1, 2004 Broadcast of the Super Bowl XXXVIII Halftime Show,
21 FCC Red. 2760 (2006) [hereinafter Super Bowl Show].
73. 2001 Policy Statement, supra note 27, at 8002 17.
74. Id. (stating that the material "must fall within the subject matter scope of [the]
indecency definition - that is, the material must describe or depict sexual or excretory
organs or activities.").
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to an affirmative finding, the agency determines whether "the broadcast [is]
patently offensive as measured by contemporary community standards for the
broadcast medium."7 5
This assessment is consistently said to be
contextual.76 Moreover, the Commission asserts that "subject matter alone
does not render material indecent."7 7
In engaging in its "highly fact-specific" 78 contextual analysis of patent
offensiveness, the FCC looks at three "principal factors":
(1) the explicitness or graphic nature of the description or depiction of sexual
or excretory organs or activities; (2) whether the material dwells on or repeats
at length descriptions of sexual or excretory organs or activities; (3) whether
the material appears to pander or is used to titillate, or whether the material
appears to have been presented for its shock value.79
The Commission "takes into account the manner and purpose of
broadcast material. For example, material that panders to, titillates, or
shocks the audience is treated quite differently than material that is
primarily used to educate or inform the audience." 80 In examining these
three factors, the Commission "weigh[s] and balance[s] them on a case-bycase basis... because '[e]ach indecency case presents its own particular
mix of these, and possibly, other factors."' 8 1
75. Id. at 8.
76. The Commission's 2001 Policy Statement states that the overall context of the
broadcast in which the disputed material appeared is critical. Id. at 9.
77. Omnibus Order, supra note 70, at 2708 T 187; see also 2001 Polig Statement, supra note
27, at 8011 21 (stressing the importance of context when determining whether repetitive
vulgar terms should be deemed indecent).
78. 2001 Policy Statement, supra note 27, at 8003 9.
79. Id. at T 10 (emphasis removed); see also Order on Reconsideration, In re Complaints
Against Various Television Licensees Concerning Their February 1, 2004 Broadcast of the
4 (2006)
Super Bowl XXXVIII Halftime Show, 21 FCC Rcd. 6653, 6654-6655
[hereinafter Super Bowl Show on Reconsideration] (describing the three-part analysis as it relates
to the Timberlake andJackson halftime show).
80. Notice of Apparent Liability for Forfeiture, In re Complaints Against Various
Television Licensees Concerning Their December 31, 2004 Broadcast of the Program
"Without a Trace" 21 FCC Rcd. 2732, 2734 7 (2006) [hereinafter Without a Trace]. The
Commission has previously explained that "the more explicit or graphic the description or
depiction, the greater the likelihood that the material will be considered patently offensive."
2001 Policy Statement, 16 FCC Red. at 8003 12.
81. Super Bowl Show, 21 FCC Red. 2760, 2763 T 5; see also Super Bowl Show on
Reconsideration, 21 FCC Red. at 6654-55 4 (articulating that in this case the first and third
factors outweighed the second factor). Although the Commission does not explain in
advance how this is to be assessed, it asserts that "in particular cases, one or two of the
factors may outweigh the others, either rendering the broadcast material patently offensive
and consequently indecent, or, alternatively, removing the broadcast material from the
realm of indecency." Without a Trace, 21 FCC Red. at 2734 5; see also 2001 Policy Statement,
10 (emphasizing that each factor must be balanced and that
16 FCC Red. at 8003
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Unlike obscenity, the patent offensiveness standard for indecency is said
to be a national standard that focuses on the "average broadcast viewer or
listener." 82 The Commission relies neither on experts nor on program
popularity in order to define the views of the average audience member.
Instead, it claims to make its patent offensiveness decisions on its "collective
experience and knowledge, developed through constant interaction with
lawmakers, courts, broadcasters, public interest groups, and ordinary
citizens, to keep abreast of contemporary community standards for the
broadcast medium."8 3
Despite initial statements indicating distaste for content regulation,
Republican FCC Chairman Michael Powell presided over the imposition of
The
fines totaling $7,928,080 for broadcast indecency in 2004.84
succeeding FCC Chairman, Kevin Martin, made explicit the fact that the
elimination of indecency during primetime hours was a key component of
his FCC policy.85 Notably, regulation of indecency became a unifying goal
for both Democratic and Republican Commissioners. 86 There were also
typically one factor alone will not be determinative of an indecency finding).
82. According to the Commission, "the standard is that of an average broadcast viewer
or listener and not the sensibilities of any individual complainant." 2001 Policy Statement, 16
FCC Rcd. at 8002 8; see also Super Bowl Show on Reconsideration, 21 FCC Rcd. at 6655 4
(finding the display of a woman's breast to be graphic and explicit to the average viewer).
83. Memorandum Opinion and Order, In re Infinity Radio License, Inc., 19 FCC Rcd.
5022, 5026
12 (2004). The Commission has explicitly rejected reliance on polls: "[i]n
determining whether material is patently offensive, we do not rely on polls, but instead apply
the three-pronged contextual analysis described in the text." Super Bowl Show, 21 FCC Rcd.
at 2762 5 n.17; see also Super Bowl Show on Reconsideration, 21 FCC Rcd. at 6658-59 T 14
(rejecting CBS's use of polls in determining what the average viewer finds offensive).
84. See Dunbar,supra note 61 (noting that, as ofApril 2004, the FCC imposed six fines
that totaled $1.6 million); see also Fairman,supra note 67, at 1741 (explaining that Chairman
Powell found the word fuck "coarse, abhorrent, and profane"); Reed Hundt, Regulating
Indecency: The Federal Communication Commission's Threat to the First Amendment, 2005 DUKE L. &
TECH. REv. 6 (quoting remarks by Chairman Powell before the Media Institute, which
called for a single standard in First Amendment analysis).
85. Bill McConnell, Kevin Martin's Challenge:New FCC Chairman Could Pose Problemfor Big
Media, BROAD. & CABLE (Mar. 21, 2005), http://www.broadcastingcable.com/article/CA5
11 792.html?; see also Kevin J. Martin, Family-Friendly Programming: Providing More Tools for
Parents, 55 FED. COMM. L.J. 553, 557 (2003) (challenging broadcasters to show familyfriendly programs during the first hour of primetime television).
86. Only Commissioner Adelstein expressed reservations about the expansion of the
scope of enforcement to isolated words. Omnibus Order, supra note 70, at 2726-27 (statement
of Comm'r Jonathan S. Adelstein concurring in part, dissenting in part). At the same time,
he reiterated his support for an enhanced enforcement policy generally. Id. at 2784; see also
BroadcastDecency Enforcement Act of 2004: HearingsBefore the Subcomm. on Telecomms. and the Internet
of the H. Comm. on Energy and Commerce, 108th Cong. 83, 106 (2004) (statements of Kevin J.
Martin & Michael J. Copps, FCC Comm'rs) (stressing the importance of providing more
family-friendly shows on broadcast channels). Commissioner Taylor Tate argued in print in
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well-publicized efforts to extend indecency regulation from broadcast to
cable.87 In 2006, the Commission was also granted a significant expansion
in its forfeiture authority by Congress in the Broadcast Decency
Enforcement Act.88 In addition, the FCC adopted a number of important
changes to its indecency rules, which resulted in making it much easier for
complainants to establish violations of the indecency prohibitions.89 First,
the Commission reversed course on whether fleeting expletives alone would
be considered to violate § 1464. The agency also for the first time relied on
"profanity" as a ground for a § 1464 violation and adopted a broad
definition of profanity.90 The threat of indecency regulation increased
significantly in both intensity and credibility. Judicial challenges followed.

support of significant indecency fines and broadcaster responsibility to air family-friendly
programming. John Eggerton, Tate Promotes Positive Programs, BROAD. & CABLE (June 12,
2006), http://www.broadcastingcable.com/article/CA6342898.html.
87.

See, e.g., Levi, Enhancing Agency Power, supra note 16, at 28 (discussing Chairman

Martin's belief that, to address the problem of indecency adequately, cable would have to be
regulated as well).
88. Broadcast Decency Enforcement Act of 2005, Pub. L. No. 109-235, § 2, 120 Stat.
491, 491 (2006) (codified as amended at 47 U.S.C. § 503(b)(2)(C)(ii) (2006)) (amending §
503(b) of the Communications Act to authorize significantly increased forfeiture penalties
and indicating congressional concern about indecent broadcast programming); see also Fox
Television Stations, Inc. v. FCC, 613 F.3d 317, 322-23 (2d Cir. 2010), vacated, 132 S. Ct.
2307 (2012) (describing the amendment and noting that as a result of the change, "the fine
for a single expletive uttered during a broadcast could easily run into the tens of millions of
dollars"). Congress had authorized the agency to impose civil forfeitures for violations of
§ 1464 in 1960. See 47 U.S.C. § 503(b)(1)(D) (2006); see also Fox Television Stations, 613 F.3d at
320 (citing to forfeiture authority). Thereafter, the Commission's Forfeiture Policy
Statement established a base forfeiture amount of $7,000 for the transmission of indecent or
obscene materials. Report and Order, In re Commission's Forfeiture Policy Statement and
Amendment of Section 1.80 of the Rules to Incorporate the Forfeiture Guidelines, 12 FCC
Rcd. 17087, 17113 (1997), recons. denied, 15 FCC Red. 303 (1999) [hereinafter Forfeiture Policy
Statement]; see also 47 C.F.R.

§ 1.80(b)(4)

(1999).

"The Forfeiture Policy Statement also specifies

that the Commission shall adjust a forfeiture based upon consideration of the factors
enumerated in section 503(b)(2)(D), such as 'the nature, circumstances, extent and gravity of
the violation, and, with respect to the violator, the degree of culpability, any history of prior
offenses, ability to pay, and such other matters as justice may require." Omnibus Order, 21
FCC Rcd. at 2670 21.
The Broadcast Decency Enforcement Act amended the Communications Act of 1934
to increase the FCC's maximum forfeiture authority from $32,500 per incident to $325,000
for each violation or each day of a continuing violation, so long as the fine for any
continuing violation does not exceed $3,000,000 for any single act or failure to act. 47
U.S.C. § 503 (2006).
89. See infra Section II.
90. See infra note 160.
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B. The Indecency Policy in the Courts
The Fox television stations, whose broadcasts of the 2002 and 2003
Billboard Music Awards had been found to violate the FCC's new fleeting
expletives policy, challenged the new policy on both constitutional and
statutory grounds in the Second Circuit.9 ' Because the FCC had not
imposed any sanctions for these violations and therefore had not afforded
the parties the opportunity to contest the indecency charges, the Second
Circuit granted the agency's request for a voluntary remand to the agency
to address the petitioners' arguments. 92 After briefing pursuant to a public
notice, the Commission issued an order upholding its prior finding that the
Fox broadcasts were actionably indecent.9 3
When the case returned to the Second Circuit, 94 two judges of the threejudge panel found the FCC's decision to be "arbitrary and capricious" in
violation of the Administrative Procedure Act. 95 The court found the
Commission's change in policy not to have been adequately explained, in
violation of the APA's requirement that agencies must provide reasoned
explanations for reversals in policy. In a section of extended constitutional
dicta, the majority also expressed skepticism that the fleeting expletives
policy could withstand First Amendment scrutiny. 96
The majority
expressed sympathy for the networks' argument that the FCC's approach to
indecency was "undefined, indiscernible, inconsistent, and consequently,
unconstitutionally vague." 97
The Supreme Court granted certiorari and, in Fox I, reversed and
remanded the Second Circuit's finding that the Commission's fleeting

91. Fox I, 556 U.S. 502, 510-11 (2009). The networks appealed the Omnibus Order,
and the cases were consolidated before the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit.
92. Order, In re Complaints Regarding Various Television Broadcasts Between
February 2, 2002 and March 8, 2005, 21 FCC Rcd. 13,299, 13,301-02
9-10 (2006)
[hereinafter Omnibus Remand Order]; see aLso Fox I, 556 U.S. at 510-11.

93. Omnibus Remand Order, 21 FCC Rcd. at 13,314 39, 13,326 66 13,327-28 % 71,
73, 13,329
79-80. This order reaffirmed the Commission's indecency findings against
Fox for the 2002 and 2003 Billboard Music Awards but reversed its finding against CBS for
The Early Show broadcast and dismissed the complaint against ABC on procedural
grounds.
94. The network's original appeal to the Second Circuit was reinstated on November 8,
2006 and was consolidated with a petition for review of the Omnibus Remand Order. Fox
Television Stations, Inc. v. FCC, 489 F.3d 444, 454 (2d Cir. 2007) (granting motions to
intervene by other networks, including CBS, and discussing several statutory and
constitutional challenges collectively raised by the networks to the validity of the Omnibus
Remand Order).
95. Id. at 447.
96. Id. at 464, 466.
97. Id. at 463.
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expletives policy violated the Administrative Procedure Act (APA).98
Writing for Chief Justice Roberts, and Justices Alito, Thomas, and
Kennedy, Justice Scalia found that the FCC's orders were not "arbitrary
and capricious" under the APA. In language that observers have read to
announce the Supreme Court's legitimation of political justifications for
agencies' policy changes,99 the Court held that the FCC had adequately
explained the reversal of its prior approach to fleeting expletives. 0 o While
the Fox case was winding its way through the Second Circuit, CBS had
appealed the Janet Jackson forfeiture to the Court of Appeals for the Third
0
Circuit.o'
That court found that the Commission had changed course on
how it treated fleeting images of nudity in violation of the Administrative
Procedure Act, vacated the FCC's orders, and remanded the case to the
Commission. 0 2 Then the Supreme Court granted the FCC's petition for
certiorari, vacated the Third Circuit's decision without an opinion, and
remanded the case for consideration in light of the Court's decision in Fox
o103
On remand, a panel of the Third Circuit reaffirmed its earlier finding
that the FCC had acted arbitrarily in "improperly impos[ing] a penalty on
CBS for violating a previously unannounced policy."104 The Third Circuit

98.

Fox I, 556 U.S. 502, 530 (2009).

99. See, e.g., Jodi L. Short, The Political Turn in American Administrative Law: Power,
Rationality, and Reasons, 61 DuKE L.J. 1811, 1829 (2011) (noting that the impact of the
decision at the outer boundaries is hospitable "to the politicization of agency reason giving");
Kathryn A. Watts, Proposing a Placefor Politics in Arbitray and Capricious Review, 119 YALE LJ.
2, 43 (2009) (arguing that courts can apply the arbitrary and capricious review in a way that
gives "political influences an accepted place in rulemaking decisions"). But see Enrique
Armijo, Politics, Rulemaking, andjudicialReview: A Response to Professor Watts, 62 ADMIN. L. REV.
573, 576 (2010) (stating that "agencies are expert in their areas of delegated authority, not in
assessing the strength and direction of political winds"); Mark Seidenfeld, The Irrelevance of
Politicsfor Arbitray and Capricious Review, 90 WASH. U. L. REV. 141, 192 (2012) (questioning
the role of courts in distinguishing legitimate from improper political influences).
100. Justice Scalia wrote for the majority in Fox I that all agency change need not be
subjected to "more searching review" or "justified by reasons more substantial than those
required to adopt a policy in the first instance." Fox I, 556 U.S. at 514. In addition to
"display[ing] awareness that it is changing position[,] ... the agency must show that there
are good reasons for the new policy. But it need not demonstrate to a court's satisfaction
that the reasons for the new policy are better than the reasons for the old one; it suffices that
the new policy is permissible under the statute, that there are good reasons for it, and that
the agency believes it to be better, which the conscious change of course adequately
indicates." Id. at 515.
101. See Super Bowl Show on Reconsideration, 21 FCC Red. 6653, 6668 1 38 (2006)
(reaffirming FCC's initial forfeiture on reconsideration).
102. CBS Corp. v. FCC (CBS 1), 535 F.3d 167 (3d Cir. 2008).
103. FCC v. CBS Corp. (CBSll), 556 U.S. 1218 (2009).
104. CBS Corp. v. FCC (CBS IIl), 663 F.3d 122, 124 (3d Cir. 2011); see also id. at 129
("We conclude that, if anything, the Supreme Court's decision fortifies our original
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did not grant en banc review. 0 5
In the meantime, the Second Circuit on remand "vacate[d] the FCC's
order and the indecency policy underlying it[,]" holding that the policy
"violates the First Amendment because it is unconstitutionally vague,
creating a chilling effect that goes far beyond the fleeting expletives at issue
here." 06 That decision returned to the Supreme Court in Fox II.
The Fox cases presented the Supreme Court with a veritable spectrum of
decisional choices. 0
On one end of the spectrum was the narrowest
possible option, focusing simply on whether the FCC's shift of policy on
fleeting expletives satisfied administrative law or constitutional due process
norms. Next was the possibility of a First Amendment-based reversal of
part or all of the FCC's changes to the indecency regime. 0 8 Further along
the spectrum was the opportunity to use the Fox cases to overrule Pacifica.
At the most deregulatory end of the spectrum was the option of using the
indecency cases as a convenient occasion for the Court to reject, once and
for all, the second-class constitutional status under which broadcasters had
operated since the twentieth century. Requests for relief by both litigants
and amici ran the gamut on this spectrum.
Critics argued that the FCC's indecency regime should be found
unconstitutional under the First Amendment.109 The Supreme Court did
opinion... ").
105. John Eggerton, Third Circuit Won't Reconsider Super Bowl Decision, BROAD. & CABLE
(Jan. 18, 2012), http://www.broadcastingcable.com/article/479252-ThirdCircuit_ Won_
tReconsider.Super BowlDecision.php.
106. Fox Television Stations, Inc. v. FCC, 613 F.3d 317, 319 (2d Cir. 2010).
107. See, e.g., Reply Brief for the Petitioners at 14-15, Fox I, 556 U.S. 502 (2009) (noting
that respondents sought distinct forms of relief).
108. Compare Brief for Respondent Fox Television Stations, Inc. at 42-43, Fox 1, 556
U.S. 502 (2009) (No. 07-582), 2008 WL 3153439 [hereinafter Fox I Brief for Fox] (noting
that the networks sought to overrule the Supreme Court's Pacfica ruling and invalidate all
broadcast indecency regulation), and Brief of Respondents NBC Universal, Inc. et al. at 4748, Fox I, 556 U.S. 502 (2009) (No. 07-582), 2008 WL 3153438 (arguing that the FCC failed
to fully satisfy the requirements of the Administrative Procedure Act (APA) for three
reasons), with Brief for Amicus Curiae ABC Television Affiliates Ass'n Supporting
Respondents at 5-7, Fox 1, 556 U.S. 502 (2009) (No. 07-582), 2008 WL 3539492
[hereinafter Fox I Brief for ABC] (asserting that the FCC's fleeting expletive policy violates
the APA based on the Pacifica decision), and Brief for Respondents CBS Television Network
Affiliates Ass'n et al. at 10-12, Fox 1, 556 U.S. 502 (2009) (No. 07-582), 2011 WL 5317316,
(contending that the FCC ignored the Court's emphasis that Pacificawas a narrow holding).
109. See, e.g., Erwin Chemerinsky, Tucker Lecture, Law and Media Symposium, 66 WASH. &
LEE L. REV. 1449, 1462-63 (2009) (arguing that "[tJhe Court's medium-by-medium
approach to indecency just does not make sense any longer."). For earlier arguments to that
effect, see KRAITENMAKER & POVE, supra note 30. Analysts complained that the FCC
approach was doctrinally inconsistent, unpredictable in its application, and placed undue
In addition, it was criticized as political-improperly
reliance on consent decrees.
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not address the constitutional issue. In Fox II, the Court specifically
explained that because it "resolves these cases on fair notice grounds under
the Due Process Clause, it need not address the First Amendment
implications of the Commission's indecency policy."'Io
As for CBS and the Super Bowl case at the Third Circuit, the Supreme
Court denied certiorari after handing down its decision in Fox II.'
Chief
Justice Roberts's concurrence in the denial of certiorari was seen by the
industry as "essentially warn [ing] broadcasters that the FCC has served fair
notice that fleeting images and expletives are subject to indecency
enforcement." 112

Reading constitutional tea leaves is obviously a dangerous undertaking.
On the one hand, Justices Ginsburg and Thomas have expressed doubts
about the continuing viability of Pacifica in light of technological change." 3
Some have suggested that the extreme narrowness of the decision in Fox II
might be due to a 4-4 split on the Court, with Justice Sotomayor recused,
responsive to the pressures of right-wing public interest groups like the PTC, whose
electronically filed complaints purportedly exaggerated social concern. See, e.g., Matthew C.
Holohan, Politics, Technology, & Indecency: Rethinking Broadcast Regulation in the 21st Century, 20
BERKELEY TECH. LJ. 341, 359-61 (2005); Kurt Hunt, Note, The FCC Complaint Process and
"Increasing Public Unease": Toward an ApoliticalBroadcast Indecency Regime, 14 MICH. TELECOMM.
& TECH. L. REV. 223, 241-42 (2007). In addition, critics have said that the rules were
ineffective on their own terms because of the expansive availability of indecent material on
cable, satellite, and other electronic media, and because it is unrealistic in light of the times
and changed social mores to suggest that FCC channeling of indecent material to late-night
hours would actually prevent children from having access to it. See, e.g., R. George Wright,
BroadcastRegulation and the Irrelevant Logic ofStrict Scrutiny, 37J. LEGIs. 179, 187-88 (2012).
110. Fox II, 132 S. Ct. 2307, 2320 (2012). For an argument that constitutional
avoidance is the wisest course in this policy space, see, for example, Note, Vagueness - Second
Circuit Strikes Down the FCC's Indecency Policy as Voidfor Vagueness, 124 HARV. L. REV. 835, 841
(2011).
111. FCC v. CBS Corp. (CBS IV), 132 S. Ct. 2677 (2012).
112. John Eggerton, Chief Justice Warns About Future Wardrobe Malfunctions, BROAD. &
CABLE
(June
29,
2012), http://www.broadcastingcable.com/article/print/486602ChiefJusticeWarns_AboutFutureWardrobeMalfunctions.php (stating that, although
Chief Justice Roberts expressed doubt about the correctness of the Third Circuit's
conclusion regarding whether the Commission had changed course regarding fleeting sexual
images as opposed to fleeting expletives, he nonetheless concurred in the Court's denial of
certiorari because the FCC had made clear that it had abandoned its exception for fleeting
expletives and ensured that "be it word or image ... any wardrobe malfunctions will not be
protected on the ground relied on by the court below") (quoting CBS IV, 132 S. Ct. at 2678)
(internal citations and quotations omitted).
113. See Fox I, 556 U.S. 502, 530 (2009) (Thomas, J., concurring) (expressing skepticism
about the viability of constitutional precedent used to support the regulation of
broadcasting); see alo Fox II, 132 S. Ct. at 2321 (Ginsburg, J., concurring) (indicating that
Pacifica was "wrong when it issued" and that it "bears reconsideration"); CBS IV, 132 S. Ct.
at 2678 (Ginsburg,J., concurring).
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And the story of media
regarding whether to overrule Pacifica."4
innovation and convergence is one of constitutional adaptation to
technological change." 5
At the same time, the Court's opinions in Fox I and Fox II suggest that
the Court is not rushing to overrule Pacifica on constitutional grounds. The
majority opinion in Fox I provides a very aggressive reading of the FCC's
regulatory power, with Justice Scalia's opinion for the majority shifting
away both from the traditional idea of scarcity of frequencies, and from the
Pacifica rationales, to a regulatory rationale grounded on the government's
ability to condition license grants. Justice Scalia's opinion in Fox I also
includes a clear statement representing the view that sexual expression is
low-value speech. As for Fox II, there is little in the opinion or oral
argument to suggest a great appetite to upend almost a century of FCC
content regulation.'"6 The oral argument in Fox II offered a number of
different reasons to expect that the Court might hesitate to upend the
fundamental regime of broadcast regulation. Whether because of a belief
in the imminent obsolescence of the broadcast medium," 7 or the symbolic
value of requiring a certain modicum of decency," 8 or the sense that there
has been a significant increase in indecent material on the air," 9 or a
concern that overruling the FCC would lead to indecency on the air as a
matter of course, 120 or the legitimacy of the objective of having a safe
114. Eugene Volokh, FCC v. Fox Television Decided Narrowly on Lack-of-Fair-Notice
Grounds, THE VOLOKH CONSPIRACY (June 21, 2012, 11:31 AM), http://www.volokh.com/
2012/06/21 /fcc-v-fox-television-decided-narrowly-on-lack-of-fair-notice-grounds/
(suggesting thatJustice Sotomayor might cast the fifth vote to overrule Pacifica).
115. Cf Samantha Barbas, How the Movies Became Speech, 64 RUTGERS L. REV. 665, 741
(2012) (believing that "the law should adjust to reflect the new communication context").
116. Broadcasters have argued that the definition referenced in Reno v. ACLU, 521 U.S.
844, 885 (1997), in which the Supreme Court struck down as unconstitutionally vague a
definition of indecency in the Communications Decency Act of 1996 (CDA), 47 U.S.C. §
233(a)-(b) (2006), was very similar to the generic definition of indecency used by the FCC in
connection with § 1464. See, e.g., Fox I Brief for ABC, supra note 108; Fox I Brief for Fox,
supra note 108. But there are differences between the CDA provisions and the FCC's
definition, and the Reno Court also expressly distinguished FCC regulation and Pacifica from
the CDA. ACLU, 521 U.S. at 867, 871.
117. See Transcript of Oral Argument at 33, Fox II, 132 S. Ct. 2307 (2012) (No. 10-1293)
(noting Justice Alito's comment that "broadcast TV ... is living on borrowed time. It's not
going to be long before it goes the way of vinyl records and eight-track tapes").
118. Id. at 22 (quotingJustice Scalia: "Sign--sign me up as supportingJustice Kennedy's
notion that this has a symbolic value, just as we require a certain modicum of dress for the
people that attend this Court and the people that attend other Federal courts. It's a
symbolic matter.").
119. Id. at 24 (reflecting ChiefJustice Roberts' point that words and images of the kind
at issue in the case had not commonly aired in the prior history of broadcasting).
120. Id. at 34-35 (reflectingJustice Kennedy's concern).
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harbor,' 21or an acceptance of indecency regulation as a tolerable quid pro
quo for licensing, 22 or temperamental tendencies to look for the narrowest
possible ground of decision,123 there are good reasons to expect judicial
hesitation at the prospect of dismantling the traditional edifice of media
regulation. At a minimum, Fox I and II together show that the Court is
dealing with the FCC very leniently, despite the agency's shifting, fits-andstarts approaches to indecent speech, its apparent responsiveness to
complaints generated by third-party interest groups, its willingness to
achieve censorship indirectly through broadcaster self-regulation, its use of
indecency as a lever to permit increased regulation of cable, and its
apparently strategic use of its backlog of complaints. There is no guarantee
that Justice Sotomayor would vote to reverse Pacifica. Moreover, whatever
the status of Pacifica as such, a modified indecency regime might pass
constitutional muster, given the deference paid by the Roberts Court to
administrative action in at least some contexts.124 Even if Pacifica is
overruled, the FCC purports to rely on an alternative rationale to support
indecency regulation.1 25
The ultimate constitutional resolution is uncertain. What seems clear for

121. Id. at 28 (citing to ChiefJustice Roberts' question at oral argument).
122. Although Justice Kagan pressed the Solicitor General on what would make
indecency regulation an acceptable condition on broadcast licensing, id. at 4, she also asked
the broadcasters' counsel, "[b]ut how about this, Mr. Phillips: Look, you've been given a
privilege, and that gives the government at least somewhat more leeway to impose
obligations on you. Not-can't impose everything, but at least has a bit more leeway. And
here we've had something that's very historically grounded. We've had this for decades and
decades that the broadcast is-the broadcaster is treated differently. It seems to work, and
it-it seems to be a good thing that there is some safe haven, even if the old technological
bases for that safe haven don't exist anymore." Id. at 25-26.
123. See, e.g., id. at 44 (quotingJustice Breyer: "Does this case in front of us really call for
the earthshaking decision that you all have argued for in the-in the briefs?"). See also

Christopher M. Fairman, Institutionalized Word Taboo: The Continuing Saga of FCC Indecency
Regulation, Feb. 25, 2013, http://papers.ssm.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract-id=2223992, at
45 ("It seems clear that this Court is not prepared to revisit Pacifica and the constitutionality
of the FCC's fleeting expletive and nudity policy."). For a recent article situating the Court's
"duck[ing]" of constitutional issues in Fox as reflecting contending visions of the First
Amendment in the Roberts Court, see Rodney A. Smolla, Categories, Tiers of Review, and the

Roiling Sea of Free Speech Doctrine and Pnciple: A Methodological Critique of United States v.
Alvarez, 76 ALB. L. REv. 499, 502 (2013).
124. Admittedly, the Roberts Court's overall approach to deference in the
administrative context is a complex matter. See Clay Calvert &Justin B. Hayes, To Defer or

Not To Defer?: Deference and Its DiferentialImpact on First Amendment Rights in the Roberts Court, 63
CASE V. REs. L. REv. 13 (2012) (explaining the elasticity of the deference doctrine in the
decisions of the Roberts Court).
125. See infra Section II.C (discussing the FCC's revival of a quid pro quo rationale
justifying regulation.)
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now is that the Court has left the FCC free to regulate indecency "as long
as its policy for doing so provides constitutionally sufficient notice of the
prohibited conduct" 26 and as long as it is clear when it changes its rules.
At the same time, the Court has issued an invitation to the Commission in
the Fox II opinion to review its indecency policy in light of the public
interest, and future constitutional and statutory challenges to the
Commission's indecency actions are certain to be filed. Under these
conditions, it behooves the Commission to appraise carefully its current
indecency regime in operation. That review requires a first step beyond
what the Court took in Fox I and II-namely, revealing the multiplicity of
changes the Commission has made to its approach to indecency since the
early 2000s. The seeming limits to the inquiry implicit in the Commission's
2013 Indecency Notice are too constraining.12 7 A full description in turn
reveals the problematic aspects of the FCC's regulatory shifts since 2003. A
more restrained approach to indecency regulation by the FCC could
permit the Court to adopt a constitutional compromise that would achieve
a rough (albeit inevitably inelegant) balance between the incommensurable
positions on both sides of the indecency issue.
II. BEYOND FLEETING EXPLETIVES-THE FULL RANGE OF CHANGES
TO THE FCC'S INDECENCY POLICY
Because the Fox cases implicated the FCC's changed stance regarding
fleeting expletives and momentary glimpses of nudity, little attention has
been paid to the other substantive and procedural changes that the
Commission has quietly but significantly made to strengthen indecency
regulation extensively since 2003.128 It is important to take a bird's-eye
view to see what the mosaic of regulatory changes has affected.
First, the agency began to impose very high forfeitures for violations of
its indecency policy. Second, it began entering into settlements with
Third, it made
licensees conditioned on indecency commitments.
procedural changes that 1) reduced the burden on complainants making a
prima facie case and 2) inflated the appearance of indecency complaints.
Fourth, it made substantive changes to its liability standards, began to use
context as a sword rather than a shield, revised its approach to news and
consideration of merit, and adopted what amounts to a "negligent
indecency" model.

126. Lyrissa Barnett Lidsky, Not a Free Press Court?, 2012 BYU L. REv. 1819,1830 (2012).
127. See supra note 21, (noting the scope of FCC's current indecency policy inquiry).
128. See generally Michael Botein & Dariusz Adamski, The FCC'sNew Indecency Enforcement
Polity and Its European Counterparts:A Cautionary Tale, 15 MEDIA L. & POL'Y 7 (2005); Brown &
Candeub, supra note 32; Candeub, supra note 39.
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Contrary to the Commission's assertions of modesty in this area, the
effect of these various changes as a whole has been quite radical. They
have both increased the FCC's power and spurred a private self-regulatory
regime arguably stiffer than the Commission's. Either way, they have
enhanced the chilling effect of indecency regulation. And, in light of the
reality of media structure today, they have also had ripple effects beyond
broadcasting. Perhaps the most notable aspect of all these changes has
been the extent to which, as a whole, they preclude judicial review while
effectuating self-censorship by broadcasters.

A. Changes Regarding Remedies
1. Fines
The most obvious change is the Commission's imposition of largeindeed, disproportionate-fines (called "forfeitures") for indecency
broadcast outside the nighttime safe harbor. Even before Congress's recent
approval of extensively increased forfeiture authority by statute, the agency
had begun imposing high fines under its old rules by assessing them on a
"'per utterance" basis129 and charging network affiliates as well as the
networks themselves for indecency in network programming. 30 Because
the Commission's forfeiture authority was further expanded ten-fold by
legislative action in 2005, one finding of indecency can lead to hundreds of
129. See Notice of Apparent Liability for Forfeiture, In re Infinity Broadcasting
Operations, Inc., Licensee of Station WKRK-FM, 18 FCC Red. 6915, 6919 12 (2003)
(announcing new "per utterance" policy, under which the FCC finds violations not on a perprogram basis, but for each utterance of the forbidden language or image in the relevant
program); see also Notice of Apparent Liability for Forfeiture, In re Clear Channel
Broadcasting Licenses, Inc., Licensee of Stations WPLA(FM), Callahan, Florida, and
WCKT(FM), Port Charlotte, Florida, 19 FCC Rcd. 1768, 1818 (2004) [hereinafter Clear
Channel WPIA Notice] (separate statement of Comm'r Kevin J. Martin) (calling for higher
fines); Notice of Apparent Liability for Forfeiture, In re Clear Channel Broadcasting
Licenses, Inc., Licensee of Stations WBGG-FM et al., 19 FCC Rcd. 6773, 6779 15 (2004)
(applying "per utterance" policy); Notice of Apparent Liability for Forfeiture, In re Entercom
Sacramento License, LLC, Licensee of Station KRXQ(FM) (Entercom Notice), 19 FCC Rcd.
20,129, 20,154-55 (2004) (separate statements of Comm'rs MichaelJ. Copps and KevinJ.
Martin). The fact that the Commission has not inevitably assessed forfeitures on a perutterance basis is not critical, given that it has announced its authority to do so and indeed
has exercised it in some circumstances.
130. See Fox Television Stations, Inc. v. FCC, 613 F.3d 317, 322 (2d Cir. 2010). The
shift to a per-licensee standard for forfeitures meant that the maximum fine for each instance
was multiplied by the number of affiliates airing the program. See Richard E. Wiley et al.,
Communications Law 2004: Contentious Times in a Shijfting Landscape, 811 PLI/PAT 109, 168-69
(2004). The utterance of a single expletive could therefore lead to millions of dollars in
forfeitures.
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thousands or even millions of dollars in fines. For the first time, the
Commission responded to indecency complaints by an explicit
consideration of the offender's economic resources as part of the process of
imposing forfeitures.
The increases in fines were designed to address the impression that
broadcasters, instead of being deterred from airing indecency, had
absorbed prior indecency forfeitures merely as minor costs of doing
business.' 31 However, the disproportionate amounts of the fines would
serve as a superdeterrent even for networks with deep pockets, especially if
the networks indemnify their affiliated stations for network programming
deemed indecent. Certainly the threat is amplified for small stations in
small markets where a judgment on fleeting indecency could be a "bet the
company" matter.132 The chilling effect of the high fines is doubtless
magnified by the Commission's use of its forfeiture decisions as occasions
for reminding broadcasters in dicta of the agency's power to revoke licenses
for failure to comply with its rules. 33

131.

See, e.g., Clear Channel WPLA Notice, 19 FCC Rcd. at 1815 (separate statement of

Chairman Michael K. Powell) ("[T]hese increased enforcement actions will allow the
Commission to turn what is now a 'cost of doing business' into a significant 'cost for doing
indecent business."'); id. at 1816 (separate statement of Comm'r Michael J. Copps,
dissenting); Notice of Apparent Liability for Forfeiture, In re Infinity Holdings Corporation
of Orlando, Licensee of Station WCKG(FM), 18 FCC Red. 19,955, 19,972 (2003)
[hereinafter Infinity WCKG Notice] (separate statement of Comm'r Michael J. Copps,
dissenting).

132. See, e.g., Jim Puzzanghera, Lawmaker Sees Both Sides of Broadcast Legislation; Rep. Greg
Walden Has a Unique Perspective in Congress as Owner ofFive Small Radio Stations, L.A. TIMES, July
5, 2006, at C. 1; Deborah Potter, Indecent Oversight, AM.JOURN. REV., Aug.-Sept. 2004, at 80.
133. See, e.g., Infinity WCKG Notice, 18 FCC Rcd. at 19,965 19 ("We reiterate our recent
statement that additional serious violations by Infinity may well lead to a license revocation
proceeding.") (internal quotation marks omitted), rescinded on othergrounds sub nom. Order, In
re Viacom Inc., 19 FCC Red. 23,100 (2004) [hereinafter Vacom Order]; see also Clear Channel
WPIA Notice, 19 FCC Red. at 1816 (separate statement of Comm'r Michael J. Copps,
dissenting) ("To fulfill our duty under the law, I believe the Commission should have
designated these cases for a hearing on the revocation of these stations' licenses .... ).
While the Commission has not commenced license revocation hearings in the indecency
context, the fact that the possibility of revocation is even mentioned is likely to be noticed by

broadcasters.

Doug Halonen, Feds Change the Rules: FCC Expands the Scope of Indecency

Enforcement to Include Any Profanity, 23 TELEVISION WEEK, Mar. 22, 2004, at 1; Todd Shields,

Common Decency: As Powell's FCC Tries to Find the Middle Ground Between Censorship and First
Amendment Rights, the Media Continue to Push the Envelope, 14 MEDIA WEEK, Feb. 6, 2004, at 18.
Notably, license revocation threats have been made to major networks, even in
circumstances of merely vicarious liability. But see Brigham Daniels, When Agencies Go Nuclear:
A Game Theoretic Approach to the Biggest Sticks in an Agency's Arsenal, 80 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 442,
498 (2012) (observing that the FCC has become "a punching bag" because of its inability to
revoke licenses for indecency regulation).
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2. Settlements
The second notable characteristic of post-2003 indecency regulation is
that it has proceeded in important instances through settlement agreements
requiring broadcasters to pay money to the U.S. Treasury and to engage in
indecency investigation and enforcement. For example, the Commission
settled with Viacom for a "voluntary contribution" of $3,500,000 to the
United States Treasury, 134 with Clear Channel for $1,750,000,135 with
Emmis for $300,000,136 and with Beasley Broadcasting for $85,000.137
These settlements have led to grand corporate policy pronouncements
that are more prohibitive than the FCC's own standards. Clear Channel,
for example, made clear that it was adopting a "zero tolerance" policy with
regard to indecency.' 3 8 Many of the settlements also require very specific
compliance agreements by the broadcasters, even where there are mere
allegations of indecency policy violations rather than administrative
findings.' 39 For example, some provide that the issuance of a Notice of

134. Viacom Order, 19 FCC Rcd. at 23,106 9 (2004) (attaching and incorporating a
Consent Decree between Viacom and the FCC), affd, Order on Reconsideration, In re
Viacom Inc., 21 FCC Rcd. 12,223 (2006). Viacom subsequently paid a fee of $300,000 in
2007 as part of an additional consent decree regarding a claim that it had inadvertently
failed to comply with provisions of the 2004 agreement. See infra note 140.
135. Order, In re Clear Channel Communications, Inc., 19 FCC Rcd. 10,880, 10,883
10 (2004) [hereinafter Clear Channel Order] (attaching consent decree).
136. Order, In re Emmis Communications Corporation (Emmis Order), 19 FCC Rcd.
16,003, 16,007-08 I 11, 13 (2004), affd, Order on Reconsideration, In re Emmis
Communications Corporation, 21 FCC Rcd. 12,219, 12,221-22
7 (2006) [hereinafter
Emmis Order on Reconsideration](rejecting challenges to Emmis consent decree).
137. Order, In re Beasley Broadcast Group, Inc., 23 FCC Rcd. 15,603, 15,610 1 12
(2008) [hereinafter Beasley Order].
138. SeeJohn Eggerton, Clear Channel Vows to Wash Out Dirty Jocks, BROAD. & CABLE (Feb.
25, 2004, 1:30 PM), http://www.broadcastingcable.com/article/92718-Clear._Channel
_Vows_toWashOutDirtyjocks.php. In keeping with that promise, the corporation fired
Howard Stem. See, e.g., Howard Stern's Radio Show Is Suspended by Clear Channel, N.Y. TIMES,
Feb. 26, 2004, available at http://www.nytimes.com/2004/02/26/business/howard-stem-sradio-show-is-suspended-by-clear-channel.html.
Of course, one might characterize such zero-tolerance commitments as a convenient
public relations gambit on the part of the group owner and believe that Clear Channel
would doubtless game the agreement and end-run its compliance obligations if it thought
doing so would be economically desirable. See generally Eric Boeblert, Clear Channel Boss Is
Shocked - Shocked - To Find Indecency!, SALON (Feb. 28, 2004, 12:43 AM),
http://www.salon.com/2004/02/28/clearchannel_3/. Nevertheless, corporate policies of
this kind are likely to have some impact at the operational level.
139. In the Clear Channel consent decree, for example, the company agreed to
implement a company-wide indecency compliance plan including automatic suspension,
remedial training, and significant (up to five-minute) time delays for programs upon the
employees' return. See Clear Channel Order, 19 FCC Rcd. at 10,886; see also Emmis Order, 19
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Apparent Liability (NAL) or other proposed action will trigger investigation
and suspension of personnel by the broadcaster, and termination of
personnel if the Commission ultimately finds a violation of its indecency
rules.140 This obligates the licensees to suspend employees based simply on
allegations of indecency, imposes "remedial training" on that basis, and
sometimes even requires stations to assign a "program monitor" and
impose a time delay when on-air talent accused of indecency on a prior
occasion is permitted to return to live broadcasting.141
Not only are the consent decree compliance provisions an unusual type
of internal control in the media context, but the settlements also suggest
that broadcasters will likely censor themselves beyond what the government
might legally be entitled to regulate.142 The fact that consent decrees
FCC Rcd. at 16,007 10; John Eggerton, FCC Upholds Viacom Indecency Settlement, BROAD. &
CABLE (Oct. 17, 2006, 10:06 AM), http://www.broadcastingcable.com/article/106188FCCUpholdsViacom IndecencySettlement.php (noting Viacom's agreement to the
same conditions).
140. See Viacom Order, 19 FCC Red. at 23,106 8(f).
141. Clear Channel Order, 19 FCC Rcd. at 10,883 I 8-9; Beasley Order, 23 FCC Rcd. at
15,608-09 T 10. Licensees might also adopt guidelines requiring indemnification from onair personnel for violations of FCC rules-a development that might lead to more selfcensorship than might be expected from a large institution. Performance bonds imposed by
networks are also not out of the realm of possibility. Cf Clay Calvert, Past Bad Speakers,
PerformanceBonds & Unfree Speech: Lawfully Incentivizing "Good" Speech or Unlawfully Intrudingon the
First Amendment?, 3 HARv. J. SPORTS & ENT. L. 245, 250 (2012) (questioning the
constitutionality of government-imposed "performance bonds on past bad speakers as
conditions precedent for future [speech]"). The National Religious Broadcasters' brief in
Fox quotes from a broadcast guideline by Dow Lohnes, available online at the University of
California, reminding broadcasters to "notify on-air talent, personalities, and guests that
reimbursement of FCC fines and attorneys fees, as well as termination, may result from
talent's utterance or depiction of obscene, indecent, or profane material during a broadcast."
Obsceniy, Indecency, and Profanity: Guidelines for Broadcasters, Dow LOHNES (June 2006),
https://secure.ucop.edu/irc/services/documents/guideines.pdf. There are reports of onair talent taking out "indecency insurance." Sidak & Singer, supra note 25, at 718; see Maria
Matasar-Padilla, Music Lessons: What Adam Lambert Can Teach Us About Media Self-Regulation, 29
CARDOZO ARTS & ENT. LJ. 113, 136 (2011) (reporting ABC's establishment of "a system
by which [it] would create negative financial repercussions for performers who engaged in
unexpectedly indecent or obscene behavior during a live broadcast").
142. See, e.g., Editorial, Pay for Play, BROAD. & CABLE (Nov. 28, 2004, 7:00 PM),
http://www.broadcastingcable.com/article/CA483385.html; The Silent Media Committed to
the First Amendment,
BROAD.
& CABLE (Apr.
11,
2004,
8:00
PM),
http://www.broadcastingcable.com/article/CA409709.html?; see also FAIRMAN, supra note
20; Botein & Adamski, supra note 128, at 24-30.
Admittedly, the settlements also constrain FCC indecency enforcement in ways to
which some Commissioners have objected. For example, the settlements prohibit the
Commission from considering the settled indecency charges at renewal or in the context of
license transfers. See, e.g., Emmis Order on Reconsideration, 21 FCC Rcd. 12,219, 12,220 (2006)
(explaining that "the Commission also agreed not to use the facts of the Consent Decree, the
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sometimes require the licensee to file periodic compliance reports with the
FCC reflecting both consultations with counsel and officer certification
increases the likelihood that this would be the case. 143 Indeed, there are
indications that the Commission would support industry-wide censorship
efforts through the "voluntary" consent decree process.144 Moreover, to the
extent that the Commission enters into these agreements with vertically
integrated companies having ownership interests across the breadth of
today's media landscape, it may well be that the compliance obligations will
have at least indirect impacts on business units that would not otherwise be
subject to the content regulations of the FCC.145
Another significant aspect of the settlement process is that it avoids
judicial assessment of the Commission's indecency approach (while publicly
serving as a lesson for other broadcasters).1 46 In addition to avoiding
forfeiture orders, the pending inquiries or complaints, 'or any similar complaints' regarding
programming aired before the Consent Decree's effective date for any purpose relating to
Emmis or its stations, and to treat all such matters as null and void"). Commissioner
Michael Copps responded to these provisions by arguing that recidivist broadcasters be
challenged at license renewal. See, e.g., Emmis Order on Reconsideration, 19 FCC Rcd. at 16,011
(concurring statement of Comm'r MichaelJ. Copps).
Moreover, the extent to which the settlement agreements in fact deter broadcasters
cannot be fully established. Indecency watchdogs complained of the inadequacy of consent
decrees by arguing that CBS had violated its 2004 consent decree with the Commission by
airing a sexually laden episode of "Without a Trace." Rather than denying license renewal
for the CBS stations at issue, the Commission entered another settlement agreement with
the network. See infra note 147.
143. See, e.g., Beasley Order, 23 FCC Rcd. at 15,609 11 ("Beasley will file compliance
reports with the Commission ninety days after the Effective Date, twelve months after the
Effective Date, twenty-four months after the Effective Date and thirty-six months after the
Effective Date. Each compliance report shall include a compliance certificate from an
officer, as an agent of Beasley, stating that the officer has personal knowledge that Beasley
has consulted with counsel to ensure compliance with this Consent Decree, together with an
accompanying statement explaining the basis for the officer's compliance certification.").
These kinds of officer certification requirements--reminiscent of the corporate law context's
Sarbanes-Oxley Act-are far beyond the kind of accountability requirements previously
imposed on electronic media in connection with program content.
144. In fact, the 2008 consent decree entered into by Beasley Broadcast Group provides
that the licensee agree to "fully participate [subject to antitrust laws] with representatives of
the broadcast, cable, and satellite industries in any efforts that may emerge to develop a
voluntary industry-wide response to programming violative of the Indecency Rules." Id. at
15,609 10(d).
145. Indeed, the Commission has also imposed indecency-promoting "voluntary"
conditions as part of merger reviews in the satellite context. See, e.g., Elizabeth A. Pike,
Article, Indecency, A La Carte, and the FCC'sApproval of the Sirius XM Satellite Radio Merger: How the
FCC Indirectly Regulated Indecent Content on Satellite Radio at the Expense of the "Public Interest," 18 U.
MIAMI Bus. L. REv. 221, 223-24, 254 (2010).
146. Some have claimed that the FCC pressures licensees to forbear from seeking
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judicial review, the FCC's settlement process can enhance its enforcement
capacity by reducing its burden since establishing a violation of a consent
decree may be easier than establishing a violation of its underlying
substantive regulations. 4 7

B. ProceduralChanges
Procedural changes to the indecency regime-changed prima facie case
increased
requirements,
revised
complaint-counting
methods,
administrative delay, and reduced delegation of authority to the
Commission staff-have reduced the transaction costs formerly associated
with lodging indecency complaints and increased the likelihood of
broadcaster liability.

judicial review of indecency actions. Brown & Candeub, supra note 32, at 1463-64 n.5.
Appeals to the courts have also been forestalled by delays in the resolution of reconsideration
orders. Id. at n.5; see Brief for Amici Curiae Nat'l Ass'n of Broadcasters et al. at 2, Fox II,
132 S. Ct. 2307 (2012) (No. 10-1293), 2011 WL 5544814 ("[T]he Commission's procedural
maneuvering appears designed to ensure that its most vulnerable orders never leave the
Commission and thus can never be reviewed by a court."). Moreover, as Botein and
Adamski point out, broadcasters may be more willing to settle "when the target cannot
secure a full evidentiary hearing without refusing to pay and inviting a lawsuit." Botein &
Adamski, supra note 128, at 27. And the pressure to settle may be even greater than that
because of the lengthy delays associated with the FCC's decisionmaking in indecency cases.
See infra note 154 and accompanying text.
147. The consent decree may eliminate the need for the FCC to establish certain
elements that would be required in an independent enforcement action and can even create
entirely new bases for liability. CBS learned this lesson when license renewals for some of its
Utah stations were objected to on the ground that it had violated then-parent Viacom's
2004 Consent Decree by not suspending all employees involved in the decision to air an
episode of "Without a Trace" as to which the Commission issued a Notice of Apparent
Liability (NAL). SeeJohn Eggerton, CBS Defends Inaction on Without a Trace, BROAD. & CABLE
(Oct. 22, 2007, 10:22 AM), http://www.broadcastingcable.com/article/ 10875-CBS
Ultimately, CBS resolved the matter by
DefendsInaction-onWithout_aTrace.php.
making a contribution of $300,000 to the government and entering into another Consent
Decree with the FCC, having acknowledged for purposes of this latest consent decree "that
it inadvertently failed to comply with the remedial steps specified in Section TV, Paragraph
8, Subsection (f) of the 2004 Consent Decree as contemplated by the Commission following
issuance of the Without A Trace NAL" and assured the agency that it "understands the
2004 Consent Decree's terms, and has taken steps to ensure that additional such oversights
do not recur in the future." Order, In re CBS Corporation, 22 FCC Rcd. 20,035, 20,040 1
11 (2007). This is despite the fact that CBS originally claimed that it had not thought the
2004 Consent Decree applied to non-live, scripted programming, that it believed the
program should not be considered indecent, and that the program at issue was a network
show whose airing would be a matter for decision at the highest station levels.
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1. Making Out a Prima Facie Case
The FCC's procedural changes to the indecency regime included
revisions to the complaint process that greatly ease the complainants'
burdens and shift costs to broadcasters.
For example, because
complainants no longer have to provide a tape or transcript of the
offending program in order to make out a prima facie case, 148 broadcasters
are in the position of having to provide evidence disproving the
complainants' factual claims.
But as a result of the recordkeeping
deregulation of the Fowler Commission in the 1980s, most broadcasters no
longer maintain full-fledged records of their aired programming.149 The
complaint procedure and changes in evidentiary rules also make it easy for
advocacy groups such as the PTC to make claims under § 1464.150 The
changed reality is that more broadcasters face more occasions to respond to
more FCC indecency inquiries, and it costs them more to do so.
Another element that adds to broadcasters' procedural burdens is the

148.

Previously, the burden was on the complainant to provide the Commission with full

or partial tapes of offending programs, the date and time of the broadcasts, and the call signs

of the stations involved. 2001 Policy Statement, 16 FCC Red. 7999, 8015

1 24 (2001)

(explaining that "given the sensitive nature of these cases and the critical role of context in
an indecency determination, it is important that the Commission be afforded as full a record
as possible to evaluate allegations of indecent programming."). Since 2003, however, the
agency has proceeded on a number of indecency complaints despite the complainants'
inability to provide such tapes or transcripts. See, e.g., Memorandum Opinion and Order, In
re Entercom Portland License, LLC, Licensee of Station KNRK(FM), Camas, Washington,
18 FCC Red. 25,484, 25,487 n.21 (2003). It has characterized its previous transcript-ortape requirement as a "practice" that is waivable in appropriate circumstances.

Memorandum Opinion and Order, In re Infinity Broadcasting Corporation of Los Angeles,
Licensee of Station KROQ-FM, Pasadena, California, 16 FCC Rcd. 6867, 6870 (2001).
Ironically, this procedural shift had occurred at the very moment that the process of
complaining to the FCC about indecency had been effectively taken over by groups such as
the PTC, an organization that has the resources to monitor, tape, and transcribe the

programming it deems indecent. For a very thoughtful account of the procedural,
evidentiary, and defense issues in FCC indecency enforcement, see Botein & Adamski, supra
note 128, at 24-30.
149. See, e.g., Memorandum Opinion and Order, In re Deregulation of Radio, 104
F.C.C.2d 505, 506 (1986); Memorandum Opinion and Order, In re Revision of
Programming and Commercialization Policies, Ascertainment Requirements, and Program
Log Requirements for Commercial Television Stations, 104 F.C.C.2d 358 (1986); see also
Botein & Adamski, supra note 128, at 24-26.

150.

Some empirical studies indicate that most of the complaints have been computer-

generated e-mails by members of that organization. See, e.g., Thierer, supra note 67, at 460,

464. But see Calvert & Richards, supra note 18, at 326, 328 (claiming that only less than half
of the half-million complaints about the Janet Jackson Super Bowl incident came through
the PTC and that only 80 percent of the complaints were attributable to "other family
groups").
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extent of delay that has historically accompanied indecency cases-even
before the unprecedented number of cases pending today.15s Delay has
various problematic consequences-ranging from fading recollections to
personnel changes to document purges that make it difficult for
broadcasters to respond to Commission indecency inquiries. Thus, in
combination, changes in the complaint process, FCC delay, and spotty
licensee recordkeeping can effectively shift the burden of addressing § 1464
violations from complainants to licensees.
2. Changes in the Method of Counting Complaints
Another notable procedural shift concerns the Commission's process for
counting complaints. This is important because of the role that the largeand purportedly increasing-number of complaints has played in the
Commission's articulated justification for increasing its attention to
indecency.' 52
The Commission, without fanfare, apparently changed its method of
counting complaints after the Janet Jackson "wardrobe reveal" incidentshifting from its previous practice of counting form complaints as a single
complaint, to a practice of individually counting each complaint or e-

151. See supra note 20 (reporting 500,000 pending complaints, down from 1.5 million).
Delay has been a consistent characteristic in FCC indecency enforcement since the 1980s.
Action for Children's Television v. FCC (ACTI), 59 F.3d 1249, 1254-56 (D.C. Cir. 1995);
Memorandum Opinion and Order, In re Infinity Radio License, Inc., 19 FCC Rcd. 5022,
5030 (2004) (dissenting statement of Comm'r Michael J. Copps) (describing a four-and-ahalf-year delay in resolving indecency claims about a live rap/hip-hop music event "The
Last Damn Show"); Notice of Apparent Liability for Forfeiture, In re Young Broadcasting of
San Francisco, Inc., Licensee, Station KRON-TV, San Francisco, California, 19 FCC Rcd.
1751, 1765 (2004) (separate statement of Comm'r MichaelJ. Copps) (reprimanding delays in
resolving indecency claims about news report on "Puppetry of the Penis"). In one striking
example, the Commission was advised that the statute of limitations had run after it had
finally voted to impose a forfeiture for airing indecency. Notice of Apparent Liability for
Forfeiture, AMFM Radio Licenses, L.L.C., Licensee of Station WITH(FM), Washington,
D.C., 19 FCC Rcd. 10,751 (2004) (reversing the NAL due to running of statute of
limitations in case involving discussions, inter alia, of penile-enlargement devices); see also
Order, In re Edmund Dinis, Former Licensee of Station WJFD-FM, New Bedford,
Massachusetts, 19 FCC Rcd. 1907 (2004). The appeals process is also lengthy. See John
Eggerton, Facing Indecency Fines? Give Cngler a Call, BROAD. & CABLE (Feb. 16, 2004) (noting
that the rescission of a fine for indecency against KBOO-FM Portland, Oregon, for airing
the SarahJones rap song "Your Revolution" took two years).
1 (2006) (describing "increasing
152. See, e.g., Omnibus Order, 21 FCC Rcd. at 2665
public unease" demonstrated by the rise in complaints "from fewer than 50 in 2000 to
approximately 1.4 million in 2004"). See also Fairman,supra note 123, at 76-77 ("Reliance
on the complaints filed by the PTC is a perfect example of the way procedure perpetuates
word taboo and institutionalizes it.").
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mail.153 It then used the total number of complaints to justify a shift in
regulatory regime.154 It did not, however, attempt to make its new process
rigorous and reliable.155 It also failed to address the questions about, inter
alia, selection bias arising from the increasing use, by interest groups such as
PTC, of electronic complaints available on the groups' websites.
3. Reduction ofDelegatedAuthority
Historically, the Commission itself only became involved in indecency at
the policy level. On a day-to-day basis, the process lay in the hands of the

153. See, e.g, Botein & Adamski, supra note 128, at 17-18; Hunt, supra note 109, at 23233; Thierer, supra note 67.
154. One might wonder to what extent the shift in how the agency counts complaints
would have real policy impacts. Is it really persuasive to think that the change in complaintcounting methods would influence the FCC's policy decisions? If the Commission really was
influenced by the number of complaints, then the shift in how they are counted
demonstrates both the manipulability of this factor and how troubling it is to think that the
agency regulated without regard to the skew in the representativeness of the data. (As
previously noted, there is a tension between the Commission's claim to use a national
standard for patent-offensiveness determinations and the agency's reliance on a purported
increase in actual public complaints as the justification for regulating. Levi, FIRST REPORTS,
supra note 16.) Even those skeptical about the actual influence of the number of public
complaints on the FCC's indecency approach would admit that its new counting regime
enabled the FCC to cloak regulatory assertiveness as mere responsiveness to public clamor
for regulation.
In relying on public complaints, the FCC may have been anticipating judicial review
and thinking of ways to support an argument for judicial deference. The Commission may
also arguably have sought political advantage by appearing to regulate at the public's behest
rather than on their own initiative. It is true that the FCC did not need to gain credibility
with Congress on this point because Congress had shown itself to be in favor of vigorous
enforcement since the 1980s, but appearing to regulate in response to public outcry might
deflect criticism from those members of Congress who did not affirmatively support the
FCC's new regime. In addition, the FCC could well conclude that an appearance of
responsive regulation in the indecency context would stand the agency in good stead in the
other contexts in which it had been subject to congressional inquiry and criticism in the past
decade. Similarly, while one might question whether the Commission had reason to curry
favor with the public in general, good "PR" with the public might both induce constituents
to support the agency in Congress, and reduce the inefficiencies associated with interest
group pressure. Ultimately, the Commission's strategic employment of complaint data to
justify regulation is troubling whether it was designed to deflect judicial scrutiny or for
political advantage with Congress and the public.
155. For example, it did not ensure that the same person's electronic complaint would
not be counted multiple times if it were sent to different recipients and different offices at the
agency. See, e.g., Levi, FIRST REPORTS, supra note 16; Thierer, supra note 67; see also Brief for
Former FCC Officials, supra note 4, at 34-35 (explaining artificiality of the complaint
process, duplication of complaints in reports, and "misleading" character of Commission's
reliance on growth in the number ofpublic complaints).
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Media Bureau, the Enforcement Bureau, and the Office of the General
Counsel. In the past, both Commission and staff decisions had been used
interchangeably as precedent in attempting to provide guidance on the
agency's application of indecency standards.' 56 After the Commission
reversed the decision of the Chief of the Enforcement Bureau in the Bono
case, however, it also made clear that indecency decisions with precedential
effect would thenceforth issue only from the Commission itself rather than
its staff. 157
This structural change can have numerous substantive consequences.
For one, it is likely to increase delay. Moreover, since the Commission has
not explicitly asserted that it will reverse all prior staff indecency decisions,
it has effectively created an orphan staff indecency jurisprudence that will
predictably increase uncertainty.15 8 The prospects of delay and uncertainty
might increase broadcasters' amenability to settlements and consent
agreements with the Commission.
In addition, query whether such a structural change is more likely to
increase the role of politics in the process and therefore lead to increasingly
The concern is that
stringent application of the indecency regime.
Commission-level indecency adjudications might be particularly susceptible
to attention and pressure by members of Congress.159
Of course,
156. See Botein & Adamski, supra note 128, at 30. See generally 2001 Policy Statement, 16
FCC Rcd. 7999 (2001).
157. The Commission had previously permitted broadcasters to rely on FCC staff
precedents in defending against indecency notices of inquiry (NOls). See Botein & Adamski,
supra note 128, at 30. By reminding broadcasters that staff opinions were not binding, the
Commission effectively reversed that practice. See, e.g., Omnibus Remand Order, 21 FCC Rcd.
21, 23; Brief for FCC et al. at 39-40, Fox Television Stations, Inc. v.
13,299, 13,307-08
FCC, 489 F.3d 444 (2d Cir. 2007) (No. 06-1760) [hereinafter FCC Second Circuit Brief],
available at http://hraunfoss.fcc.gov/edocs.public/attachmatch/DOC-268846Al.pdf; see
also Editorial, Good Directions, BROAD. & CABLE (Oct. 8, 2005), http://www.broadcastingcable.com/article/CA6266853.html.
158. See FCC Second Circuit Brief, supra note 157, at 27 (characterizing the networks as
requesting reversal of the Omnibus Remand Order "on the basis of other issues-presented in
other cases-that the Commission has not finally resolved").
As happened with the Bono case, the Enforcement Bureau's indecency decisions
might also be more likely to be reversed by the full Commission if they exculpate the
broadcaster.
Arguably, the Bono case can be explained as an artifact of a time when the
Commission had not yet clearly defined how aggressive its enforcement policy was going to
be, and the Enforcement Bureau did not have clear guidance on the matter. Even though
the agency's stance on fleeting expletives is now clear, however, much room for vaiance is
still left with respect to application of other aspects of the policy. This suggests that the
uncertainty that generated the Bono case is likely to be replicated.
159. It has been said that the Enforcement Bureau Chief's decision in the Bono case was
reversed by the Commission as a result of political pressure on the Commissioners from
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controversial cases were probably vetted by Bureau chiefs or reviewed by
the Chairman's office prior to the issuance of staff decisions even before the
shift in the Commission's position on delegation, so the precise extent to
which staff decisions could be insulated from political factors is an open
question. While this is true, logic suggests that at least with regard to some
cases, members of Congress could put pressure more directly and efficiently
on the Commissioners themselves than on the FCC's civil servant staff.
More significantly, one might wonder whether it is in fact more
normatively desirable to repose decisional authority in unaccountable
administrative functionaries as opposed to Commissioners who are visible,
identified, and subject to politics-tempering judicial review. One's ultimate
view on this issue likely depends both on one's views of democratic
legitimacy and on the extent to which judicial review would in fact be likely
to cleanse improper political influence.
One's view might also be
influenced by the actual transparency of staff processes.
C.

Changes in Substantive Standards

These procedural shifts discussed in Section II.B were accompanied by
substantive changes to the FCC's indecency regime (in addition to the
changed treatment of fleeting expletives that triggered the Fox litigation).
For a short-lived moment, the Commission began to find broadcasters
liable for airing not only indecent but also profane programming, with the
term "profane" defined to include far more than blasphemous
expression.160 More lastingly, the Commission reversed its asserted practice
It began to rely on
of treating context as an exculpatory factor.
broadcasters' own programming standards as justifying liability. It changed
its approach to news, suggesting a more skeptical attitude toward
journalistic judgment and the exculpatory value of merit. It effectively
developed a "negligent indecency" approach, whereby failure to use
technological methods of preventing fleeting expletives, for example, could
trigger liability. It did not weigh in the broadcasters' favor that the
Congress. See, e.g., Corn-Revere, supra note 42. Cf Fairman, supra note 123, at 77-78
("Concentration of decision-making power in a handful of partisan appointees, chiefly the
Chairman, who can exert excessive influence in the regulatory process affects word
taboo. . . . Conflict between the FCC Commissioners and agency staff is at the center of the
destabilizing shifts in indecency enforcement.").
160. The Bush-era FCC revived profanity as a separate and independent basis for a
finding of indecency under § 1464, defining it very broadly. See Fox Television Stations, Inc.
v. FCC, 489 F.3d 444, 452-66 (2d Cir. 2007); see also FAIRMAN, supra note 20, at 125-26;
Candeub, supra note 39, at 924. By the time the Fox case had returned to the Supreme
Court, however, the agency appeared to have retired profanity as an independent category
for indecency violations.
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challenged programming was presented live and the indecency was
unscripted, unexpected, or accidental.
It floated the possibility of
respondeat superior liability despite the speech context, the mens rea
requirement of § 1464 (as a criminal statute), and broadcaster attempts to
warn performers of the need for indecency compliance. It applied its
patent-offensiveness inquiry in a manner that would inevitably lead to
administrative assessments of aesthetic necessity.
1.

The Transfornationof "Context"

The FCC's reliance on context analysis in indecency cases has often
Now, the
been criticized as inconsistent, subjective, and arbitrary.161
Commission has revised its approach to context in a way that turns the
inquiry on its head, effectively making context a one-way ratchet. Prior to
2003, the Commission looked at the context of a sexual expression as a
mitigating, exculpatory factor. Now, by contrast, and without admitting
any shift, the agency looks at program context in order to reinforce indecency
findings-thereby turning the analysis of the expressive context of
indecency into a sword rather than a shield. Something that might not be
considered indecent on its own will now be interpreted as indecent if it is
surrounded by other sexualized (albeit not indecent) material.162 At the

161. For arguments criticizing the subjectivity of both the pre- and post-2003 context
analysis, see, for example, Brief for Former FCC Officials, supra note 4, at 15-16 (arguing
that "pointing to 'context' is not an explanation in itself" and that "with such subjective
censorship, the FCC becomes the national nanny of who gets an artistic pass and who does
not").
162. On radio, for example, the Commission found significant that the "Opie &
Anthony" program often ran sexual contests for listeners. Infinity WCKG Notice, 18 FCC
Rcd. 19,955, 19,962 14 (2003); see also Bill McConnell, Next 7ime, rour License, BROAD. &
In the
CABLE (Oct. 6, 2003), http://www.broadcastingcable.com/article/CA327538.html.
television context, the Commission focused on the risqu6 character of the choreography of
the entire Super Bowl halftime show (even though it contained no nudity) and saw Janet
Jackson's "costume reveal" as simply the patently offensive culmination of a highly
sexualized performance of the song "Rock Your Body." The agency explained that "in
cases involving televised nudity, the contextual analysis necessarily involves an assessment of
the entire segment or program, and not just the particular scene in which the nudity occurs.
Accordingly, in this case, our contextual analysis considers the entire halftime show, not just
the final segment during which Jackson's breast is uncovered." Super Bowl Show, 21 FCC
Rcd. 2760, 2765 10 (2006); see also Super Bowl Show on Reconsideration, 21 FCC Rcd. 6653,
6658 13 (2006). As the Commission explained: "The offensive segment in question did not
merely show a fleeting glimpse of a woman's breast, as CBS presents it. Rather, it showed a
man tearing off a portion of a woman's clothing to reveal her naked breast during a highly
sexualized performance and while he sang 'gonna have you naked by the end of this song.'
From the viewer's standpoint, this nudity hardly seems 'accidental,' nor was it. This
broadcast thus presents a much different case than would, for example, a broadcast in which
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same time, the non-risqu6 character of surrounding programming is not
necessarily used to mitigate the finding of indecency.1 63
The FCC's expansion of its context analysis to include inferences from
programming contexts beyond the expression at issue is a problem because
of the agency's refusal to recognize that what it considers as part of the
inferential context and what it does not is itself a substantive-and
potentially contestable-decision. Which contextual factors are considered
and which are not will often be outcome-determinative, but that
determination is not self-evident.
Moreover, the Commission has expanded its prior notion of context to
include not only the expressive context of the speech complained of but also
the nature of the program's format and asserted viewer expectations." 4
This expanded view of context allows the Commission to assert its own
views of audience expectations.

2. A ChangedApproach to News and Merit in Programming
Although the Commission has declared it "imperative [to] proceed with
the utmost restraint when it comes to news programming"16 5 because such
expression is central to the First Amendment's free speech and press
guarantees, the Commission's post-2003 decisions reveal an attitudinal shift
that is likely to permit more intervention. First, despite tipping its hat to the
First Amendment status of news, the Commission in the same breath
explicitly asserts that "there is no outright news exemption from our
indecency rules." 66 This is despite the general belief, based on prior news
cases, that the Commission would apply an implicit news exemption in

a woman's dress strap breaks, accidentally revealing her breast for a fraction of a second."
Super Bowl Show, 21 FCC Red. at 2767 T 13.
163. As ABC argued in its response to the government's petition for certiorari in Fox II,
for example, the FCC's contextual analysis failed to consider the brief scene of nudity in
NYPD Blue in the broader context of the program-the "larger story arc." Brief in Opp'n
for ABC, Inc. et al. at 11, FCC v. Fox Television Stations, Inc., 131 S. Ct. 3065 (2011) (No.
10-1293), 2011 WL 2066574. By contrast, the agency looked at the overall "highly
sexualized performance" of the Super Bowl halftime show to find patently offensive the
momentary revelation ofJanet Jackson's breast. Super Bowl Show on Reconsideration, 21 FCC
Red. at 6658 13.
164. In the Super Bowl forfeiture order, for example, the agency rested its finding that
theJackson halftime show was patently offensive by focusing on audience expectations about
the type of programming at issue: "Clearly, the nudity in this context was pandering,
titillating and shocking to the viewing audience, particularly during a prime time broadcast
of a sporting event that was marketed as family entertainment and contained no warning
that it would include nudity." Super Bowl Show, 21 FCC Rcd. at 2766-67 T 13.
165. OrnnibusRemand Order, 21 FCC Red. 13,299, 13,327 71 (2006).
166. Id.
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assessing indecency.1 67
Moreover, despite its claims of relying on broadcasters' news
judgments,168 the Commission appears now to permit inquiry in indecency
cases into whether or not a program is a bona fide news program.169 It also
appears implicitly to permit consideration of a news program's merit-to
distinguish between coverage of "real" news and puff stories, and between
sexual expression that is or is not incidental to a news story.170 FCC
assessments of news status are likely to increase with the increasing overlap
between news and entertainment in today's media landscape.
Beyond news, the Commission's approach to the role of merit in
indecency assessments appears to be changing.
The agency's own
assessments about the necessity of sexual elements in programming now
appear to outweigh the overall assessment of the merit or value of the work
as a whole, even though people's perceptions of the patent offensiveness of
specific elements in a work might be outweighed by their views of its overall
value. The Commission also focuses more on the intent to shock than on
167. This assumption was grounded on cases such as Peter Branton, in which a radio
station broadcast a wiretap tape of an expletive-laden telephone conversation by mobster
John Gotti. See Letter to Peter Branton, 6 FCC Rcd. 610, 610 (1991); see also Omnibus Remand
Order, 21 FCC Rcd. at 13,327 70 n.213 (citing Memorandum Opinion and Order, In re
Infinity Broadcasting Corporation of Pennsylvania, 3 FCC Rcd. 930, 937 n.31, vacated on

other grounds sub nom. ACT I, 852 F.2d 1332 (D.C. Cir. 1988) [hereinafter Infinity Order A])
(remarking that "context will always be critical to an indecency determination and ... the
context of a bona fide news program will obviously be different from the contexts of the
three broadcasts now before us, and, therefore, would probably be of less concern"); 2001
9 (stating that "explicit language in the
Policy Statement, 16 FCC Rcd. 7999, 8002-03
context of a bonafide newscast might not be patently offensive").
168. For example, the FCC's reference to CBS's "plausible characterization" of an
interview of a "Survivor" contestant on "The Early Show" as a bona fide news interview
suggests reliance on broadcasters' assessments of their own programming. Omnibus Remand
Order, 21 FCC Rcd. at 13,328 72 (discussing complaint about contestant's use of the word
"bullshitter" in the interview).

169. See, e.g., Memorandum Opinion and Order, In re Entercom Seattle License, LLC,
Licensee of Station KNDD(FM), Seattle, Washington, 19 FCC Rcd. 9069, 9074-75

1

15

(2004); Forfeiture Order, In re Entercom Seattle License, LLC, Licensee of Station
KNDD(FM), Seattle, Washington, 17 FCC Rcd. 18,347, 18,349-50 TT 9-10 (2002); Levi,
FIRST REPORTS, supra note 16, at 26 n.142.
170. In roung, the Commission imposed an indecency fine over the momentary view of a
penis on a morning news program featuring an interview with members of an acting troupe
putting on "Puppetry of the Penis." Notice of Apparent Liability for Forfeiture, In re Young
Broadcasting of San Francisco, Inc., Licensee, Station KRON-TV, San Francisco,

California, 19 FCC Rcd. 1751, 1751-52 (2004). The Commission did not accept the
broadcaster's argument for news program immunity. In its Omnibus Order, the Commission

distinguished the Young result from news footage showing the exposed penis of a flood victim
on the ground that the puppetry "display was not incidental to the coverage of a news
event.. . ." Omnibus Order, 21 FCC Rcd. at 2717 1218.
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the merit or value of the work. By contrast, even though the Commission
never purported to assess merit on the basis of critical acclaim or the work's
market acceptance, the agency in the past gave exculpatory credit for works
of merit.
3.

The Development of 'Weglgent" Indecency

There are also signs that the Commission has turned the mens rea
requirement of a criminal statute into a mere negligence requirement for
purposes of administrative liability by implicitly adopting a theory of
The agency now
indecency liability based on "negligent indecency."'
appears to see "willfulness" as established by broadcasters' failure to guard
fully against unanticipated indecency.172
Under the new regime, broadcasters cannot excuse indecency simply on
the ground that their programming was aired live 73 because broadcasters
could theoretically eliminate indecency even in live programming-with
the use of time-delay systems and by taking appropriate steps to prevent
foreseeable indecent activity or utterances in live programming.1 74 The
171. Botein & Adamski, supra note 128, at 21 (coining the phrase).
172. The FCC had taken the position in its original forfeiture order in the CBS Super
Bowl case that CBS willfully breached § 1464 because it "consciously and deliberately
broadcast the halftime show, whether or not it intended to broadcast nudity"; "consciously
and deliberately failed to take reasonable precautions to ensure that no actionably indecent
material was broadcast"; and was vicariously liable under principles of respondeat superior
for the willful actions of its agents, Justin Timberlake andJanetJackson. Super Bowl Show, 21
FCC Rcd. 2760, 2768 15 (2006); see also CBS Corp. v. FCC, 535 F.3d 167, 173 (3d Cir.
2008). On reconsideration, the FCC's Reconsideration Order revised the Commission's
approach for determining CBS's liability under the willfulness standard. See CBS Corp., 535
F.3d at 173-74 (citations omitted) ("The Commission reiterated its application of vicarious
liability in the form of respondeatsuperior and its determination that CBS was directly liable for
failing to take adequate measures to prevent the broadcast of indecent material.... But it
abandoned its position that CBS acted willfully under 47 U.S.C. § 503(b)(1) by intentionally
broadcasting the Halftime Show irrespective of its intent to broadcast the particular content
included in the show. Instead, it determined CBS could be liable 'given the nondelegable
nature of broadcast licensees' responsibility for their programming.'. . . The Commission
has since elaborated on this aspect of the Reconsideration Order, explaining it as a separate
theory of liability whereby CBS can be held vicariously liable even for the acts of its
independent contractors because it holds non-delegable duties as a broadcast licensee to
operate in the public interest and to avoid broadcasting indecent material.").
173. Memorandum Opinion and Order, In re Complaints Against Various Broadcast
Licensees Regarding Their Airing of the "Golden Globe Awards" Program, 19 FCC Rcd.
34-38.
4975, 4980T 11 (2004); Omnibus Remand Order, 21 FCC Rcd. at 13,312-14
174. Thus, for example, the Commission stated that the networks could have foreseen
indecent activity on air in the Nicole Richie case, Omnibus Remand Order, 21 FCC Rcd. at
13,312 33, and the Super Bowl case, Super Bowl Show on Reconsideration,21 FCC Rcd. 6653,
6660-61 (2006).
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Commission has also been imposing liability for indecency on a respondeat
supenor or vicarious liability theory, despite the lack of direct fault on the
part of broadcasters and their asserted attempts to assure compliance by
program participants.17 5 The Commission has effectively ruled that
warnings to performers by broadcasters would not suffice to meet the
stations' burden, implicitly imposing on broadcasters an obligation to
employ technology to censor programming.17 6 Indeed, a broadcaster's
failure to implement technological blocking mechanisms could count as
evidence of its willfulness in airing actionable indecency.'7 7 Liability could
even be imposed on broadcasters for failing to use time-delay technology
effectively. 7 8
The Commission takes the position that any other rule would invite gross

The Commission will expect technological measures to be used regardless of the news
judgments of the broadcasters regarding the benefits of live, unmediated programming. The
Commission argues, in its Omnibus Remand Order, that awards shows are not in fact typically
aired live for parts of the country in different time zones, and that therefore the requirement
of a time delay would not in fact "place live broadcasts at risk or impose undue burdens on
broadcasters." Omnibus Remand Order, 21 FCC Rcd. at 13,313 36.
For other examples of live programming that might have invited FCC indecency
enforcement, see CBS Broadcasting Inc., Opposition to Notice of Apparent Liability for
Forfeiture at 48-50, In re Complaints Against Various Television Licensees Concerning
Their February 1, 2004, Broadcast of the Super Bowl XXXVIII Halftime Show, File No.
EB-04-IH-00 11 (3d Cir. Nov. 5, 2004) (discussing 2004 Democratic National Convention,
California gubernatorial politics, and presidential scandals).
175. See Super Bowl Show on Reconsideration, 21 FCC Rcd. at 6660 1 17 ("CBS acted
willfully because it consciously and deliberately broadcast the halftime show and consciously
and deliberately failed to take reasonable precautions to ensure that no actionably indecent
material was broadcast."); id. at 6662 23 (respondeat superior theory).
176. CBS provided evidence that it had apprised the halftime show performers about its
policies, including policies regarding indecency. On the Commission's analysis, the only
viable option available to CBS was installing time-delay mechanisms.
177. In the Super Bowl case, for example, the agency weighed in a liability finding that
CBS failed to include a delay mechanism in light of the possibility that indecency might
result during the suggestive choreography of the halftime show. Super Bowl Show, 21 FCC
Rcd. at 2769-2770 19 (footnotes omitted) ("In sum, there was a significant and foreseeable
risk in a halftime show seeking to push the envelope and replete with sexual content that
performers might depart from script and staging, and this is particularly true ofJackson and
Timberlake given the sexually-provocative nature of their performance, the fact that it was
promoted as 'shocking,' and the fact that it culminated with the scripted line 'gonna have
you naked by the end of this song.' . . . [W]e conclude that CBS recognized the high risk
that this broadcast raised of airing indecent material.").
178. For example, the Commission chastised Fox in the final 2003 Billboard Awards
order for using the same time-delay system that had previously proven inadequate to edit
out Cher's expletive in another award ceremony. Omnibus Remand Order, 21 FCC Red. at
13,312-13 M34-35.
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manipulation.179 However, the agency does not engage in a realistic
assessment of the availability and expense of technological solutions. If it is
true that networks spend upwards of $1 million to engage in video tape
delays,180 then the cost of technological compliance creates potentially
insuperable problems for smaller and less profitable stations.' 8 Moreover,
while the technology may exist to bleep out fleeting expletives, it cannot
address the more subtle, contextual assessments of sexual expression that do
The Commission's
not involve identifiable expletives and nudity.
deployment of technology in this context is an ironic reversal of the trend in
First Amendment jurisprudence to rely on technology to provide
alternatives to regulation.

4.

The Broadcast StandardsBootstrap

The negligent indecency development is bookended by the
Commission's transformation of broadcasters' own standards and practices
guidelines into the basis for legal liability.182 The government took the
position in the Fox cases that broadcasters' own programming standards
provide "highly probative evidence" of contemporary community standards
for the broadcast medium.'83 Thus, if program content would constitute a
"dramatic departure" from broadcasters' own editorial norms, then it
should be subject to regulation on that basis alone.
The FCC's conscription of the broadcasters' own programming practices
standards is problematic. The self-incriminatory use of the standards is a

179. Super Bowl Show, 21 FCC Rcd. at 2771 22 ("A contrary result would permit a
broadcast licensee to stage a show that 'pushes the envelope,' send that show out over the air
waves, knowingly taking the risk that performers will engage in offensive unscripted acts or
use offensive unscripted language, and then disavow responsibility-leaving no one legally
responsible for the result."); see also Omnibus Remand Order, 21 FCC Rcd. at 13,309 T 25 ("We
believe that granting an automatic exemption for 'isolated or fleeting' expletives ... would
as a matter of logic permit broadcasters to air expletives at all hours of a day so long as they
did so one at a time.").
180. Botein & Adamski, supra note 128, at 32-34; see also Fox 1, 556 U.S. 502, 558 (2009)
(Breyer, J., dissenting) (citing reports of costs of S 100,000 for installation and operation of
bleeping/delay systems for small stations).
181. Fox I, 556 U.S. at 558-61.
182. See Brief Amici Curiae of The Reporters Comm. for Freedom of the Press et al. at
28-30, Fox II, 132 S. Ct. 2307 (2012) (No. 10-1293), 2011 WL 5544812; see also Botein &
Adamski, supra note 128, at 13 (commenting on broadcast networks' standards and practices
departments).
183. Reply Brief for the Petitioners, Fox II, 132 S. Ct. 2307 (2012) (No. 10-1293), 2011
WL 6046214 [hereinafter Fox II FCC Reply]; see also Brief for the Petitioners at 34-35, Fox
II, 132 S. Ct. 2307 (2012) (No. 10-1293), 2011 WL 3947560 [hereinafter Fox II Government
Brief].
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regulatory bootstrap that is both unfair and counterproductive. The
broadcasters' general standards are at best hortatory and aspirational, and
they are not even used as prohibitive rules by the broadcasters themselves.
Because they are standards rather than rules, they are not often subject to
reevaluation and amendment by the broadcasters. The manner in which
the standards are adopted, and the relationships between the licensees'
business units and their Standards and Practices departments are complex.
Even if initially adopted to propitiate the FCC during more regulatory
times, the standards now purportedly signal what the broadcasters think
might be disliked by their advertisers. As such, their goal and reference
points are different from those of the FCC's indecency regime. (In addition
to the question whether the standards are revised to keep up with the times,
it is also the case that broadcasters recognize that different advertisers have
different degrees of tolerance for edgy programming. Thus, the rules in
practice are inevitably adapted to different advertisers.) Violation of the
standards is not designed to trigger exorbitant punishment. The standards
are also broad and vague, and they therefore cannot do the evidentiary
work the Commission seeks. Even if they explicitly prohibit the use of
expletives on the air, the rest of what they prohibit is far from evident.
Moreover, there is a social interest in having broadcasters operate
according to standards that reflect social norms. The FCC's use of those
standards to justify regulation will increase the likelihood that the
broadcasters will eliminate them.
On the FCC side, there is something institutionally unseemly in allowing
the Commission to avoid a vagueness charge for its standards by justifying
regulation based on the broadcasters' own vague standards.
The
Commission is transforming only the articulated private standards, rather
than the entirety of the private norms and practices, into law. Moreover,
the Commission ordinarily claims that it determines patent offensiveness on
the basis of its own expertise. The agency's claim that the broadcasters'
standards reflect community norms of offensiveness for the first time
suggests that the offensiveness finding on which the Commission will hang
exorbitant fines is not the Commission's own assessment, but the
broadcasters'. But as a matter of practical reality, are not commercial
broadcasters' assessments of offensiveness or acceptability in programming
better reflected in program ratings than in general program standards?
And even though an administrative agency can properly decide that selfregulation is not working and therefore switch back to regulation, it should
not be able to have its cake and eat it too by simultaneously retaining a selfregulatory regime while using its insufficiencies to serve as the basis for
regulation.
In sum, allowing the Commission to rest its indecency regime on
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is both

inappropriate

and

Operation of the Patent Offensiveness Standards

The Commission's approaches to both prongs of the patent offensiveness
finding reflect new emphases, and the government's reliance on an
expansive definition of indecency as "non-conformance with existing
standards of morality" evidences a regulatory shift.
a. Aesthetic Necessity
In applying its contextual analysis, the Commission has chosen a path
that inevitably leads to editorial intrusion and aesthetic judgments despite
the agency's claims of deference to broadcaster editorial judgments. By
definition, the FCC staff members charged with reviewing programs
against which indecency complaints have been lodged have to make
editorially intrusive contextual decisions in the second prong of the
indecency inquiry. That inquiry necessarily involves Commission staff in
expressive decisions and basic editorial functions about what is necessary or
gratuitous in a program. There is no way to separate out this finding from
a substantive theory of what the program fundamentally means and from
whether each element chosen was in fact needed in order to support the
meaning. In many instances, this will mean that the Commission will
incorrectly assume a clear separation between content and form or
substance and style and second-guess fundamental artistic choices.185
184. The government argued in Fox II that the FCC uses broadcasters' own standards
not to establish the legal boundary of what Fox can broadcast, but to provide "highly
probative" evidence of contemporary community standards and undermine Fox's vagueness
claim. Fox II FCC Reply, supra note 183, at 3. But what the broadcasters' standards reflect
is not necessarily the Commission's standards. Broadcasters' standards reflect advertising
standards, which are not necessarily the same. Advertisers, for example, may not wish to be
associated with programming that does not rise to the level of patent offensiveness, which is
the FCC's touchstone for indecency regime violations.
185. See Cohen v. California, 403 U.S. 15, 26 (1971) ("[Mluch linguistic expression
serves a dual communicative function: it conveys not only ideas capable of relatively precise,
detached explication, but otherwise inexpressible emotions as well. In fact, words are often
chosen as much for their emotive as their cognitive force. We cannot sanction the view that
the Constitution, while solicitous of the cognitive content of individual speech, has little or
no regard for that emotive function which, practically speaking, may often be the more
important element of the overall message sought to be communicated.").
One example that shows the editorial nature of the FCC's decisions in this area is the
story of Martin Scorsese's PBS documentary on blues musicians. The Commission found
that the artists' use of expletives throughout the program made the program indecent.
Scorsese said that he thought the language was not only the truthful representation of how
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The artistic necessity test also makes the highly suspect suggestion that
there is a single metric by which gratuitousness is to be assessed. What
might be considered gratuitous by a Walt Disney director is likely to be
considered barely sufficient by the Farrelly Brothers or Quentin Tarantino
or Oliver Stone. In addition, the aesthetic necessity inquiry might in
practice apply disproportionately to certain types of programming.
Aesthetic necessity is a particularly difficult and norm-laden decision to
make whatever the program, but it is inevitably contestable when the
program is humorous or satirical.186 Some scholars have argued that FCC
regulation will unduly leach the emotive character of speech. 187 While that
is an important danger, so is the fact that the new FCC regulation will
censor the fundamental meaning and message of the speech. Moreover, it
is precisely because it is gratuitous and unnecessary that transgressive
speech can succeed in shocking the hearer for substantive, political, artistic,
and social reasons. And the distinction the Commission seeks to make is
also particularly unpersuasive in an artistic climate in which pornography
and the stylistic vocabulary of pornography have become so incorporated
into mainstream artistic presentations. 8 8 Finally, the artistic necessity

the participants spoke but also a necessary part of his documentary. John Eggerton, FCC
'Whitewashing' Blues, Says Scorsese, BROAD. & CABLE (May 8, 2006, 12:40 PM),
http://www.broadcastingcable.com/article/104068FCCWhitewashing.Blues.Says.Scorsese.php; see also Super Bowl Show, 21 FCC Rcd. 2760,
2786 (2006) (statement of Comm'r Jonathan S. Adelstein, concurring) ("It is clear from a
common sense viewing of the program that coarse language is a part of the culture of the
individuals being portrayed. To accurately reflect their viewpoint and emotions about blues
music requires airing of certain material that, if prohibited, would undercut the ability of the
filmmaker to convey the reality of the subject of the documentary."). By contrast, the
Commission did not find the expletives used during the fictional depiction of the D-Day in
Steven Spielberg's movie "Saving Private Ryan" to be indecent. Memorandum Opinion
and Order, In Re Complaints Against Various Television Licensees Regarding Their
Broadcast on Nov. 11, 2004, of the ABC Television Network's Presentation of the Film
"Saving Private Ryan," 20 FCC Rcd. 4507 (2005). Obviously, there are ways in which to
distinguish these cases. However, the important point here is that in assessing whether the
language was necessary or gratuitous with respect to these two works, the Commission was
making a directorial decision. In doing so, it was usurping the role of the editor and
purporting to establish the fundamental meaning of the work.
186. See, e.g., Christine Alice Corcos, Some Thoughts on Chuck Lorre: "Bad Words" and "The
Raging Paranoia of Our Network Censors", 22 REGENT U. L. REV. 369, 380 (2010) (discussing
Two and a HalfMen producer Chuck Lorre's view of his TV shows as critique of CBS and the
FCC regarding indecent words).
187. See, e.g., Hopkins, supra note 20.
188. See, eg., Amy Adler, All Porn All the Time, 31 N.Y.U. REV. L. & Soc. CHANGE 695
(2007); Don Aucoin, The Pornfication ofAmerica, BOsTON GLOBE, Jan. 24, 2006, at Cl ("Not
too long ago, pornography was a furtive profession, its products created and consumed in
the shadows. But it has steadily elbowed its way into the limelight, with an impact that can
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inquiry now indulged in by the FCC is even more intrusive than the
assessment of whether the programming has merit or, as in the obscenity
context, redeeming social value. A program can be deemed to have merit
and social value even though people might disagree as to the artistic
necessity of its sexual components. In sum, these types of judgment calls
about expression are precisely what should be considered off limits for the
government. 8 9
b. Determining Sexual or Excretoy Character
With respect to the determination of whether expression is sexual or
excretory, the FCC's essentialist interpretation is not limited to what it
characterizes as the inherently sexual meaning of expletives like "fuck."
The fact that the FCC has found both breasts and buttocks to satisfy the
category of sexual or excretory references, regardless of whether they are
shown in sexualized or excretory situations, shows that the Commission is
working with contextual definitions of what is sexual or excretory. As for
expletives, there is no context in which such language is uttered as an
expletive in which it could reasonably be said to be about sex. 190 Arguably,
be measured not just by the Internet-fed ubiquity of pornography itself but by the way
aspects of the porn sensibility now inform movies, music videos, fashion, magazines, and
celebrity culture."). See generally PoP-PORN: PORNOGRAPHY INAMERICAN CULTURE (Ann C.
Hall & Mardia J. Bishop eds. 2007) (collecting essays addressing the ubiquity of porn in
American culture today).
189. It might be argued in response that the aesthetic determination by the FCC
functions as an exculpatory inquiry for the broadcaster-after all, if the Commission finds
that the sexual material was necessary, then it will not find a violation of its indecency rules.
This does not respond to the argument in text, however, that whether or not it ultimately
finds the challenged material necessary, the government's inquiry inevitably trenches into
fundamental aspects of constitutionally protected expressive freedom.
Furthermore, questions might be raised as to what standard the Commission could
properly use if the artistic necessity inquiry is foreclosed. What alternate approach can the
Commission retreat to if it must abandon the assessment of gratuitousness? One possibility
is a return to its prior approach of considering merit at a high level. When deployed along
with the presumption recommended in Section IV infra, the expressively invasive character
of the government's inquiry could be reduced. It is of course true that even the merit
inquiry implicates free expression concerns. Yet, given that the indecency regime is unlikely
to be abandoned, a pragmatic inquiry must focus on what can be done to reduce the most
noxious aspects of the current policy.
190. See Fox I, 556 U.S. 502, 543 (2009) (Stevens, J., dissenting) ("There is a critical
distinction between the use of an expletive to describe a sexual or excretory function and the
use of such a word for an entirely different purpose, such as to express an emotion. One
rests at the core of indecency; the other stands miles apart. As any golfer who has watched
his partner shank a short approach knows, it would be absurd to accept the suggestion that
the resultant four-letter word uttered on the golf course describes sex or excrement and is
therefore indecent. But that is the absurdity the FCC has embraced in its new approach to
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the Commission's categories are also both under- and over-inclusive.191 As
the Tom Lehrer quote in the title of this article instructs us, everything is
lewd, when properly viewed.192
Even if we accept the FCC's assertion that breasts and buttocks are
inherently sexual, very little expression is clearly inherently sexual or
excretory. Much of today's sexualized humor, for example, depends on
double entendre where the humor lies precisely in the see-saw of the sexual
subtext disguised by sexual deniability. Years ago, the FCC sought to
address indecency in double entendre by whether the sexual import of the
expression was clearly understandable or inescapable.' 93 It is not even clear
if this is still the standard the agency would use. But, in any event, it means
that much flirtatious expression could be considered inherently sexual and
subject to regulation.
More generally, the Commission's new semantic theory raises a deeper
question of why the Commission chooses to focus on words that are
deemed to have sexual or excretory meaning. Why not seek to regulate any
words that are considered offensive-in or out of context? If the focus of
modern indecency regulation is attributable to the fortuity of George
Carlin's filthy words monologue, that is insufficient reason to keep it so
fixed.

indecency.").
The approach that asserts a term's "inherent" meaning is also ahistorical. See Dave E.
Hutchinson, Note, "Fleeting Expletives" Are the Tip of the Iceberg: Falloutfrom Exposing the Arbitray
and CapriciousNature of Indecency Regulation, 61 FED. CoMM. LJ. 229, 231 (2008) (describing
the transformation of the sexual meaning of the term "jerk" from the late 19th to the 20th
century); see also Brief for Former FCC Officials, supra note 4, at 14 n.11.
191. Brief for Former FCC Officials, supra note 4, at 13-14 (characterizing as "utterly
perplexing" the FCC's efforts to distinguish various words-such as "ass," "dickhead," and
"up yours" from words such as "bullshitter" and "fuck 'em"-as to inherently sexual
character).
192.

See supra note *.

193. See 2001 Policy Statement, 16 FCC Rcd. 7999, 8003-04 1 12 ("Merely because the
material consists of double entendre or innuendo, however, does not preclude an indecency
finding if the sexual or excretory import is unmistakable."); see also Letter to Rusk
Corporation, Licensee, Radio Station KLOL(FM), 8 FCC Rcd. 3228 (1993) ("[W]hile [the
licensee] may have substituted innuendo and double entendre for more directly explicit
sexual references and descriptions in some instances, unmistakable sexual references remain
that render the sexual meaning of the innuendo inescapable."); Letter to Carl J. Wagner,
Great American Television and Radio Company, Licensee, Radio Stations WFBQ(FM) et
al., 6 FCC Rcd. 3692, 3693 (1990) ("While the passages arguably consist of double entendre
and indirect references, the language used in each passage was understandable and clearly
capable of a specific sexual meaning and, because of the context, the sexual import was
inescapable.").
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Nonconformance with Accepted Standards ofMorality

In its Fox briefing, the government explicitly referred to the "normal"
definition of indecency as "nonconformance with accepted standards of
morality."l 94 Although this is a reference to a part of the Supreme Court's
opinion in Pacifica,195 its deployment in the context of the Commission's
indecency policy now is instructive. In Pacifica, the Court deployed the
notion of nonconformance with accepted standards of morality as a way of
distinguishing between obscenity and indecency in § 1464. Moreover, the
Carlin monologue at issue in Pacifica was considered a nuisance that could
be time-channeled because its daytime airing did not conform with
accepted standards of morality. The fact that the FCC is now bringing this
statement to the forefront as what defines indecency-rather than its more
complex generic standard-suggests the possibility of more invasive
indecency regulation in the future. The FCC might find a program not to
conform with accepted standards of morality even if it was not patently
offensive to the average broadcast viewer or listener. The reference to
accepted standards of morality is also an explicit admission by the
government that it is engaging in morality legislation. This is a troubling
position for the government to take with respect to speech, as noted
below. 196 Moreover, it is a far cry from the Pacifica approach, under which
the Court permitted the government to regulate not to enforce morality,
but to ensure that children did not come across a nuisance during the day.
III. UNDERLYING SHIFTS IN THE FCC's REGUIATORYJUSTIFICATIONS
The procedural and doctrinal changes described in Section II have made
it easier for complainants to bring indecency complaints, have chilled
broadcaster speech, and have created incentives for stations to engage in
constraining self-regulation-all with a reduced likelihood of judicial review
and oversight.
More broadly, however, those changes also reflect important shifts in the
traditional regulatory justifications for FCC involvement in this area. The
FCC has reinterpreted its classic reasons for regulating indecency,
attempting to adjust the Pacifica factors to fit modern conditions. It has also
argued for indecency regulation not under such indecency-specific
rationales, but under notions of broadcast scarcity and contractuallyinterpreted license conditions new to this regulatory context.
The

194. See, e.g., Fox II FCC Reply, supra note 183, at 12-13 (quoting Pacifica II, 438 U.S.
726, 740 (1978)).
195. Pacfica,438 U.S. at 740.
196. See Part III B.2, infra text accompanying notes 234-245.
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reinterpretations of the FCC's traditional regulatory justifications present
important social risks and do not do the work the FCC requires of them.
A. Reframing the FCCsArticulated Reasonsfor Indecency Regulation
As the Court asserted in Pacifica, broadcasting has been granted lesser
constitutional protection for speech because of the medium's exceptional
characteristics: its unique pervasiveness and unique accessibility to
children.197 Those characteristics have permitted the Commission to
regulate, it has traditionally claimed, for the dual objectives of assisting
parents and promoting an independent government interest in the well-

197. The first factor justifying time channeling in Pacfica is the unique pervasiveness of
radio, while the second is radio's unique accessibility to children. The Commission has
consistently argued for the continuing viability of these factors-claiming that despite
technological change, broadcasting is still uniquely pervasive both in diffusion and
viewership. With regard to the pervasiveness of diffusion, the Commission refers to the
millions who still live in broadcast-only households. Fox II Government Brief, supra note
183, at 44-45; see also Brief of Amici Curiae Am. Acad. of Pediatrics et al. in Support of
Aflirmance at 16, Fox II, 132 S. Ct. 2307 (2012) (No. 10-1293), 2011 WL 5544810
(presenting statistics on television and cable use in U.S. households). As for viewership, the
Commission relies on the continuing dominance of broadcast television programming
despite the availability of cable, arguing that "television broadcast programming has
retained its dominance despite the proliferation of different ways of accessing it." Fox II
FCC Reply, supra note 183, at 14; see also Fox II Government Brief, supra note 183, at 45.
The agency also claims that even if cable has made inroads into broadcast network
audiences, technological change has in no way reduced the pervasiveness of radio.
Although the FCC has argued for the continuing relevance of the factors used in
Pacifica as justifications for channeling the Carlin monologue to late-night hours, it has also
reinterpreted and reframed them. Pervasiveness has been associated with the continuing
dominance of broadcast programming and also perhaps its continuing salience. Moreover,
the discussion of pervasiveness now focuses not only on the extensive availability of
broadcasting, but also on distinct demographic effects and the intrusion of broadcast into the
home. The Commission's Fox II briefs, for example, focused on how low-income children
are disproportionately represented in the group of broadcast-only households. See generally
Fox II Government Brief, supra note 183; Fox II FCC Reply, supra note 183. The
government also described the uniquely pervasive presence of broadcasting by reference to
its intrusion into the home. See Fox II Government Brief, supra note 183, at 4-5. Perhaps
most importantly, the Commission argued that the continuing pervasiveness of broadcasting
is due in part to regulatory design including, for example, the Commission's own "must
carry" rules. As for the unique accessibility of broadcasting to children, the Commission
focused on the fact that alternative services to broadcasting are available only by
subscription. See Fox II Government Brief, supra note 183, at 22; see also Fox II FCC Reply,
supra note 183, at 20. The Commission also took the position that disturbing the prior
regulatory regime would "upset parents' settled expectations" that broadcast television is a
safe zone, Fox II Government Brief, supra note 183, at 52, so the uniqueness of accessibility is
translated as a uniquely safe area on which parents can reasonably rely.
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being of children.198
In reality, the original regulatory scheme in Pacifca rested on an
awkward combination of public decorum and protecting childrenawkward because there is no necessary connection between the two goals.
The nuisance concept in Pacifica suggests that indecent expression might
violate norms of public decorum regardless of the presence of children.
(Although the presence of children in the audience can further add to
adults' discomfort if they would prefer not to watch this kind of
programming together, this is not necessarily a reflection of parental
concern about harm to children from exposure to this material). As for the
goal of protecting children from direct harm, neither the Court nor the
FCC has defined this concern crisply. Even if exposure to bad language
and sexual expression could affect children's social development negatively,
it is difficult to determine how much of this influence can be attributed to
radio and television when the social environment as a whole is rife with
such material.
Whatever the merits of the original Pacifica theories, however, the
Commission's reframing of its regulatory justifications has neither openly
acknowledged their tensions nor provided a more desirable alternative.
1. A New Take on Assisting Parents-MoralZoning to Providea "Safe Haven"
The FCC has historically justified indecency regulation by the need to
promote parental control. Indeed, assisting parents has been seen as an
"uncontroversial" basis for regulation. 199 Such a regulatory goal is thought
to be most acceptable from the point of view of a "neutral" government
behaving merely as the agent of the public, helping parents make their own
normative decisions rather than imposing governmental cultural policy.
The broadcast challengers in Fox II rejected this regulatory rationale,
claiming that it had been undermined by media developments. They asked

198. See Collins, supra note 20, at 1244 (listing "five potential government interests in
shielding children from allegedly indecent materials in broadcasting: (1) supporting parental
preferences; (2)preventing psychological harm; (3) preventing imitation of harmful behavior;
(4) promoting civility and socially appropriate behavior; and (5) protecting from offense"); see
also Alan E. Garfield, Protecting Childrenfrom Speech, 57 FLA. L. REV. 565, 602 (2005).
199. See, e.g., Ashutosh Bhagwat, What If I Want My Aids To Watch Pornography?:Protecting
Childrenfrom "Indecent" Speech, 11 WM. & MARY BILL RTs. J. 671, 673 (2003) (describing as
"quite uncontroversial" the government's "interest in supporting and facilitating parental
supervision over their children's access to sexually explicit speech"); Catherine J. Ross,
Anything Goes: Examining the State's Interest in Protecting Childrenfrom ControversialSpeech, 53 VAND.
L. REV. 427 (2000) (describing and critiquing governmental interest in parental control); see
also J.M. Balkin, Media Filters, the V-Chip, and the Foundations of Broadcast Regulation, 45 DUKE
L.J. 1131 (1996) (characterizing parental control as the underlying regulatory justification).
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what it could reasonably mean for the government to assist parental control
by regulating broadcast in light of children's likely exposure to fleeting
expletives and sexual situations in the plethora of media to which they now
have ready access. 200 Without any showing of harm to children from
exposure to broadcast indecency, they asked, why scapegoat over-the-air
broadcasters in a context in which far more indecency can be found on
unregulated cable and the Internet? 201
In response, the Commission asserted that far from making broadcast
regulation irrelevant and ineffective, "The rise of alternative, unregulated
platforms for video programming has, if anything, strengthened the need
for broadcast-indecency regulation." 202 Referring to increased indecency
on the air, the reliance of parents on indecency-free daytime programming
since 1927,203 and asserted parental clamor for regulation (evidenced by
increased numbers of indecency complaints), the Commission cast its
changed indecency regime as nothing more than responsive regulation
compelled by broadcaster misbehavior.
In regulating, the Commission adopted a different spin on the notion of
assisting parents. On the reframed argument, the Commission no longer
purports to cleanse electronic media indecency during the day. Instead, it
recasts its role as providing a relative "safe zone" in a sea of electronically
available smut. 204
200. This query does not even address the parents who do not want Commission
"assistance" of this sort.
201. In the current landscape, these theorists suggest that stringent enforcement will
inevitably be ineffectual. Many of the briefs filed with the Supreme Court in the Fox
litigation argued against indecency regulation on the ground that the Commission's
initiatives were simply ineffective and anachronistic in light of the increased social
acceptability of sexual expression and the availability of indecent material on non-broadcast
media. See Adam Candeub, Shall Those Who Live by FCC Indecency Complaints Die by FCC
Indecency Complaints?, 22 REGENT U. L. REv. 307, 308 (2010) ("[T]he degree that the
broadcast indecency regulations in fact protect children from indecent material is marginal
to nonexistent in our current media environment."); Wright, supra note 109.
202. See Fox II FCC Reply, supra note 183, at 15 (quoting Fox 1, 556 U.S. 502, 529-30
(2009)) ("Because of 'the pervasiveness of foul language, and the coarsening of public
entertainment in other media such as cable,' the need remains for 'more stringent regulation
of broadcast programs so as to give conscientious parents a relatively safe haven for their
children."'). At the same time, the rise of those alternative platforms has dramatically
reduced the burden of broadcast indecency regulation on those adults who wish to produce
or view indecent programming, see Fox II Government Brief, supra note 183, at 48-49, "just
as the widespread availability of digital video recording devices that permit time-shifted
viewing has materially reduced the burden of requiring indecent material to be broadcast
after 10 p.m." Fox IIFCC Reply, supra note 183, at 15 (citation omitted).
203. Fox I Government Brief, supra note 183, at 23, 52-53; Fox II FCC Reply, supra note
183, at 13-17.
204. What are the purported benefits of such a safe haven from indecency? It is said to
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2. From Individual to Social Harm--Reframing the Independent GovernmentalInterest
in the Well-being of Children
The other interest in indecency regulation classically articulated by the
FCC is an independent government interest in the physical and
psychological well-being of youth. 205 As noted above, the particular type of
harm to be feared from indecency has never been clearly articulated either
by the FCC or by the Supreme Court. Critics have challenged the notion
of harm to children from indecent television content. 206 The majority in
Fox Ideferred to the FCC's concerns about harm to children because of the
ethical constraints on attempting to test the asserted harms. 207
Even if critics are right to lambast this version of the FCC's harm-based

help parents who work and have little time to supervise their children's media use. On this
approach, government regulation is necessary because existing consumer tools will not be
adequate to the task (either because they are imperfect or because parents do not know how
to use them). The existence of safe zones might also be thought to permit parents to make
decisions about when to have awkward conversations with their children about sex-rather
than having their timing dictated by networks. Implicit in paeans to moral zoning is the
argument that it wrests control from corporate media (whose decisions are driven by profit
motives rather than the public interest) and celebrities (to whomJustice Scalia refers in Fox I
as "foul-mouthed glitteratae from Hollywood," Fox 1, 556 U.S. 502, 527 (2009)), who both
exert outsized influence on youth culture. Cf Rodney A. Smolla, Qualified Intimacy, Celebrity,
and the Case for a Newsgathering Privilege, 33 U. RICH. L. REV. 1233 (2000) (discussing Prof.
Nagel's coinage of the term "pseudo-intimacy" to describe the construction of modern
celebrity).
205. See, e.g., Forfeiture Order, In re Complaints Against Various Licensees Regarding
Their Broadcast of the Fox Television Network Program "Married by America" on April 7,
2003, 23 FCC Rcd. 3222, 3236 (2008); cf Ginsberg v. New York, 390 U.S. 629, 640 (1968)
(asserting the state's "independent interest in the well-being of its youth" in the context of a
New York statute prohibiting the sale to minors of material that would not be considered
obscene for adults); Sable Commc'ns of Cal., Inc. v. FCC, 492 U.S. 115, 126 (1989); Pacifica,
438 U.S. 726, 749 (1978).
206. Some have argued that the government has not shown evidence of harm to
children. Others have complained that the Commission's regulatory regime conceives of
children as including teenagers up to eighteen years old, whose acquaintance with sexual
matters is likely to extend far beyond what they could learn from broadcast television
indecency. Still others have characterized as speculative the particular kinds of harm to
children presumed by the indecency regime. There is also a lack of consensus among social
scientists about the particular types of psychological harms that can be caused by indecency.
Indeed, even in the context of televised violence, in which there has been far more empirical
research, the impact of media images on children's psychological states or behavior is
contested. See, e.g., Clay Calvert & Matthew D. Bunker, Free Speech, Fleeting Expletives, and the
Causation Quagmire: Was Justice Scalia Wrong in Fox Television Stations?, 47 SAN DIEGO L.
REV. 737 (2010); Fairman, supra note 123, at 53-58.
207. The Supreme Court has shown some ambivalence toward governmental claims to
an independent interest in regulations to promote the psychological welfare of children, and
it is troubling thatJustice Scalia in Fox I assumes away that ambivalence.

564

ADMINISTRATIVELA WREVIEW

[65:3

rationale for indecency regulation, the Commission's new approach
suggests a reinterpretation of the independent governmental interest.
Simply put, in this version, the independent governmental interest in the
well-being of children is grounded on the assertedly social harms of
indecency rather than any specific feared harm to children's psyches. Now,
child protection has been read to subsume Pacifica l's nuisance rationale
and has in turn been transformed into an imperative focused on social
rather than individual harm.
What is the social harm wrought by broadcast indecency? The answer is
not entirely clear. Justice Scalia's opinion for the majority in Fox I asserts
that children mimic behavior presented to them as "normal and
appropriate." 208 This suggests that the Commission's feared social harm
results from the apparent normalization of sexual expression in public.
Such normalization could arguably harm individual children's ability to
operate in the social world. 209 If many children change the norms of what
is seen as appropriate, this could also lead to broader social harms. 210

208. Fox I, 556 U.S. at 519. This argument is also reflected in the government's briefing
in Fox II and in the Fox II oral argument. Justice Scalia effectively took judicial notice of this
phenomenon by saying that empirical data demonstrating harm would not be required
when "it suffices to know that children mimic the behavior they observe-or at least the
behavior that is presented to them as normal and appropriate." Id. at 519 (emphasis added).
For example, the
This intuition might find support in communications studies.
communications theory of "cultivation analysis" looks to how repeated media messages can
lead viewers to believe that what they are seeing is normal and appropriate. See Calvert &
Richards, supra note 20, at 324; cf LaChrystal D. Ricke, Funny or Hann/id?:Derogatoy Speech on
Fox's Family Guy, 63 CoMM. STUD. 119, 122 (2012) (describing "cultivation" analysis, which
looks at how repeated messages can impact viewer's perception of social reality and have
social consequences).
209. See Patrick M. Garry, The First Amendment and Non-Political Speech Exploring a
ConstitutionalModel That Focuses on the Existence ofAlternative Channels of Communication, 72 Mo. L.
REv. 477, 510-11 (2007) ("As the Supreme Court has acknowledged, a democratic
government requires the healthy, well-rounded growth of young people into full maturity as
citizens, with all that implies. This includes the inculcation of certain civic values that in
turn will mold individual character so as to instill a sense of public duty. And one way to
achieve this character development is to prevent childhood exposure to harmful speech and
images.") (footnotes omitted) (internal quotation marks omitted); see also Collins, supra note
20, at 1253-58 (discussing governmental interests in promoting civility and socially
appropriate behavior).
210. See Christopher Wolfe, Public Morality and the Modern Supreme Court, 45 AM. J. JURIS.
65, 68-9 (2000) ("An example of a complicated mixture of grounds for protecting public
morality may be found in the concern for the moral ecology of society and the possibility of
parents raising their children with various good habits. The permission of particular acts by
a community has something of an educative effect, contributing to the 'normalization' and
hence the legitimization of such acts ... These effects may be especially powerful on young
people ... What is at stake in the regulation of public morality is the souls of our children.").
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This rationale is not logically limited to the protection of public discourse
for/by children; however, it bleeds beyond the powerful (if underanalyzed)
child protection trope. 211 So what justifies regulating pursuant to a
government interest in society-protecting "appropriate social discourse"?
On one interpretation, this is just morality-based censorship of speech
masquerading as protection of social discourse. This is akin to historians'
descriptions of previous crackdowns on indecency outside the media
context as aspects of government trying to enforce public order. 212
On an alternative interpretation, however, normalizing indecency could
reasonably be said to undermine the quality of community life and the
opportunity for a rich and diverse democratic discourse open to all. If so,
the government could claim a "legitimate [state] interest in establishing a
series of ground rules for public discussion and debate" 213-an interest in
adopting something akin to Robert's Rules of Order so as to "sharpen the
discussion and broaden participation in it."214 In apparently shifting its
regulatory rationales from individual psychic harm to social harm, the FCC
could be joining an important strand in modern speech theory.2 15

211. Even the childhood effects are contested. Professor Garry, for example, points to
social science documenting harm to children but cannot distinguish the effect of indecent
and violent expression. See Garry, supra note 209, at 512 (citing relevant studies). Professor
Garry might also be said to have made a leap from the appropriateness of government
inculcation of civic virtues to promote citizenship to the conclusion that preventing
childhood exposure to indecency is a way to achieve the character of dutiful citizen upon
maturity. But see Wolfe, supra note 210 (describing benefit of public morality as childfocused). As for claims of connections between exposure to sexual television content and
increases in teenage sexual activity, see Collins, supra note 20, at 1251-53 and sources cited
therein, the scientific evidence is still thin and insufficiently granular to establish which sorts
of sexual expression pose the greatest threat. Indeed, if-as one might suspect-the effects
are attributable to the overall vulgarity and sexualization of many television programs, then
even stringent FCC indecency enforcement could not eliminate the threat. See Calvert &
Bunker, supra note 206 (describing the harm causation evidence issue).
212. See, e.g., BEN WILSON, THE MAKING OF VICTORIAN VALUEs: DECENCY AND
DISSENT IN BRITAIN, 1789-1837 (1980).

213. Thomas G. Krattenmaker, Looking Back at Cohen v. California: A 40-Year
Retrospectivefrom Inside the Court, 20 WM. & MARY BILL RTs. J. 651, 684 (2012).
214. Id. at 685. Professor Krattenmaker explains that, "Harm is done both to
individuals and to society when language is used to degrade or to diminish the humanity or
worth of any person in that society. It is not prudish to recognize that certain kinds of
vulgarities ... can wound people who are already among society's least protected, most
vulnerable members. And permitting that sort of harm to individuals can harm our society
as well, by further alienating or degrading those already at risk." Id. at 684-85 (footnote
omitted).
215. Arguments justifying regulation of speech on the basis of social harm have been
very common in discussions of the constitutionality of hate speech regulation. In his recent
book arguing for the regulation of hate speech, Jeremy Waldron argues that mere offense
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In addition to the regulatory justification based on denying
endorsement,2 16 rules such as prohibitions of indecency can be styled as
symbolic statements by government that some things are inappropriate on

cannot be a legitimate basis for governmental censorship. JEREMY WALDRON, THE HARM
IN HATE SPEECH 105-06 (2012). Hate speech, he contends, should be prohibited not
because individuals will feel offended but because of the impact of such expression on the
ability of vulnerable populations to participate in democratic society as citizens of equal
dignity. Recently, such arguments have emerged in other contexts as well-for example, as
the impetus for a movement to regulate political discourse. See, e.g., Danielle Keats Citron &
Helen Norton, Intermediaries and Hate Speech: Fostering Digital Citizenshipfor Our Information Age,

91 B.U. L. REV. 1435 (2011); Toni M. Massaro & Robin Stryker, Freedom of Speech, Liberal
Democracy, and EmergingEvidence on Civility and Effective DemocraticEngagement, 54 ARIZ. L. REV.
375 (2012). The difference is that in the indecency context, the agency is not regulating to
protect politically weak and vulnerable populations and ensure their political participation.
See Barak Orbach, On Hubris, Civility, and Incivilio, 54 ARIz. L. REV. 443 (2012) (highlighting
the downsides of regulating to promote civility norms in public discourse).
216. The FCC could be said to have reframed Pacifica's nuisance rationale through the
lens of government endorsement. On this view, government can regulate daytime
indecency on TV lest the public believe that it endorses the appropriateness of such speech.
As described in the Fox II opinion, "The Government ... maintains that when it licenses a
conventional broadcast spectrum, the public may assume that the Government has its own
interest in setting certain standards." Fox II, 132 S. Ct. 2307, 2320 (2012) (citing Fox II
Government Brief, supra note 183, at 40-53).
Concerns about the appearance of
government endorsement have also surfaced to explain the Lanham Act's exclusion of
scandalous marks from registration.
For discussions of trademark law treatment of
scandalous marks, see, for example,Jennifer Rothman, Sex Exceptionalism in IntellectualProperty,
23 STANFORD L. & POL'Y REV. 119 (2012); Anne Gilson LaLonde, Trademarks Laid Bare:

Marks That May Be Scandalous or Immoral, 101 TRADEMARK REP. 1476 (2011); Sonia K.
Katyal, Trademark Intersectionality, 57 UCLA L. REV. 1601 (2010); Sarah Burstein, Dilution By
Tarnishment: The New Cause ofAction, 98 TRADEMARK REP. 1189 (2008);Jasmine Abdel-khalik,
To Live In In- "Fame"-y: Reconceiving Scandalous Marks as Analogous to Famous Marks, 25 CARDOzO

ARTS & ENT. L.J. 173 (2007); Llewellyn J. Gibbons, Semiotics of the Scandalous, 9 MARQ.
INTELL. PROP. L. REV. 187 (2005); M. Christopher Bolen et al., 11hen Scandal Becomes Vogue:
The Registrability of Sexual References in Trademarks and Protection of Trademarksfrom Tarnishment in
Sexual Contexts, 39 IDEA 435 (1999); Stephen R. Baird, Moral Intervention in the Trademark
Arena: Banning the Registration of Scandalous and Immoral Trademarks, 83 TRADEMARK REP. 661
(1993); Theodore H. Davis, Jr., Registration of Scandalous, Immoral, ad DisparagingMatter Under

Section 2(a) of the Lanham Act: Can One Man's Vulgarity Be Another's Registered Trademark?, 83
TRADEMARK REP. 801 (1993); Regina Shaffer-Goldman, Note, Cease-and-Desist:Tarnishment's
Blunt Sword in its Battle Against The Unseemly, The Unwholesome, and the Unsavory, 20 FORDHAM
INTELL. PROP. MEDIA & ENT. LJ. 1241 (2010); Christopher T. McDavid, Note, I Know It
When I See It: Obscenity, Copyright, and the Cautionay Tale of the Lanham Act, 47 U. LOUiSVILLE L.
REV. 561 (2009); Regan Smith, Note, Trademark Law and Free Speech: Protectionfor Scandalous

and DisparagingMarks, 42 HARV. C.R.-C.L. L. REV. 451 (2007); see also David E. Shipley, A
Dangerous Undertaking Indeed: Juvenile Humor, Raunchy jokes, Obscene Materials and Bad Taste in

Copyright, 98 KY. LJ. 517 (2010) (noting the copyright ability of obscene and offensive
material, in contrast to trademark law).
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television.2 17 The FCC might also rest the permissibility of its social interest
on a vision of broadcast television as an educational, socializing agent. Just
as it has done with respect to the regulation of children's educational
television programming, the Commission has implicitly cast television in an
educative role. 218 On this view, broadcasters have chosen to operate in a
medium that happens to have profound teaching capacity and impact and
can, therefore, be deemed to have agreed to limit their expressive freedoms
in some minor areas.
3.

The FCC's Shift to Proto-ContractualArguments
In addition to maintaining the modern relevance of the Pacifica

217. Cf Adam Samaha, Regulationfor the Sake of Appearance, 125 HARv. L. REv. 1563
(2012) (discussing the undertheorized logic of regulatory decisions justified by reference to
appearance).
218. The FCC has adopted children's educational television programming requirements
in response to the Children's Television Act of 1990, Pub. L. No. 101-437, 104 Stat. 996
(1990); see also Collins, supra note 20, at 1254-55 (noting congressional and FCC recognition
of educational functions of broadcasters).
Since education extends beyond teaching children math and grammar to encompass
their socialization and inculcation with norms and values, the FCC's focus on appropriate
and inappropriate speech can be interpreted as akin to educational regulation.
The Supreme Court's education jurisprudence grants extensive judicial deference to
school officials. Although Tinker v. Des Moines Independent Community School District, 393 U.S.
503, 509 (1969), grants students the right to speak without causing material disruption to the
educational process, later cases approve restrictions on student speech beyond what would
be considered constitutionally permissible outside the public school context. For example,
the Court has permitted schools to censor "vulgar and lewd speech" to make the point that
such expression is inconsistent with the values of public school education. Bethel Sch. Dist.
No. 403 v. Fraser, 478 U.S. 675, 685-86 (1986). The Court said in Fraser that it is
appropriate for public schools to inculcate in students "the habits and manners of civility" in
order to promote self-government and "the maintenance of a democratic political system."
478 U.S. at 681. As the Court put it:
The undoubted freedom to advocate unpopular and controversial views in schools
and classrooms must be balanced against the society's countervailing interest in
teaching students the boundaries of socially appropriate behavior.... Surely it is a
highly appropriate function of public school education to prohibit the use of vulgar
and offensive terms in public discourse.. . . The process of educating our youth for
citizenship in public schools is not confined to books, the curriculum, and the civics
class; schools must teach by example the shared values of a civilized social order.
Consciously or otherwise, teachers-and indeed the older students-demonstrate the
appropriate form of civil discourse and political expression by their conduct and
deportment in and out of class. Inescapably, like parents, they are role models. The
schools, as instruments of the state, may determine that the essential lessons of civil,
mature conduct cannot be conveyed in a school that tolerates lewd, indecent, or
offensive speech and conduct such as that indulged in by this confused boy.
478 U.S. at 681, 683.
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categories, the government in the Fox cases also attempted to ground
regulation in a proto-contractual rationale, presumably designed to serve as
a justificatory substitute if the Court were to overrule Pacifica (and scarcitybased Red Lion).219 Specifically, the government's briefing in the Fox cases
argued various versions of the general claim that indecency regulation was
simply a part of the regulatory bargain in exchange for broadcasters'
privileged access to a scarce public resource granted by government
licensing. 220 This claim contains various strands. 221 It is at least, in part, a
revival of the "quid pro quo" justification for broadcast regulation that the
FCC had been developing since the 1990s, 222 but appears clearly in the
foreground here for the first time.
B. The Risks of the FCCsReframed Regulatoy Justifications
The attempt to refashion the exceptional Pacifica factors for a modern
age and, more significantly, to adopt a consent-based or quid pro quo
justification for broadcast's continued regulatory second-class status, fails to
compensate for the failures of the indecency regime.
1. The Limits of Safe Havens
There is something intuitively attractive about safe havens for children.
Zoning has served in other contexts to limit noxious uses and reduce the
extent to which they encroach on social life.
Nevertheless, the
Commission's revised notion of assisting parents is hardly as uncomplicated
as the agency would wish or pretend. Broadcast safe havens impose costs
on broadcasters without corresponding benefits in practice.223 The
Commission cannot properly regulate when it has not even explored
technological alternatives to regulating for safe zones. And "proponents of
censorship are inevitably tempted to protect adults in the name of

219. In contrast with Pacifica, which grounded exceptional First Amendment treatment
of broadcasting on pervasiveness and accessibility to children, the Court in Red Lion
Broadcasting Co. v. FCC upheld the Commission's broadcast fairness doctrine as justified by
the scarcity of the electromagnetic spectrum. 395 U.S. 367 (1969). Historically, the
Commission has not justified indecency regulation by reference to the traditional regulatory
rationale of broadcast scarcity.
220. Fox II Government Brief, supra note 183, at 51-53.
221. See infra notes 251, 255 and accompanying text.
222. See Charles W. Logan, Jr., Getting Beyond Scarcity: A .New Paradrgmfor Assessing the
Constitutionaliy ofBroadcastRegulation, 85 CAL. L. REv. 1687, 1690-91 (1997).
223. See, e.g., Wright, supra note 109, at 198-99 (arguing that "a broadcasting 'safe
haven' rule would burden the speech rights of broadcasters, while at the same time being, as
a practical matter, entirely unnecessary").
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protecting children." 224
Whatever its appeal in the abstract, is the idea of safe harbors
meaningful and realistic today?225 The agency has not actually assessed the
possibility of establishing clearly identifiable safe zones in today's
technological circumstances. It is not clear that parents can easily process
zoning information in a converged media landscape.
Since most
consumers view television via cable or the Internet, they do not necessarily
know whether they are watching FCC-regulated broadcast television or
cable programming to which indecency rules do not apply. 226 To the
extent that the television V-chip has weaknesses, the availability of more
robust (and perhaps more accessible) cable and Internet filtering methods
for parents might compensate for V-chip limits. 227 And improvements in
the V-chip can reduce the need for safe zoning approaches, even for those
viewers who do not have cable. 228 Finally, the FCC's new take on assisting
parents does not answer the question of what the regulations should be.
The safe harbor notion, as such, also fails to justify why broadcasters alone
should be the subjects of regulatory attention.
Proponents of safe haven justifications might respond that the indecency
regime will not, in fact, prove to be an ineffective finger in the dike of
indecent programming on electronic media because of the increasingly
converging structure of the media industry. Arguably, given the continuing
relevance of broadcast content even in a media marketplace flooded by
non-broadcast distribution mechanisms, regulated material could have
amplified effects in the media market as a whole.

224. Balkin, supra note 199, at 1155.
225. Even in 1998, Professor Glen Robinson had characterized the attempt to protect
children from George Carlin's seven dirty words, or even "a sustained monologue of dirty
words, racial slurs and sexual innuendo" as "a quixotic ambition, unless we are to establish
speech monitors in every playground and on every street corner." Robinson, supra note 50,
at 959.
226. Candeub, Indecency, supra note 201, at 308 ("Most households receive their
broadcast television through cable. Most people therefore click from regulated 'decent'
broadcast programming to unregulated and perhaps 'indecent' cable programming without
even noticing it."). For a powerful argument based on the technological obsolescence of the
Pacifica factors, see Brief for Former FCC Officials, supra note 4, at 21-28.
227. To the extent that the justification for broadcast regulation is the "coarseness" in
available filtering mechanisms, improvements in broadcast filtering will obviate the need for
regulation. See Balkin, supra note 199, at 1148-50 ("If broadcast media can permit blocking
and time-shifting of programming easily, cheaply, and painlessly, they will have largely
approximated the filtering status of the print media.").
228. This does not address important questions, inter alia, about the censorious effects of
decisions made by filtering intermediaries. Balkin, supra note 199, at 1131-32, 1165 ("In the
Information Age, the informational filter, not information itself, is king.").
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This, however, overstates the case. 229 In any event, if the safe-haven
approach is effective, then it raises the underlying tension between the goals
of assisting parents and prohibiting indecency. 230 There are social tensions
between norms of community and individual autonomy and differences
even within communities. 23 ' If the Commission's attempt to carve out a
safe space, in fact, indirectly affects (and cleanses) non-broadcast
programming, then the Commission will have used a parental control
rationale to empower the most intolerant parents, undermine the control of
those who see things differently, and promote a particular moral
viewpoint.232 The picture of beleaguered conservative parents at the mercy
of broadcasters, seeking a small enclave away from the sea of smut, does not
reflect the full and more complex picture. Conservative groups have
positioned themselves as moral norm entrepreneurs and claim much
success.
So, far from being the relatively modest reframing of the classic parentassistive regulatory rationale, the agency's new take on safe havens is either
ineffective and unnecessary or effective and an example of disguised
government cultural policymaking. When there is public dispute, the
Commission's decision to put its thumb on the scale and use its indecency
rules to prevent the purported social harm is suggesting this material is
inappropriate and is tantamount to choosing one side of a split on national
values. Ultimately, promoting parental control is not the neutral regulatory
justification that it purports to be.

2.

The Perilsof Regulating to Prevent Social Harm

Similarly, the Commission's transformation of the government's interest
in the well-being of children from a concern about harm to children to a
concern about the social harms of indecency on public discourse reflects a

229. For example, given that broadcast indecency is only limited temporally, and not
prohibited, edgy programming will still be produced for both cable and broadcast if it is
thought to have a market. Moreover, co-owned, but different, distribution media are likely
to produce brand-differentiated programming.
230. This tension has been previously noted in connection with the Commission's pre2003 indecency regime. Bhagwat, supra note 199, at 679; of ACT III, 58 F.3d 654, 663
(D.C. Cir. 1995) (recounting and rejecting petitioners' argument that governmental goals of
protecting children and helping parents were in irreconcilable conflict).
231. See Edward L. Rubin, Sex, Politics, and Moraliy, 47 WM. & MARY L. REv. 1, 2-4
(2005) (noting that the current culture of self-expression is not always consistent with the
moral boundaries of, at least, some communities).
232. If only 65% of poll respondents-not 95%-say they are worried about sex and
violence on the airwaves, why privilege them? Ratings show that whether or not they like
the indecency in the shows, viewers like the shows enough to tolerate the indecency.
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shift in focus that brings with it significant risks. Even if there could be
consensus that psychic harm to children must be avoided (with views
differing only as to the actuality and scope of such harm), the Commission's
transformed regulatory rationale is far more about affirmatively regulating
morality and culture than protecting children's psyches. 233 But the FCC
should not serve as the country's culture czar. Ultimately, the publicdecorum or social-appropriateness claims that appear to underlie the
Commission's desire to prevent social harm, not to mention the deeper
moral claim about preserving culture, effectively put the government's
weight on one side of a contested social/moral issue. 234 Those who believe
233. Professor Rubin's article suggests that this morality is so closely associated with
Christian religious teaching that it should be considered a violation of the Establishment
Clause. See Rubin, supra note 231, at 4, 34-40; see also Robinson, supra note 50, at 961-62
(describing Louis Henkin's "convincing" argument "that obscenity legislation was really
morals legislation in disguise" and questioning whether there is "any meaningful distinction"
between indecency and obscenity for purposes of this regulatory justification).
234. This is objectionable. See Balkin, supra note 199, at 1137 ("[Tlhe desire to use
government to control culture by controlling what people watch on television cannot be a
constitutional justification for the regulation of free expression."); Krattenmaker, supra note
213, at 688 ("Perhaps government has a claim to a greater legitimate role in regulating the
public dialogue where its tools are less draconian [than jail terms, as in Cohen v. California]
and its goals seem more acceptable than simply to enforce a temporary majority's desire for
cultural and ideological conformity. However, I have yet to see such a case."); Robinson,
supra note 50, at 965 (implying that, while it is possible to engage in means-ends analysis
regarding goals such as localism or "protecting children against unwitting exposure to
indecent messages . .. redefin[ing] the end as preserving 'culture' and the formerly reasoned
assessment reduces to a brute political contest of competing preferences. There simply is no
way to evaluate what means will secure that end. Indeed, there is hardly even a way of
articulating what the end means in terms that can be reconciled with the liberal premises of
the First Amendment.").
While some decry the coarsening of American culture, others express concern that
regulating indecency is little more than placing government's imprimatur on majoitarian
and prudish norms. In his dissent in Pacica,for example, Justice Brennan worried that "in
our land of cultural pluralism, there are many who think, act, and talk differently from the
Members of this Court, and who do not share their fragile sensibilities. It is only an acute
ethnocentric myopia that enables the Court to approve the censorship of communications
solely because of the words they contain." Pacifica, 438 U.S. 726, 775 (1978) (Brennan, J.,
dissenting). But see Anita L. Allen, Disrobed: The Constitution of Modesty, 51 ViLL. L. REv. 841,
841-43 (2006) (discussing moral justifications for approval of mandatory sexual modesty
laws).
In any event, even the Court's First Amendment jurisprudence in the educational
context would not necessarily justify giving the FCC carte blanche as to broadcast indecency
regulation. The Court's jurisprudence leaves fuzzy to some extent the demarcation between
acceptable and unacceptable speech in the public school context. Moreover, permitting
schools to inculcate fundamental values essential to maintaining a democratic political
system does not mean permitting them to suppress dissent. The Fraseropinion described the
students exposed to the indecent language as a "captive audience" and emphasized the role
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that the government should enforce morality norms in order to protect
society, make the mistake of conflating society with the morality of one
segment of the population-even if that segment is, arguably, the majority.
If the regulation of indecency is an example of the government's attempt to
ensure room for a traditional cultural narrative in response to the urgings of
organized moral norm entrepreneurs, it is troubling on many levels.235 It is
of the schools as "instruments of the state." Bethel Sch. Dist. No. 403 v. Fraser, 478 U.S.
Finally, the Court in Fraser explicitly recognized that "the
675, 680, 683 (1986).
constitutional rights of students in public school are not automatically coextensive with the
rights of adults in other settings," indicating that such moral education would not be
appropriate outside the school context. Id. at 682.
Nor is the government speech doctrine available to the Commission in this context.
The Court has not found broadcast licensees to be governmental actors, despite the
discussion by somejustices in CBS, Inc. v. Democratic.Nat'lComm. 412 U.S. 94, 114-21 (1973).
235. Some might argue that government neutrality on socio-moral issues is both
impossible and undesirable. See, e.g., Abner S. Greene, Government of the Good, 53 VAND. L.
REV. 1, 2, 4-5, 19-20 (2000); Steven D. Smith, Wy Is Government Speech Problematic?: The
Unnecessary Problem, the Unnoticed Problem, and the Big Problem, 87 DENV. U. L. REV. 945, 946
(2010). Indeed, they might affirmatively attribute to government a role in endorsing
important moral and social values. Doctrinally, they might point for support to the
Supreme Court's developing government speech doctrine, which permits government, when
speaking on its own, to endorse preferred social norms without interference from the First
Amendment. See Pleasant Grove City v. Summum, 555 U.S. 460, 467 (2009) ("If [the state
is] engaging in [its] own expressive conduct, then the Free Speech Clause has no
application."). For scholarly work on government speech, see generally MARK G. YUDOF,
WHEN GOvERNMENT SPEAKS: POLYTICs, LAW, AND GOVERNMENT ExPRESSION IN AMERICA

(1983); Joseph Blocher, Viewpoint Neutrality and Government Speech, 52 B.C. L. REV. 695 (2011);
David Fagundes, State Actors As First Amendment Speakers, 100 Nw. U. L. REV. 1637 (2006);
Greene, supra; Steven Shiffrin, Government Speech, 27 UCLA L. REV. 565 (1980); Smith, supra;
Nelson Tebbe, Government Nonendorsement Brooklyn Law Sch. Legal Studies Research Papers, Research
Paper No. 287 (2013), available at http://ssrn.com/abstract=2125243 (proposing a limit of
nondisparagement as a constraint on government speech); Wolfe, supra note 210 (describing
the Supreme Court's contraction of public morality). And by contrast to libertarian or
classically liberal theorists, First Amendment scholars of a democratic stripe might conclude
that government has a positive role to play in regulating speech to achieve higher quality
and more inclusive public discourse. See generally OWEN M. Fiss, THE IRONY OF FREE
SPEECH (1996).
By contrast, others would point to the dangers posed by a government unconstrained
by aspirations to neutrality on highly contested social and moral issues. Cf W. Va. State Bd.
of Educ. v. Barnette, 319 U.S. 624, 642 (1942) ("If there is any fixed star in our
constitutional constellation, it is that no official, high or petty, can prescribe what shall be
orthodox in politics, nationalism, religion, or other matters of opinion or force citizens to
confess by word or act their faith therein. If there are any circumstances which permit an
exception, they do not now occur to us."). Without the lodestar of government neutrality as
to fundamental conceptions of the good, they would argue, what would ensure protection of
minorities, disfavored groups, and those considered moral and cultural outliers at any given
time? Similarly, even if the government has an appropriate role to play in the development
of cultural policy, should it structure the speech marketplace more than what is necessary to
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particularly problematic when that side, as noted above, is not the
disadvantaged and voiceless minority it claims to be. And history suggests
that we should be skeptical of historical claims of past consensus on
traditional morality.236
As for the argument that the FCC's intervention is less morality
regulation than democratic intervention to promote civil public discourse,
the argument for regulating to prevent social harm in this context proves
create room for all points of view? Doctrinally, such critics might argue that there are in fact
more constitutional constraints on government endorsement of particular visions of the good
than might at first appear from government speech jurisprudence. See generally Tebbe, supra.
Moreover, even those who are skeptical about the goal of government moral neutrality
recognize the particular threat posed by government speech when government has been
captured by a faction. See, e.g., Smith, supra, at 962. Arguably, that is what has happened in
the indecency context. Cf Barak Orbach, supra note 215, at 446-47 (2012) (warning that
"although 'civility' is a concept of inclusiveness, it determines participation and therefore it
has exclusionary effects" and showing how "the use of 'civility' and 'incivility' as rules of
engagements in group deliberations [threatens conformity] and increase[s] likelihood of
costly mistakes"). Finally, even if democratic free speech theory legitimately justifies
government involvement in creating the preconditions for democratic deliberation, the
indecency context is sufficiently distant from core democratic and political discourse as to
lead to a different cost-benefit calculation regarding government involvement.
However, this does not mean that not regulating is costless. Professor Post has
importantly explained the fundamental tension underlying government regulation of
indecent speech. Robert C. Post, The Constitutional Concept of Public Discourse: Outrageous
Opinion, Democratic Deliberation, and Hustler Magazine v. Falwell, 103 HARV. L. REv. 601,
627-33 (1990). Crudely put, the problem is that while government should be prohibited
from penalizing speech violating decency and propriety norms because it should not select
and privilege only some of the diverse communities that make up the country, disabling
government from doing so may well undermine the very ability to engage in the kind of
reasoned, deliberative discourse to promote democracy that decency norms may be
responsible for enabling.
Perhaps this makes government regulation of indecent speech "inherent[ly]
intract[able]." Jonathan Weinberg, Cable T7 Indecency and the Court, 21 COLUM.-VLAJ.L. &
ARTS 95, 125 (1997). As far back as the original Pacifica case before the FCC, thenCommissioner Glen Robinson admitted the conflict: "[here is no logical ground for
compromise between the right of free speech and the right to have public utterance limited"
for propriety's sake; "the conflicting claims" can only "be made to co-exist by tour de force."
Pacfica Order, 56 F.C.C.2d 94, 110 (1975) (concurring statement of Comm'r Glen 0.
Robinson). Nevertheless, political reality suggests the continuation of some level of
Commission regulation in this area. Recognition of the intractability of the problem should
counsel modesty and restraint on the part of the Commission.
236. Neil M. Richards, Privacy and the Limits ofHistory, 21 YALEJ.L. & HUMAN. 165, 168,
170-71 (2009) (reviewing LAWRENCE M. FRIEDMAN, GUARDING LIFE'S DARK SECRETS:
LEGAL AND SOCIAL CONTROLS OVER REPUTATION, PROPRIETY, AND PRIVACY (2007)
[hereinafter FRIEDMAN, GUARDING LIFE'S DARK SECRETS]) ("[]he lesson that Dark Secrets

suggests to us is that when it comes to the regulation of sexuality (and particularly disfavored
forms of sexual activity and expression), there are very few traditions other than a persistent
and long-standing tradition of conflict over the relevant legal and social norms.").
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too much. It prompts the question of why we are only concerned about
indecency when symbolic condemnation of violence might yield more
social benefits. It could even more easily justify a rule that nobody could
disseminate racist speech (at a minimum in a mode where children could
get access to it).237
Attempting to regulate to prevent social harm is not worth the candle
when the regulation is unlikely to be effective in light of broader
technological and cultural trends. After all, what is the educative and
socially beneficial effect of "clean" broadcast airwaves when children learn
expressive norms and notions of appropriateness from other media as well,
and when much social discourse is already coarse to a degree many decry?
History warns us about the limits of regulating sin to maintain public order;
such attempts are destined for failure. Professor Lawrence Friedman has
characterized various aspects of 19th-century American law as reflecting a
"Victorian compromise"23 8 designed to protect a social order perceived as
delicate and unstable.239 Given the ultimate-and relatively rapid-failure

237. The revamped indecency policy arguably does little more than allow on-the-air
demeaning sexualization of women, racial skews, and rampant violence. Broadcast sex is
commodified, non-transgressive, mainstream material. On this view, there is no equalityreinforcing reason for the agency's regulatory choices.
238.

LAWRENCE M. FRIEDMAN, CRIME AND PUNISHMENT IN AMERICAN HISTORY 127

(1993) [hereinafter FRIEDMAN, CRIME AND PUNISHMENT]; FRIEDMAN, GUARDING LIFE'S
DARK SECRETS, supra note 236.
239.

FRIEDMAN, GUARDING LIFE'S DARK SECRETS, supra note 236, at 14 ("In short,

underlying the Victorian compromise was a theory of society. Society was a delicate plant.
It was at all times in unstable balance. Each generation had to be trained in the proper
norms and values. Rules about reputation and propriety were necessary. Vice and
debauchery, unless they were controlled, would run riot; and the whole system of order
would come tumbling down."); see Herbert Hovenkamp, The ClassicalAmerican State and the
Regulation of Morals, U. Iowa Legal Studies Research Paper No. 1-12, 2012, available at
(for another account of
http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=2041942
morality regulation). Pursuant to the Victorian Compromise, clear and stringent sets of legal
rules were seen as necessary to preserve morality and public order. At the same time,
because some immoral conduct by upper-class men was inevitable and because respect for
the reputations of such "pillars of society" was seen as essential to social stability, the law was
permitted to provide zones of privacy where the stringent, bright-line rules of morality
would not be enforced against them. "So long as the general social fabric was preserved, it
did not matter if vice continued to exist beneath the surface." SeeJoshua C. Tate, Gambling
Commodity Speculation, and the "Victorian Compromise", 19 YALEJ.L. & HUMAN. 97, 98-99 (2007).
Private sin, at least to some degree, was acceptable so long as public order was maintained.
Prostitution and gambling were similarly acceptable so long as they were engaged in a
discreet, private, and hidden fashion. See id. (citing FRIEDMAN, CRIME AND PUNISHMENT,
supra note 238, at 127). Cf WALTER KENDRICK, THE SECRET MUSEUM: PORNOGRAPHY IN
MODERN CULTURE (1997) (discussing acceptability of pornography for masculine elites in
the 19th century).
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of the "Victorian Compromise" in its own time, how much more
unavailing must be the FCC's attempts to control social discourse today?
The sin market is much bigger and much less discreet than what was
envisioned during the period of the Victorian Compromise. Pornography
is said to be the most rapidly growing expressive industry. Recently
mainstream society has begun to flirt more openly with pornographic
subjects, revealing clothing, and transgressive sexuality.
Notably,
pornographic style has become very common in non-pornographic
representations. 2 0 The notion that FCC regulation of broadcast indecency
could preserve public order or public morality in such circumstances is
unpersuasive.
The government might claim some value in symbolic governmental
statements, but that is a thin reed on which to rest the indecency edifice. 241
Symbolic statements are only meaningful and effective when everyone
understands the symbols in the same way and when they have credibility.
Moreover, the FCC's recent approach to indecency regulation-which
fetishizes certain words but permits them to be aired when they are
presented sufficiently seriously that they are informative to elites without

240. The degree to which mainstream media and social life reflect norms of
pornography has been the subject of much scholarly attention. See, e.g., Adler, supra note
188; see also David Cole, Playing by Pornography's Rules: The Regulation of Sexual Expression, 143 U.
PA. L. REv. 111, 114-16 (1994) (explaining that "representations of sexual conduct are more
subject to regulation than sex itself [because of] the demarcation between public and private
spheres" and arguing that "sexual expression . .. inevitably confounds society's attempts to
regulate it. It subverts every taboo by making it a fetish. The forbidden is simultaneously
eroticized. As a result, attempts to regulate sexual expression are doomed to failure; by
creating taboos to transgress, regulation only adds to sexual expression's appeal. At the
same time, by obsessively seeking to regulate and control sexual expression, we construct a
sexuality that is in turn obsessed with transgression and taboo, often to the exclusion of other
values. Our regulations endlessly reproduce a pornographic conception of sexuality, which
in turn limits our ability to remake sexuality in a different light.").
241. In addition to the difficulties of justifying FCC intervention on symbolic grounds,
the argument that regulation is necessary to avoid the appearance of governmental
endorsement of indecency is fundamentally flawed as well. It is far from clear that the
availability of indecent programming during the day over the airwaves would necessarily be
seen by the viewing public as government endorsement of any particular message. Cf
Caroline Mala Corbin, Mixed Speech: When Speech Is Both Private and Governmental, 83 N.Y.U. L.
REV. 605 (2008) (discussing how to determine when messages are attributable to the state);
Lidsky, supra note 126. Even if that were not the case, and the public did think of what is on
television as somehow allowed and therefore endorsed by government, the argument is both
under- and over-inclusive as a regulatory justification. After all, even if the government can
regulate to avoid endorsing fleeting expletives, what about the kinds of sexualized but not
clearly indecent fare that pervade the electronic media and offend many viewers and
listeners? If accepted, this kind of argument would have huge consequences for speech
regulation in general.
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being pandering to the general public at large-contains contradictions
within its own symbolism. Even though public behavior and attitudes can
be influenced by the government's expressive actions, they are unlikely to
be shifted by the erratic symbolic expression of an agency with which most
people are not familiar. More broadly, justifying regulation for its symbolic
value glosses over the questions of who made the FCC the expositor of
symbolic values, and what kind of symbols the FCC has the moral authority
to express. It also does not explain why the symbolism is confined just to
broadcast programming, rather than all the electronic media that are
subject to the Commission's jurisdiction.242
Finally, even if the FCC could permissibly regulate to promote a
decorous vision of public discourse, that authority would not dictate the
specifics of its indecency prohibitions. If the Commission were to interpret
its authority broadly under this justification, it might choose a standard of
"appropriateness" as a benchmark for indecency regulation. Yet this is
unreasonable; appropriateness is an even more problematic standard than
the current criterion of patent offensiveness. Something may be generally
thought of as inappropriate without reaching the higher level of patent
offensiveness. Much sexually-themed and referential material on television
and radio would likely not be found patently offensive, although it would
certainly be considered inappropriate by many viewers and listeners. To
the extent that the revamped regulatory rationale conflates the well-being
of children with promoting appropriate social discourse and permits
regulation more stringent even than what the Commission's post-2003
decisions have wrought, it is unduly expansive.
3. The Dangersof a Turn to Proto-ContractualRegulatoyJustfications
Finally, can the proto-contractual turn reasonably serve as an alternative
regulatory ground if Pacifica, with its traditional rationales of pervasiveness
and accessibility, is overturned? The government's argument ultimately
cannot stand independently of scarcity under Red Lion or pervasiveness and
accessibility under Pacifica. Moreover, apart from likely constitutional
infirmities, the FCC's turn to a contractual justification for indecency
regulation has potentially far-reaching consequences that would be best

242. Direct Broadcast Satellite (DBS), for example, is both licensed and regulated by the
FCC. Cable, though not licensed by the Commission, is regulated by the agency, and in
some ways more intensely than broadcasting. As for the Internet, one could argue that it
might logically be thought to fall into the FCC's ancillary authority as an electronic medium
that competes with conventional regulated media. This is not an argument in favor of
regulating these media. Rather, it is an explanation of why the "symbolism" defense of
regulation does not adequately justify the differential treatment of broadcasting.
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avoided as a matter of sound regulatory policy for the electronic media.
The government's argument in the Fox cases is often articulated as a
contractual one-based on notions of consent, bargain, and acquiescence
by regulated entities.243 On this view, licensee consent to indecency
conditions avoids concerns about unconstitutional conditions. 2 "4 But this is
such a formal and artificial notion of consent as to be completely divorced
from reality. 245 Moreover, because broadcasters can lose their licenses over
violations of § 1464, the consent argument raises the question of coercion
resulting from the possibly catastrophic loss resulting from the removal of a
government benefit.246
The government has alternatively argued that the FCC's regulations are
a public-regarding licensing quid pro quo whose appropriateness rests less
on agreement or acquiescence by the licensees than on the implicit value of
the license benefit granted by the FCC.247 Government can constitutionally
243. See Fox II Government Brief, supra note 183, at 52 (explaining that parents' settled
expectations of a broadcast safe haven impose a restraint on broadcasters "of which they
were fully aware when they secured their licenses"). It should be noted that the FCC's new
regulatory justification is not fully fleshed out and has in fact been argued in at least two (and
perhaps three) versions.
244. But see Philip Hamburger, Unconstitutional Conditions: The Irrelevance of Consent, 98 VA.
L. REV. 479 (2012) (arguing that consent should be irrelevant to the unconstitutional
conditions analysis).
245. Even if consent were viable in principle, at a macro level, it could not as such justify
the shifting FCC interpretations in the indecency context over time. Consent is not a oneway proposition, or an agreement without temporal contexts. What licensees could have
been deemed to have agreed to at time X, on the basis of the FCC's regulatory scheme at
that time, does not necessarily extend to different FCC rules in a different overall regulatory
context at time Y. Moreover, being aware of prohibitions on daytime indecency is one
thing, while awareness of the FCC's specific interpretations of the prohibition is
emphatically another-particularly as they have changed over the regulatory period. The
government's argument would effectively attribute actual knowledge and acquiescence to
regulated entities solely on the basis of regulatory subject matter. Finally, even if
broadcasters could be deemed to have consented to indecency regulation historically, their
litigation positions since 2003 suggest that they have not consented to the extension of the
traditional regime.
246. Cf Nat'l Fed'n of Indep. Bus. v. Sebelius (NFIB), 132 S. Ct. 2566 (2012). Though
NFIB concerns federalism rather than the First Amendment, its holding on the Medicaid
expansion suggests that in the Court's view, the threat of withdrawal of an existing grant of
government resources may be coercive if the threat amounts to a "gun to the head," id. at
2604, or if "refusing to accede" to the threat "is not a realistic option," id. at 2662 (joint
dissenting opinion). That might be one way to characterize the threat of withdrawing the
broadcaster's license if it does not conform to the indecency rules. Coercion is not
intrinsically unconstitutional, of course, but if government action involves coercion, the
justification for the action cannot rest on a claim that the entity being regulated voluntarily
agreed to it.
247. Fox II Government Brief, supra note 183, at 53; see also Logan, supra note 222. To
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attach speech-restrictive conditions to the receipt of government benefits so
long as those restrictions are reasonable and viewpoint-neutral. However,
while it is beyond the scope of this Article to apply or rationalize
unconstitutional condition doctrine, 248 indecency regulation serves as a
textbook example of the challenges facing such regulatory justifications.
It is not clear that the broadcast license should be considered a
government benefit or privilege that can be accompanied by these sorts of
conditions. 249 Arguably, the scarcity ground of Red Lion could support the
claim that government licensing is what makes broadcasting possible at
all. 250 Allocation issues in broadcasting are not so fundamentally different
from those in areas where they are solved by property rights regimes, and
scarcity is a widely discredited basis to justify content regulation. 25' It is not
the extent that the government also makes an argument justifying the quid pro quo on the
"public ownership" of the airwaves, that argument has been shredded in Robinson, supra
note 50, at 911-12.
248. The doctrine of unconstitutional conditions has generated a large literature. See,
e.g., Adam B. Cox & Adam Samaha, Unconstitutional Conditions Questions Everywhere: The
Implications of Exit and Sorting for ConstitutionalLaw and Theory, 5 J. LEG. ANALYsis 62 (2013);
Mitchell N. Berman, Coercion Without Baselines: UnconstitutionalConditions in Three Dimensions, 90
GEO. LJ. 1, 5 n.20 (2001); Robert C. Post, Subsidized Speech, 106 YALE LJ. 151 (1996);
Martin H. Redish & Daryl I. Kessler, Government Subsidies and Free Expression, 80 MINN. L.
REV. 543 (1995); David Cole, Byond UnconstitutionalConditions: Charting Spheres of Neutrality in
Government-Funded Speech, 67 N.Y.U. L. REv. 675 (1992); Cass R. Sunstein, Why the
Unconstitutional ConditionsDoctrineIs an Anachronism (with ParticularReference to Religion, Speech, and
Abortion), 70 B.U. L. REV. 593 (1990); Kathleen M. Sullivan, Unconstitutional Conditions, 102
HARV. L. REV. 1413, 1415-16 (1989) (characterizing unconstitutional conditions as "a
minefield to be traversed gingerly"); Richard A. Epstein, UnconstitutionalConditions, State Power,
and the Limits of Consent, 102 HARV. L. REV. 5 (1988); Seth F. Kreimer, Allocational Sanctions:
The Problem ofNegative Rghts in a Positive State, 132 U. PA. L. REV. 1293 (1984); Robert Hale,
Unconstitutional Conditions and Constitutional Rights, 35 COLUM. L. REV. 321 (1935). For a
particularly lucid discussion in the electronic media context, see Robinson, supra note 52, at
921-24 (describing "so-called unconstitutional conditions" as "the true Okefanokee of
constitutional law").
249. See Hamburger, supra note 244, at 504 n.42. The argument that broadcasters can
impose conditions on licenses "tends to prove too much." Balkin, supra note 199, at 1135
("The government does not license the airwaves as an act of governmental largesse-the
usual means ofjustifying conditions on licenses. Rather, the licensing scheme exists because
the government decided to take complete control of the airwaves and parcel out licenses
instead of auctioning off rights to broadcast at certain times in certain locations and with
certain degrees of broadcast strength. The government does not license the manufacture
and distribution of paper or printing presses. Even if it did so, it could not constitutionally
justify imposing content-based conditions on their use. Thus, the conditions-on-licensing
justification ultimately rests on the prior justifications for licensing, which depend in turn
upon the scarcity rationale.").
250. Red Lion Broad. Co. v. FCC, 395 U.S. 367 (1969).
251. For criticisms of scarcity as a distinguishing basis for broadcast regulation, see, for
example, POWE, supra note 30, at 197-209; KRATTENMAKER & POWE, supra note 30;
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reasonable to think that government could constitutionally decline to allow
broadcasting, thereby resting its power to condition licenses on its choice to
permit it. 252
But let us suppose that the FCC's licensing is to be analyzed against the
rubric of unconstitutional conditions inquiries. Although the line between
acceptable and unacceptable conditions has been criticized as wavering and
confusing, there is little disagreement on the general proposition that in
order to be constitutional, there must be some relationship between the
contractual condition and a legitimate regulatory purpose.25 3 The problem

MATTHEw L. SPITZER, SEVEN DIRTY WORDS AND Six OTHER STORIES 1013-20 (1986);
Ronald H. Coase, The Federal Communications Commission,J.L. & EcON., Oct. 1959, at 1, 1227; Robinson, supra note 50, at 911. Moreover, this argument does not recognize the
change in the media market, in which licensees hold their stations not as gratis grants from
the government, but in exchange for millions paid in a private market.
252. Nevertheless, some argue that if government, as regulator of the commons, can
choose not to sell the spectrum, it can then arguably choose to trade spectrum rights for
some kinds of programming obligations. Robinson, supra note 50, at 921 (asking whether, to
the extent that the government's "bargaining prerogative ] ... to create ... use rights . . . to
ensure effective use of the spectrum commons . . . presumably entails a power to sell those
use rights .. . then does [government] not also have the power to arrange to take payment in
kind rather than in coin, to trade spectrum rights for some form of programming instead of
dollars?"). Even so, as Professor Robinson points out, "objections to bargaining between the
state and the individual [can] arise ... from the way that the state uses its control of public
goods ... to gain inappropriate bargaining advantages." Id. at 922. Others would argue
that if there is a choice, in the broadcasting context, the government should always choose to
operate through private ordering.
253. See, e.g., Sullivan, supra note 248, at 1460. Professor Robinson would add to the
inquiry the question whether those on the other side of the bargaining table in a bargain
with government, "and others similar[ly] situated, are made better off by the bargain."
Robinson, supra note 50, at 922. How we come out on that inquiry, however, depends on
the perspective from which we choose to make the assessment. For example, Professor
Robinson characterizes the FCC's children's television rules as a "great bargain" for
broadcasters because they received $70 billion worth of spectrum in exchange for a mere
three hours per week of programming obligations. Id. More generally, Professor Robinson
concludes that "we have achieved a remarkable degree of free speech with only the most
modest First Amendment interventions. . . ." Id. at 970. If we assess each FCC condition on
broadcasters against the broad overview of the history of protection against competition
provided for free via licensing, few government conditions would arguably rise to the level of
bad bargains for broadcasters. Cf Cox & Samaha, supra note 248 (observing that nearly all
constitutional questions are convertible into unconstitutional conditions questions by
expanding frames of reference and assessing exit opportunities).
The relationship between funding conditions and legitimate government purposes was
recently addressed in a different context by the Supreme Court in Agency for International
Development v. Alliance for Open Society, 133 S. Ct. 2321 (2013). There, the Court found
unconstitutional a funding condition under the Leadership Against HIV/AIDS,
Tuberculosis, and Malaria Act requiring grantees to adopt an anti-prostitution policy. The
majority focused its analysis on distinguishing between "conditions that define the limits of
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is that the quid pro quo argument proposed by the government has no
clear connection to the FCC's particular indecency regime. Nor does the
quid pro quo approach contain any inherent limit. Why is today's
extensive indecency regulation the right quid pro quo for the privilege to
operate a broadcast station? What makes this quid proportional to the
quo?254 The Commission's argument would mean that virtually any
the government spending program-those that specify the activities Congress wants to
subsidize-and conditions that seek to leverage funding to regulate speech outside the
contours of the program itself." Id. at 2328. On this approach, the condition failed because
it compelled "the affirmation of a belief that by its nature cannot be confined within the
scope of the Government program." Id. at 2332. The Court implicitly recognized,
however, its prior precedent hinging unconstitutional conditions analysis on the relevance of
the condition to the objectives of the program and on the coercive character of the
condition. Id. at 2328 ("The dissent thinks that [a funding condition can unconstitutionally
burden First Amendment rights] . . . when the condition is not relevant to the objectives of
the program (although it has its doubts about that), or when the condition is actually
coercive, in the sense of an offer that cannot be refused. Our precedents, however, are not
so limited."). While this raises the question of defining and assessing the fit between the
condition and the government program's purpose, it indicates that courts should, at a
minimum, look at that connection.
Even though FCC regulation does not involve a funding program like the Leadership
Act at issue in Alliance for Open Society, the government's briefing in Fox II analogized
indecency regulation to a condition on a government grant by characterizing the
Commission's indecency conditions as part of a selection mechanism. Fox II FCC Reply,
supra note 183, at 19 ("The salient feature of the broadcast medium . . . is that the
government must select among would-be participants seeking to exploit this uniquely public
resource . . . in order for the medium to function at all. As especially privileged beneficiaries
of those selection and enforcement mechanisms, respondents may reasonably be required to
accept public-interest obligations that could not constitutionally be imposed on persons who
speak without government assistance."). This argument is akin to justice Scalia's view in
dissent in Alliance for Open Sociey that the government can properly select the recipients of its
largesse by choosing those "who believe in its ideas." Id. at 2332. The Alliancefor Open Sociey
majority rebutted this analysis in its own context (see id. at 2330) with arguments useful here
as well. In addition, the selection argument works even less well in the broadcast regulation
context. Broadcast regulation is not analogous to grantee selection for narrow, well-defined
government funding programs designed to promote a particular government point of view
or project. Indecency regulation need not be the selection criterion necessary for the
broadcast medium to function. And however differently the Alliance for Open Society Court
can describe the Leadership Act's goals, there is far more plausible variety in describing the
government's legitimate purpose in regulating the broadcast medium. Moreover, the fact
that the government has to make a selection among licensees does not mean that the
selection must be made on ideological grounds. See Nat'l Broad. Co. v. United States, 319
U.S. 190 (1943) ("Because [radio] cannot be used by all, some who wish to use it must be
denied. But Congress did not authorize the Commission to choose among applicants upon
the basis of their political, economic or social views, or upon any other capricious basis.").
Simply put, the government's selection-based argument in the indecency context assumes its
conclusion.
254. See Logan, supra note 222, at 1737 (discussing the requirement that the "quid" be
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conditions could be attached to what the government has called the "highly
favorable regulatory treatment" of broadcasters.2 55
The condition is also discriminatorily applied. Why, for example, are
Direct Broadcast Satellite (DBS) providers not subject to the same
indecency controls as broadcasters, despite being, like terrestrial
broadcasters, licensed users of the spectrum? 256
When all is said and done, an attempt to cabin the Commission's

comparable to the "quo").
255. Fox II FCC Reply, supra note 183, at 16.
256. It is true that singling out broadcasting is not as under-inclusive as it might first
appear, given that for the present time, broadcast-originated programming still accounts for
the lion's share of what is viewed by the public, whatever the means of transmission. This
means that broadcasting serves as something of a choke point for the largest share of
programs delivered to television households. If the FCC regulates all broadcast-originated
programming, it will then necessarily (albeit indirectly) also regulate the programming as
seen on cable or DBS. Nevertheless, this reality does not eliminate the formal discrimination
in the Commission's approach to different media.
There is also the argument that what has been described in the text as problematically
discriminatory application is better characterized as the kind of opportunity for exit that
would render FCC broadcast regulation a tolerable restraint rather than an unconstitutional
condition. In their exit- and sorting-focused take on unconstitutional conditions analysis, for
example, Professors Cox and Samaha specifically target mass media indecency regulation as
an analytical example:
[A] long-standing response to those who support limits on risqu6 content is that
sensitive audience members should "just change the channel." But easy exit in this
context cuts in the opposite direction, as well. Hardy audience members who prefer
content driven by economic forces rather than government officials and affiliated

interest groups are free to migrate away from broadcast. This leaves a large
mainstream audience with the option of choosing stations with FCC oversight. One
might say that government oversight becomes built into broadcaster brands. And
those in the broadcasting business are hardly locked into that delivery mechanism.
NBC is not an immobile asset; the people and capital behind its facade can migrate
(and to a degree have migrated) into unregulated territory. What seems to be
jurisdictionally underinclusive decency regulation has had the effect of enhancing
audience choices, and making a sorting analysis more appropriate ....
Cox & Samaha, supra note 248, at 97.
Yet, while the FCC has not sought to apply its indecency regime either to cable or to
DBS, arguments can be made that the FCC can regulate indecency in electronic media
other than broadcasting. The Supreme Court in DenverArea Educ. Telecomm. Consortium, Inc. v.
FCC, 518 U.S. 727, 748 (1996), for example, "approved in principle that limited control of
indecent content could be extended to cable television . . . ." Robinson, supra note 50, at
967. Moreover, both the easy exit asserted by Cox & Samaha, and their implicit acceptance
of audience choice as legitimating differential treatment, deserve testing. Cf PAUL
HoRwITz, FIRST AMENDMENT INSTITUTIONS 164-65 (2013) (arguing against the "partial

regulation" model because "[w]hatever the scope of permissible experimentation [within the
First Amendment], it should not be arbitrary. The way we treat communications media
ought to be based on "real differences in the methods of communication").
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regulatory conditions by saying that media content-unlike the general
uniquely related to the purpose of licensing
welfare of children 257-is
ultimately circles back on either the conventional ground for licensingscarcity-or the special character of broadcasting under Pacifica. If the quid
pro quo rationale ultimately rests on one or the other of the traditional
justifications for broadcast exceptionalism, then it cannot properly serve as
the independent regulatory ground sought by the government. 258 In turn,
scarcity is a "particularly badly suited justification" for regulation of
indecency.259 And pervasiveness is unpersuasive as a regulatory justification
not only because broadcasting is no longer the most powerful and
dominant communication medium but also because technological means of
parental control might be able to cabin it.260 To the extent that the
traditional regulatory rationales invite critique, the quid pro quo argument
cannot circumvent it.

Moreover, at least arguably, the FCC's broadcast regulation has ripple
effects beyond over-the-air broadcasting. The Commission's move to a
257. The FCC could not permissibly condition the grant of a license on the condition
that the licensee give 10% of its profits to a charity for the well-being of children, even
though giving to such a charity might be a legitimate public purpose, because it is not a
purpose that the Commission is empowered to promote. Some who have argued that the
FCC's public interest obligations should be seen as a proportional quid pro quo for licensing
benefits justify content regulations such as children's programming requirements and
political broadcasting rules on the ground that they promote robust and diverse private
speech-which is also the goal of the FCC's licensing scheme. See, e.g., Logan, supra note
222, at 1739-40. Even if that level of parallelism were sufficient, however, it is inapplicable
in the case of indecency regulation (which by definition is designed to reduce, rather than
promote, "robust and open" private speech at least during the day). Id. at 1744-46
(recognizing this problem and concluding that the quid pro quo argument is harder in the
context of indecency regulation).
258. See, e.g., Balkin, supra note 199, at 1133 (explaining that justifications for contentbased regulations other than scarcity and pervasiveness-"the fact that broadcasters hold
licenses from the government, and the importance of empowering democracy-tend to be
parasitic on the scarcity rationale").
Yet another regulatory justification, gleaned from the government's briefing in Fox II,
rests on the historical past of FCC content regulation. The government's insistence on the
legalizing effect of such history implicitly may be an argument about the appropriate scope
ofjudicial review. See Fox II Government Brief, supra note 183, at 52. However, given both
the extensive public interest regulation that the FCC has imposed on licensees at one point
or another over the past eighty years, and the shifts in the Commission's treatment of
indecency over time as recounted above, the past provides neither its own regulatory
justification nor clear constraints on FCC discretion. Under such circumstances, history
cannot alone justify deferential judicial review.
259. Balkin, supra note 199, at 1134 ("At best, scarcity provides a reason to put things on
the air, not to keep things off.").
260. Balkin, supra note 199, at 1136-38 (describing the five ways in which courts have
interpreted the notion of pervasiveness).
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contractual regulatory argument also raises the broader question of
whether regulatory expansion justified under a contractual approach is
likely to lead to further, more expansive regulation in broadcasting or
beyond. Aside from constitutional problems with claims of expansive
government power to condition grants, the discretion given regulators by
the Commission's quid pro quo rationale is profoundly worrisome as a
policy matter.
IV. WHY THE FCC's CURRENT INDECENCY REGIME Is BAD POLICY

In the final analysis, many of the factors described above have
constitutional overtones. But there does not have to be a finding of
constitutional proportions in order to claim that the negative consequences
of the FCC's indecency policy outweigh any positive impact of symbolic
safe havens. Even if the Court were to find that the fleeting expletives
policy and the indecency regime as a whole would pass constitutional
muster,26 the Commission should nevertheless hesitate to engage in
rigorous indecency enforcement. The extensive description in Sections II
and III above of the changes wrought in the indecency regime suggests the
many reasons why the new approach is bad policy today.

261. Depending on the Commission's approach to indecency going forward, challenges
to the constitutionality of the regime are likely to be brought. See Lidsky, supra note 126. On
the constitutional status of "child-protection censorship," see Garfield, supra note 198.
Although indecency regulation is content-based regulation and therefore definitionally
triggers strict scrutiny, First Amendment analysis in the broadcast context has been
described as following "strict scrutiny light." Jerry Kang, Trojan Horses ofRace, 118 HARV. L.
REv. 1489, 1574 (2005). In addressing the constitutionality of the indecency rules in 1995,
the D.C. Circuit Court of Appeals in Action for Children's Television v. FCC cited the Supreme
Court's opinion in New rork v. Ferberto find compelling the state's interest in safeguarding the
physical and psychological well-being of minors. ACTIII, 58 F.3d 654, 661 (D.C. Cir. 1995)
(quoting New York v. Ferber, 458 U.S. 747, 756-57 (1982)). Whether the Commission's
indecency rules are sufficiently narrowly tailored to satisfy such a compelling interest would
presumably depend both on the specific aspect of the rules at issue and on how skeptical a
court wished to be regarding the technological fixes. See, e.g., United States v. Playboy
Entm't Grp., Inc., 529 U.S. 803 (2000); cf Dawn C. Nunziato, Technology and Pornography,
2007 BYU L. REv. 1535, 1537 (concluding, in the Internet context, that "the more effective
user-based filtering technology becomes in restricting minors' access to sexually-themed
content, the less likely courts are to uphold other legislative means of restricting minors'
access to such content"). Even in the non-broadcast context, Snyder v. Phelps, 131 S. Ct.
1207 (2011), demonstrates that Cohen v. California, 403 U.S. 15 (1971), "does not address
the regulation of private, apolitical interpersonal speech and should not be taken to do so."
Krattenmaker, supra note 213, at 682; see also Jonathan Weinberg, Vagueness and Indecency, 3
VILL. SPORTS & ENT. L.J. 221 (1996) (pointing to the tension between FCC indecency
regulation-and other FCC regulation more generally-and traditional First Amendment
vagueness analysis).
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A. Unintended Consequences: The Threats to Local Programmingand Public
Broadcasting
The FCC's attention to indecency regulation in the past decade raises
the question of unintended consequences. The procedural and substantive
changes in the indecency policy (as described in Section II above) lead to
measurable harms to important values beyond the scope of the indecency
debate.
As pointed out in Justice Breyer's dissent in Fox I,262 the Commission's
current approach to indecency has an important unintended effect on local
broadcasters and the local press. In light of the expense of time-delay
technology, a small station may reasonably react to the FCC's negligent
indecency approach by avoiding live coverage of news and other
community events. 263 Despite the critiques to which much local news can
be subject, local reporting is still a very important part of function of the
press. Particularly in light of the massive economic challenges facing local
and regional newspapers, 264 local television news-such as it is in fact,
local-serves as even more of a bulwark against erosion of the local press.
The Commission's indecency policy thus stands in tension with its
longstanding commitment to localism as a lodestar of regulatory policy. 265
The various indecency policy shifts, as well as the expansion in forfeiture
authority, pose particularly difficult problems for public radio and television
stations. As is pointed out in the amicus brief of the Public Broadcasting
Service (PBS):
A single expletive broadcast in a program carried by all 353 PBS member
262. Fox 1, 556 U.S. 502, 556-61 (2009) (Breyer,J., dissenting); see also Stuart Benjamin,
FCC v. Fox and the Demise of Local Broadcasting, THE VOLOKH CONSPIRAcY (May 9, 2009,
9:06 AM), http://www.volokh.com/posts/1241874410.shtml.
263. See, e.g., Shelly Rosenfeld, An Indecent Proposal?: What Clamping Down on Fleeting
Expletives on the Airwaves Meansfor the TV Industy, 12 TEX. REv. ENT. & SPORTS L. 225, 23536 (2011); Kathleen Walman, Defining Indecency As an Artifact of CulturalPolicy, 24 REv. POL'Y
REs. 119, 120, 128-29 (2007); David Lee, Comment, How Detailedofan ExplanationIs Required
When an Administrative Agency Changes an Existing Policy?: Implications and Analysis of FCC v. Fox
Television Stations, Inc. on Administrative Law Making and Television Broadcasters, 30 J. NAT'L
Ass'NADMIN. L.JUDIcIARY 681, 713-14 (2010).
264. See Lii Levi, SocialMedia and the Press, 90 N.C. L. REv. 1531, 1545-47 (2012).
265. See generally Report on Broadcast Localism and Notice of Proposed Rulemaking, 23
FCC Rcd. 1324 (2008). Other FCC policies may conflict with excessive emphasis on
indecency as well. See Walman, supra note 263, at 123, 127, 129-30 (arguing that "patterns
of enforcement in indecency may create a cultural policy that is less hospitable to other
values that have been identified as important to cultural policy" and mentioning diversity in
addition to localism); see also Fox I, 556 U.S. at 557 (Breyer,J., dissenting) ("The FCC cannot
claim that local coverage lacks special importance. To the contrary, 'the concept of localism
has been a cornerstone of broadcast regulation for decades."') (citation omitted).
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stations could result in a forfeiture of nearly $115 million. This amount is
over a quarter of the Fiscal Year 2012 federal appropriations for the
Corporation for Public Broadcasting's general fund, which provides the
federal support for public broadcasters. 266
This is a monumental and potentially existential impact, which is
particularly threatening for public broadcasters. Given the smaller number
of broadcast network affiliates, the financial threat to public broadcasting
may be even more significant than to the commercial sector.
Public
The impact is not just likely to be financial, however.
over
other
critics
and
Congress
from
siege
under
is
always
broadcasting
ideological disagreements. FCC indecency findings would likely serve as
arrows in the quiver of those wishing to cut or eliminate public
broadcasting.
The briefing for the Fox cases at the Supreme Court contains data on
broadcaster claims of the chilling effect of indecency regulation. On the
public television side, 267 the PBS amicus brief in Fox II provides numerous

266. Brief of PBS as Amicus Curiae Supporting Respondents at 15, Fox II, 132 S. Ct.
2307 (2012) (No. 10-1293) [hereinafter PBS Brief].
267. The briefs contain examples of chill at commercial stations as well. The amicus
brief of the National Association of Broadcasters has the following account of the effect of
the fleeting expletives policy:
Broadcasters have been forced to rethink whether and how to present local and
. Live reports from journalists embedded with U.S.
national news and sports...
troops have been suppressed, and broadcast footage from war zones has been
withheld from broadcast. Broadcasters have expressed concerns about carrying live
audio or video from arraignments and trials, emotionally charged demonstrations,
and the scenes of breaking news such as disasters. Many broadcasters are also
concerned about or have decided against carrying live high school or college sporting
events or locker room interviews.
Brief for Nat'l Ass'n of Broadcasters, supra note 146, at 24-25.
Examples abound from the sublime to the ridiculous. There are reports of radio
stations cutting or editing iconic rock songs such as Lou Reed's "Walk on the Wild Side"
and Steve Miller's "Jet Airliner" despite a decade of unedited airing prior to the shift in the
FCC's indecency regime. See Sidak & Singer, supra note 25, at 718. The fleeting view of an
elderly female patient's breast during an episode of the television program "ER" caused the
program not to be aired. Collins, supra note 20, at 1257. In reporting on an attack on a
Paul Gauguin painting of two nudes at the National Gallery, local stations are said to have
either blurred the breasts in the painting or shown the figures from the shoulders up. Brief
for Nat'l Ass'n of Broadcasters, supra note 146, at 26. Recently, CBS reportedly censored a
GoDaddy Super Bowl commercial because it "feature[d] a close-up of tongue action."
Margaret Eby, Too Much Tonguefor TV: CBS Censors GoDaddy's Super Bowl Commercial of Bar
Refaeli Making Out with Lucky Nerd, N.Y. DAILY NEWS (Feb. 1,2013), http://www.nydailynews
.com/entertainment/t-movies/bar-refaeli-kisses-geek-love-super-bowl-ad-article1.1253364.
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examples of the chilling effect. 268 What is notable about most of these
examples is that they concern meritorious programming about significant
matters of public interest.
The maintenance of public broadcasting is vitally important. Much of
the most significant television and radio programming of the age has come
from public radio and television. This may be in part because public
broadcasting need not consider the salability of its programming to
commercial advertisers and is therefore freer to air unprofitable but socially
beneficial programming (or more controversial programming), or
experiment in ways feared to be too costly for PBS's commercial
counterparts. Public radio and television also seek to serve, inter alia,
268. Approximately two dozen PBS stations edited the footage, in "American
Experience: Eyes on the Prize" (the award-winning documentary series about the civil rights
era), of a civil rights activist addressing a rally and using an expletive. PBS Brief, supra note
266, at 17. Some stations chose to edit a conversation between George H.W. Bush and
then-President Lyndon Johnson in the documentary "American Experience: George H.W.
Bush." Id. In the documentary, the narrator repeats a conversation in which President
Johnson advises then-Representative George H.W. Bush to run for the Senate because "the
difference between being a member of the Senate and a member of the House is the
difference between chicken salad and chicken shit." Id. PBS's 2007 documentary about
Enron-"Enron: The Smartest Guys in the Room"-was edited to remove expletives in
phone recordings of Enron traders using expletives. Id. at 17-18. Public television station
WNET excised an image of a graffiti reading "Fuck America" in an episode of the series
"Extreme Oil" filmed in Azerbaijan, "even though foreign sentiment-intense hostility to
the United States-was an important element of the program's message . . . ." Id. at 18.
Public station WGBH, producer of "Frontline: A Soldier's Heart" (a documentary
addressing U.S. soldiers' difficulties in accessing PTSD treatment), edited a veterans
advocate's report of a soldier's superior calling a PTSD sufferer a "fucking pussy" by
excising the expletive from the quote, only to have Denver public station KRMA-TV
receive a FCC Letter of Inquiry regarding the use of the word "pussy" in the program. Id.
at 18. PBS edited some of the historical cartoons depicting sexual activity in the
documentary Marie Antoinette, after spending "considerable resources to determine the
legal status of the cartoons and the language describing the King's sexual activities in light of
the new FCC policy," but some stations nevertheless refused to air the program. Id. at 1819. Broadcasters considered whether to omit footage in "Antiques Roadshow" of a nude
lithograph of Marilyn Monroe. Id. at 19. Many of the videos and lyrics in a documentary
about the misogyny and sexism in modem hip-hop were edited out of a documentary
entitled "Hip Hop: Beyond Beats and Rhymes." Id. Indeed, some of "the very lyrics at
issue in the documentary were ultimately edited." Id. PBS also distributed an edited version
of a documentary called "Operation Homecoming," about the experience of American
soldiers serving in Iraq and Afghanistan, which contained coarse language and gestures from
soldiers' own writings and videos. Id. at 19-20. Many public television stations aired an
edited version of a Ken Bums documentary about World War II entitled "The War" and
included personal accounts of combat experience and explanations of the terms FUBAR
and SNAFU. Id. at 20. PBS's brief in Fox II described these instances as "but some of the
many examples of honest, valuable content that viewers have lost because of the FCC's
vague new indecency policy." Id. at 20.
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populations whose interests would not necessarily be at the forefront of
commercial programmers. Sometimes, this may mean that the public
programming will be edgier, less polite in the mainstream mold, and more
true to life in outsider communities. And in those circumstances, it is likely
that some content will air that would be considered "inappropriate" by the
FCC and even perhaps the commercial broadcast establishment.
Whatever one thinks of the merits and value of particular public
broadcasting programs, there is an important underlying value to public
programming that cannot be matched by commercial fare. At a minimum,
therefore, FCC indecency enforcement that would threaten the viability of
a profoundly important part of American culture is both a worrisome
possibility and a particularly bad idea.
B. The Problems with Indecency Regulation Through a PoliticalLens
Another problem with the FCC's current foray into indecency is its
political context. The FCC's actions can be explained by contrasting
accounts.
Although the Commission claims to be regulating in a
proportional response to public clamor, some see the agency as captive to
the views of an ideological minority. On another view, the FCC is using
public complaints as a convenient blind to regulate according to its own
ideology or in response to congressional pressure.269 Either way, the
political take on FCC indecency regulation is concerning as a matter of
policy.
It is unacceptable if the FCC's action is an example of an administrative
agency serving as the regulatory tool of an ideological minority. 270 That

269. See Botein & Adamski, supra note 128, at 8, 14 (arguing that the driving force in the
FCC's indecency policy changes has been political rather than moral or a response to
change in public attitudes). Professors Botein and Adamski in fact provide multiple possible
political explanations for the Commission's activity--including the possibility of resourcerich interest groups such as the PTC "exploit[ing] an opportunity to promote their agendas
in an election year" and the possibility of the "Bush-Cheney Administration us[ing] its
personal ties to both Chairman Powell and then-Commissioner (later Chairman) Martin to
emphasize their party's commitment to eradicating indecency." Id. at 17. And this without
mentioning congressional pressure. Another take on this is that it is an example of
regulation in response to moral panic.
270. Even if public complaints have increased, and even if these complaints have in fact
sincerely and substantively influenced FCC enforcement, the Commission has
misinterpreted their significance and meaning. See supra Section II. Moreover, in relying on
the numerosity of complaints as a regulatory trigger, the Commission has neither addressed
the sample bias in the current crop of complaints nor recognized the dangers posed to
communicative diversity by enhanced government regulation in this area. See, e.g.,
Candeub, Indecency, supra note 201, at 321 (discussing the threat to religious broadcasting
posed by increased government media regulation including indecency policy).
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most of the complaints to the Commission have been generated through
the online activities of private interest groups-"family groups" 27' such as
the PTC 272-casts doubt on the Commission's assertion that the increasing
number of indecency complaints reflects both increasing broadcast
indecency and the general public's desire for regulation.2 73 To the extent
that the Commission actually interprets the complaints to reflect public
concern, it fails to recognize the amplifying effect of its own indecency
process on such purported evidence of public views; it erroneously assumes
that the public in general agrees with the complaints made by PTC
supporters.274
Apart from constitutional concerns, government
endorsement of the views of the narrowest advocacy communities is
undesirable-perhaps especially as they relate to expressive values. Given
the difficulty of managing divergent public values on such speech issues, the

271. See Calvert & Richards, supra note 20, at 325, 328 (identifying PTC and others as
such).
272. See, e.g., FAIRMAN, supra note 20, at 121.
273. Cf Candeub, Indecency, supra note 201, at 309 ("The complaint process allows
political actors to reveal credible information about their political strength and affiliation. It
is a type of public exhibition. By filing complaints, cultural conservatives display their
powerful muscles. Politicians-by issuing forfeiture notices to broadcasters-demonstrate
their commitment to serve that power."); Holohan, supra note 109, at 361 ("The problem
with the PTC's influence is not just that it overstates the indecency problem. The PTC's
influence, coupled with the FCC's reactive approach to detecting violations, allows the PTC
to channel the FCC's immense enforcement power toward programming that the PTC itself
finds objectionable. This creates a strong possibility of selective prosecution, exacerbated by
the PTC's political ties."). See also John Eggerton, PTC Pushes Public to Complain to FCC About
Indecency Policy, BROAD & CABLE, May 7, 2013, http://www.broadcastingcable.com/article/
493295-PTCPushesPublictoComplaintoFCC_Aboutjndecency_Policy.php
("The
Parents Television Council has declared May 6-10 '#NolndecencyFCC Week,' and
is encouraging the public to file comments at the FCC about the proposal to focus on
egregious indecency cases as well as to tweet their displeasure. PTC opposes what it sees as
the effort to limit indecency complaints by the commission.").
274. Of course, one might argue that just because complaints are form letters generated
via the PTC does not mean that large numbers of people are not, in fact, offended by
indecency on television and radio. They may simply have been finally given the tools with
which to express their beliefs to the government with a minimum of transaction costs. But
the ways in which challenged programming is described on anti-indecency websites may
unduly inflame visitors to the sites, even if they might not have been offended if they had
seen the programming in context. Also, people who belong to organizations like the PTC,
the American Family Association (AFA) or Morality in Media join groups of like-minded
people with regard to certain groups of issues that might fall under an umbrella of family
values or family concerns. Once they join, however, they may submit to significant social
influence with respect to what they should find indecent and complain about to the FCC.
See Robert J. MacCoun, The Burden of Social Proof Shared Thresholds and Social Influence, UNIv.
OF CAL. BERKELEY, SCH. OF L. (2011), availableat http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?
abstractid= 1441539.
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uncertainty of what the public "really" believes, and the deficiencies of the
policies the Commission has adopted, the agency should not take the risk of
becoming the unwitting tool of cultural regulation entrepreneurs.
Movements for cultural regulation "logically direct their efforts at
regulating media that are both popularly influential and institutionally
vulnerable."2 75 Broadcast television fits this profile perfectly. The
perceived weakness of broadcasting should not give purchase, through
capture of the FCC, to narrow movements for such cultural regulation.
This is both because it leads to an overvaluing of socially conservative views
but also because of its distracting effect. Aggressive indecency enforcement
may promote the appearance of government governing-another example
(like terrorism preparedness drills) that is designed to convince people that
the powerful in society (government and influential media corporations) are
doing their part to control social ills. Such regulation could also be
deployed as part of an overall regulatory approach that addresses easily
understandable narrow issues with emotional salience, while keeping the
public distracted from the much broader effects of less accessible rules (such
as those regarding media consolidation).
The problem of capture by conservative family groups is not the only
objection when the Commission's actions are seen through a political lens.
It is troubling even if the agency's indecency regime represents capitulation
to members of Congress under the guise of public calls to regulate. By
regulating, the FCC can satisfy a Congress on which the agency is
dependent for its funding and propitiate a legislature, some of whose
members have called for FCC elimination or reform. On the one hand,
apparent across-the-aisle agreement on the purported need to protect
children from indecency may suggest that in regulating, the Commission is
legitimately responding to democratic, legislative will. The Supreme
Court's decision in Fox I suggests that the administrative consideration of
political factors in changing policies is not by definition problematic. 276 At
the same time, however, the FCC may be responding to a small group of
legislators rather than Congress as a whole by enhancing its indecency
regime. Although no legislator can be seen as championing indecency
275. PAUL STARR, THE CREATION OF THE MEDIA: POLrICAL ORIGINS OF MODERN
COMMUNICATIONS 326 (2004); see also Balkin, supra note 199, at 1139-40 (explaining that
"calls for censorship .. . arise most heatedly in moments of great cultural change and
uncertainty," as cultural upheaval, triggered by changes in both norms and technology,
leads to anxiety in the population).
276. See Fox 1, 556 U.S. 502, 515, 523 (2009); see also Jodi L. Short, The Political Turn in
American Administrative Law- Power, Rationality, and Reasons, 61 DuKE LJ. 1811, 1828 (2012)
(noting that Justice Scalia's opinion in Fox suggested that the basis for satisfying the reasongiving standard "need not necessarily be apolitical").

590

ADMINTSTRA 77VE LA wREVIEW

[65:3

regardless of harm to children, it is not clear that Congress as a whole
would support the Commission's stringent indecency regulations. Indeed,
perhaps pragmatic legislators wish simply to punt indecency decisions to
the FCC so that they can blame the Commission if their constituents are
dissatisfied.
Finally, the FCC's approach is worrisome on an alternative political
account as well-one according to which the Commission's recent appetite
for indecency regulation comes not from interest group or congressional
pressure but from the agency's own strategically disguised ideological
initiatives or tendencies to institutional self-protection. Of course, the FCC
is in one sense a political body with a fundamental institutional interest in
maintaining power and continuing relevance. Despite variations in the
invasiveness of indecency enforcement since 2003, the FCC's initiatives
amount to a reassertion of the FCC as a significant political, cultural,
regulatory, disciplining force. There is today very little left with which the
Commission can control broadcasters' programming decisions. In a world
in which license terms are lengthy, licenses are presumptively renewable,
and assignments are made by auction, few regulatory hooks remain
available to the Commission. Thus, indecency regulation can serve as a
strategic move to maintain control by the FCC.277 The power to impose
huge fines buttresses the FCC's leverage vis-i-vis regulated entities. The
indecency policy allows the FCC to drive a wedge between the networks
and their affiliates, further eroding network power. Institutionally, it might
also be used as a way to manage the consequences of other regulatory
failures.278 This possibility of indecency regulation as the tail that wags the
otherwise unbiddable dog is also problematic.

277. Does this cast doubt on the possibility that the Commission's deployment of a
contractual rationale for regulation could become a regulatory Trojan horse? Although it
might-which is why this Article does not make a strong claim that the revision in
regulatory justifications will enable broader regulatory initiatives-it is also possible that the
new rationale could be used to revive regulation from the limited realm to which the decline
of the scarcity rationale has led it.
Viewing the FCC as using indecency regulation as a means of enhancing its authority
and relevance does not mean that the agency will engage in regulatory conduct that it does
not believe is substantively desirable. It does suggest, however, that the agency might be
influenced in its assessment of what is substantively desirable by reference to such political
factors.
278. To the extent that-as some have claimed-media consolidation has led to
increased amounts of indecency on the air, a renascence of regulation in that area might be
seen as repairing the consequences of the Commission's other deregulatory rules.
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C. The Availability ofLess Restrictive Technological Solutions
Less restrictive technological means can be promoted, without all the
censorship risk. Moreover, even though ratings and blocking mechanisms
on the broadcast side cry out for improvement, the vast majority of
television viewers in this country subscribe to cable, with its more extensive
consumer-protective technological solutions. In any event, the Commission
has not attended to the promotion of consumer-side technological aids,
despite congressionally-prompted attention to the question.
Congress
passed the Child Safe Viewing Act of 2007279 in 2008, requiring the
Commission to initiate an inquiry examining the state of the marketplace
with respect to the availability and deployment of blocking technologies
and ratings systems. 280 In its responsive Report to Congress in 2009, the
Commission concluded that:
Taken as a whole, the record indicates that no single parental control
technology available today works across all media platforms. Moreover,
even within each media platform, these technologies vary greatly with respect
to the following criteria: (i) cost to consumers; (ii) level of consumer
awareness/promotional and educational efforts; (iii) adoption rate; (iv)
customer support; (v) ease of use; (vi) means to prevent children from
overriding parental controls; (vii) blocking content/black listing; (viii)
selecting content/white listing; (ix) access to multiple ratings systems; (x)
parental understanding of ratings systems; (xi) reliance on non-ratings-based
system; (xii) ability to monitor usage and view usage history; (xiii) ability to
restrict access and usage; (xiv) access to parental controls outside of the home;
and (xv) tracking. In addition, a common theme that runs throughout the
comments is the need for greater education and media literacy for parents
and more effective diffusion of information about the tools available to them.
Many commenters urge the government to play a more substantial role in
meeting this need. 28'
Having described the landscape, however, the agency did not make any
affirmative recommendations.
Instead, it identified a set of further
unresolved questions, such as:

279. Child Safe Viewing Act of 2007, Pub. L. No. 110-452, 122 Stat. 5025 (2008)
(describing the FCC as canvassing "the existence and availability of advanced blocking
technologies; ... methods of encouraging the development, deployment, and use of such
technology . .. that do not affect the packaging or pricing of a content provider's
offering; . . . and the existence, availability, and use of parental empowerment tools and
initiatives already in the market").
280. Report, Implementation of the Child Safe Viewing Act; Examination of Parental
Control Technologies for Video or Audio Programming, 24 FCC Rcd. 11,413, 11,414
(2009) [hereinafter FCC Safe Viewing Report].
281. Id. at ll,415 5.
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* To what extent are parents aware of the control technologies that exist
today? Does parental awareness differ among media?;
* Are there reasons besides lack of awareness that keep parents from using
these technologies? If so, what are they, and do they differ among media?;
* It appears that adoption of control technologies may be greater for the
Internet than for broadcasting and other traditional media sources: Why is
this so?;
* Are there data to determine the pace of innovation in parental control
technologies, whether innovation is proceeding at a pace consistent with
other consumer technologies, and whether evolving needs of parents,
caregivers, and children are being satisfied in a timely manner?282
The Report concluded by assuring Congress that "the Commission
intends to issue a further Notice of Inquiy to explore these issues and others
related to the goal of protecting children and empowering parents in the
digital age." 283 While the Commission did, in fact, open a proceeding in
2009,284 it has not pursued or concluded this inquiry to date.
D. What Are BroadcastersLikely To Do?
FCC Commissioners have repeatedly pointed to the increase in
indecency complaints in the past decade. According to "decency groups,"
the increase in complaints has been prompted by an across-the-board
increase in casual indecency both on television and on radio, even in the
precincts of what has historically been thought of as family
entertainment. 285 Critics of broadcasters and the FCC claim that
indecency grew at least in part because of the insufficiency of Commission
enforcement. With FCC enforcement delays and easily absorbable small
fines, broadcasters could comfortably steer very close to-and often overthe danger zone so long as their programming continued to be profitable.
In any censorship regime, the speech of the regulated speaker is to some
degree asymptotically defined by the censoring rule. The censorship rule
stands as an invitation to broadcasters to get as close as possible to the line
of what is unacceptable, but not to cross it. The censorship regime itself

282. Id. at 11,416 6 (footnotes omitted).
283. Id. at 7.
284. FCC Releases Notice of Inquiry on Serving and Protecting Children and
Empowering Parents in an Evolving Media Landscape, 2009 WL 3413027 (F.C.C.) (Oct.
23, 2009); Notice of Inquiry, Empowering Parents and Protecting Children in an Evolving
Media Landscape, 24 FCC Rcd. 13,171 (2009).
285. See Abigail T. Rom, Note, From Carlin's Seven to Bono's One: The Federal Communications
Commission's Regulation of Those Words You Can Never Say on Broadcast Television, 44 VAL. U. L.
REv. 705, 706 (2010) (citing to PTC studies).
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becomes an element in the decision about what content to air-influencing
the choice of material. The changes wrought by the FCC since 2003
appear to have unduly amplified that reality.
Arguments focusing on the asserted increase in broadcast indecency also
predict its likely increase as a result of the current media climate. Thus,
proponents argue, daytime broadcasting will be further overrun with
indecency-as a matter of "common sense" 28 6-if the FCC does not step in
aggressively. 287 Why should we anticipate increased broadcast indecency?
Echoing others, the government claimed in the Fox I briefing that increases
in niche programming and competition with cable and satellite would push
broadcasters to emulate more risque programming featured on cable and
DBS.288 The majority's opinion in Fox I found that the FCC's prediction of

increased fleeting expletives on air was "rational (if not inescapable)." 289
Earthier programming may also be generated by changes in program
formats-such as reality programs and procedural crime dramas that often
focus on sexualized crime. Moreover, many decry what they see as the
coarsening morality of America, which invites increasingly shocking and
transgressive programming. Finally, both media watchers and some FCC
Commissioners have adverted to an argument that indecency may be
286. Fox II FCC Reply, supra note 183, at 14.
287. For example, the Commission warned that a per se exemption for fleeting
expletives would "permit broadcasters to air expletives at all hours of the day so long as they
did so one at a time." Fox Television Stations, Inc. v. FCC, 489 F.3d 444, 460 (2d Cir.
2007) (citing Omnibus Remand Order, 21 FCC Red. at 13,309 25).
288. Indeed, the government characterized the National Association of Broadcasters
brief as an admission that broadcasters seek relaxation of the indecency rules in order to
allow broadcasters to compete more with cable. See Fox II FCC Reply, supra note 183, at 14;
see also Calvert & Richards, supra note 20, at 312;Jost, supra note 12, at 982-83.
The dissent in the Second Circuit's Fox opinion also predicts an increase in indecency
because of broadcasters' need to compete with cable. Judge Leval
would bet [his] money on the agency's prediction [that] ... [t]he words proscribed by
the Commission's decency standards are much more common in daily discourse
today than they were thirty years ago [and] the regulated networks compete for
audience with the unregulated cable channels, which increasingly make liberal use of
their freedom to fill programming with such expletives. The media press regularly
reports how difficult it is for networks to compete with cable for that reason. It seems
to me the agency has good reason to expect that a marked increase would occur if the
old policy were continued.
Fox Television Stations, 489 F.3d at 472-73 (LevalJ., dissenting). However, as the majority
pointed out, "no evidence supporting this proposition is contained in the record that was
considered by the FCC when rendering its decision." Id. at 460 n. 11 (majority opinion); see
also Holohan, supra note 109, at 368 (concluding that "the Pacifica rules give broadcasters a
severe competitive disadvantage").
289. Fox 1, 556 U.S. 502, 518 (2009); see also Fox Television Stations, 489 F.3d at 472-73
(Leval,J., dissenting).
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associated with-and perhaps even promoted by-media consolidation. 290
What broadcasters are likely to do with respect to indecency, if left
unregulated, is actually a hard question. On the one hand, empirical data
reflecting increased broadcast indecency suggest a correlation with a rise in
cable indecency. 291 This suggests that what is available on cable and
perhaps the Internet will influence what broadcast programmers think is
appropriate in prime time. On the other hand, courts have opined that
threats of increased indecency are "divorced from reality." 292 The PTC's
president has taken the position that there is not a major broadcast market
for "the edgier content."293 The tolerance of their advertisers is also a
critical factor for broadcasters. If major advertisers shy away from
increasingly explicit programming on television, broadcasters will be
compelled to adjust. 294 Recent empirical data on how well sexually290. See Michael J. Copps, The "Vast Wasteland" Revisited: Headedfor More of the Same?, 55
FED. CoMM. L.J. 473, 478 (2003); Byron L. Dorgan, The FCC and Media Ownership: The Loss of
the Public Interest Standard, 19 NoTRE DAME J.L. ETHICS & PUB. POL'Y 443, 449 (2005);

Katherine A. Fallow, The Big Chill?: Congress and the FCC Crack Down on Indecency, COMM.
LAW., Spring 2004, at 25 n.14 (citing to testimony by Commissioners on the effect of
consolidation on local affiliates' power to reject indecent programming); Press Release, FCC,
Comm'r Michael J. Copps Calls for Re-Examination of FCC's Indecency Definition,
Analysis of Link Between Media Consolidation and "Race to the Bottom" (Nov. 21, 2002),
available at http://hraunfoss.fcc.gov/edocs-public/attachmatch/DOC-228735Al.pdf; see
also S. REP. No. 108-253, at 6 (2004) (referring to PTC testimony attributing "a coarsening
of content on the airwaves" to media consolidation). But see Abner Greene et al., Indecent
Exposure?: The FCC's Recent Enforcement of Obscenity Laws, 15 FORDHAM INTELL. PROP. MEDIA

& ENT. LJ. 1087, 1118 (2005) (comments of Mr. John Fiorini, III, Wiley Rein & Fielding
L.L.P.) (attributing increase in indecent content to competition rather than consolidation);
Michael Powell, Chairman, FCC, Remarks at the National Association of Broadcasters
Summit on Responsible Programming (Mar. 31, 2004), available at http://hraunfoss.fcc.gov/
edocs-public/attachmatch/DOC-245663Al.pdf.
291. See Fox Television Stations v. FCC, 489 F.3d 444, 472-73 (2d Cir. 2007) (Leval,J.,
dissenting). See also PARENTS TELEVISION COUNCIL, The Alarming Family Hour, http://www.
parentstv.org/PTC/publications/reports/faiilyhour/familyhour-92007-finalPDF.pdf
(providing data on increased broadcast indecency); PARENTS TELEVISION COUNCIL,
HABITAT FOR PROFANITY, http://w2.parentstv.org/main/MediaFiles/PDF/ Studies/2010HabitatforProfanity.pdf; Dale Kunkel et al., Sex on TV, THE HENRY J. KAISER FAMILY

FOUNDATION(2005), http://kff.org/other/sex-on-tv-4-report/.
292. See Fox Television Stations, 489 F.3d at 460 (noting that broadcasters have never
barraged the airwaves with expletives even prior to the Golden Globes).
293. Calvert & Richards, supra note 20, at 313-14.
294. On the likelihood of self-censorship by broadcasters, see, for example, Corcos, supra
note 186; Fairman, supra note 123, at 89-90; Matasar-Padilla, supra note 141, at 141; EricJ.
Segall, In the Name of the Children: Government Regulation of Indecency on the Radio, Televisior, and the
Internet-Let's Stop the Madness, 47 U. LOUISVILLE L. REV. 697, 712 (2009). For one anecdotal
example, American Idol runner-up Adam Lambert apparently did not appear on ABC for
two years following a highly sexualized performance on the 2009 American Music Awards
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oriented program promotional ads correlate with program ratings also
suggest that broadcasters should be aware of possible unintended
consequences of using sex as a promotional device.295 Moreover, despite
anecdotal accounts, the precise degree to which cable programming-and
particularly basic cable-contains more sexual content than broadcasting is
unclear.29 6 Also, recent evidence suggests a reduction in cable viewing, a
development whose possible impact on broadcast indecency is also
unclear.297 Perhaps station branding will help limit indecency on the air
regardless of regulation;29 8 and perhaps changes in the popularity of
different types of program formats will influence the likely degree of sexual
expression. 299
The question of what broadcasters are likely to do in response to a
restrained indecency regime is likely to depend on what industry structure
and media ownership will look like in the future. There is also a question
about whether, and to what extent, cable will continue to be sold in tiered
show. See Shirley Halperin, Adam Lambert Returns to 2011 AMAs As Presenter; Producer Says He
'Was Never
Banned',
HOLLYWOOD
REP.
(Nov.
19,
2011,
12:24
AM),
http://www.hollywoodreporter.com/news/adam-lambert-american-music-awards-263878;
John F. Stephens & Matthew G. Stein, The Future of the FCC'sNew Indecency Policy, L.A. LAw.,
May 2010, at 14, 17. Indeed, in its comments filed in the Commission's pending indecency
proceeding, CBS explicitly assured the agency that "[i]t need not be concerned that doing so
will make of broadcast television some sort of red-light district. That has not happened with
respect to the post-10 p.m. 'safe harbor,' and it will not happen in daytime, or primetime..."
John Eggerton, CBS: FCC Should Adopt 'Egregious Case' Indecency Enforcement Policy, BROAD. &
20,
2013,
http://www.broadcastingcable.com/article/494166CABLE,
June

CBSFCCShould AdoptEgregiousCaseIndecency. EnforcementPolicy.php

(internal

quotation marks omitted).
295. John J. Davies, TV Ratings and Verbal and Visual Sexual Content in PromotionalAds, 17 J.
PROMOTION MGMT. 378 (2011).

296. Barbara K. Kaye & Barry S. Sapolsky, Taboo or Not Taboo? That Is the Question:
Offensive Language on Prime-Time Broadcast and Cable Programming, 53 J. BROAD. & ELEC. MEDIA
22, 24 (2009). But see PARENTS TELEVISION COUNCIL, Cartoons Are No Laughing Matter: Sex,
Drugs and Profanity on Primetime Animated Programs, (Aug. 16 2011), http://www.parentstv.org/

PTC/news/release/2011/0816.asp (PTC study finding high levels of sexual references in
cable cartoon programming).
297. See Brief for Nat'l Religious Broadcasters as Amicus Curiae in Support of the
Petitioner at 21, Fox II, 132 S. Ct. 2307 (2012) (No. 10-1293), 2011 WL 4048808 (noting
reduced cable viewing and increase in broadcast viewing).
298. See Blake Lawrence, To Infinity and Beyond: FCC Enforcement Limiting Broadcast
Indecency from George Carlin to Cher and into the Digital Age, 18 UCLA ENT. L. REV. 148, 174
(2011); see also Fairman,supra note 123, at 91; Kristin L. Rakowski, Branding as an Antidote to

Indecency Regulation, 16 UCLA ENT. L. REV. 1,42 (2009).
299. It may be that sexual references are more likely in some program formats than
others. If, for example, reality programming tends to lead to increased sexual references,
then a lessening in popularity of such program formats might correspondingly reduce such
expression.
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and bundled fashion, as it has been. While the Ninth Circuit recently
rejected a judicial challenge to cable tiering on antitrust grounds,300 and
while the current FCC appears to have lost momentum on former
Chairman Kevin Martin's push for a la carte cable regulation,3 0 Senator
John McCain is currently pushing for cable a la carte legislation and has
recently written to the FCC asking the agency to "take steps" to adopt his
Television Consumer Freedom Act.30 2 What happens to the cable business
model should also be factored into a discussion of the likelihood of
indecency on the air in the future. While predictions of broadcast television
overrun with explicitly sexual content during daytime hours are overstated,
what we can conclude in this uncertain area is that some increase in
sexualized television content is possible.
In the final analysis, because of the important costs of indecency
regulation and the reality that the FCC is unlikely to eliminate indecency
regulation altogether, the policy burden will be to propose reforms that
both reduce the negative effects of indecency regulation and address the
complex programming incentives that broadcasters now face. The FCC's
rules should be enforced with restraint, relying on some measure of
broadcaster self-regulation constrained by reasonable FCC backstops.
V. EXPLORING THE SECOND BEST: RECOMMENDATIONS FOR
REGULATORY RESTRAINT ON THREE FRONTS

There is historical precedent for administrative forbearance in the
broadcast indecency context, with the FCC having chosen to target only
George Carlin's "seven dirty words" even after the Supreme Court's 1978
decision in Pacifica could have been interpreted to justify significantly more
stringent enforcement of the agency's indecency rules.303 Now too, the
FCC should choose relative forbearance as a matter of policy to avoid the
negative consequences detailed in Section III above.
This is not to say that forbearance should simply lead to an impoverished
bright line approach like the arbitrary prohibition of the seven dirty words.
Instead, the. particulars of the Commission's restraint should be informed
by reference to the three major players in the area-broadcasters, the FCC
300. Brantley v. NBC Universal, Inc., 675 F.3d 1192 (9th Cir. 2012).
301. See Robert Corn-Revere, Can Broadcast Indecency Regulations Be Extended to Cable
Television and Satellite Radio?, 30 S. ILL. U. LJ. 243, 246-47 (2006); see also Pike, supra note 145,
at 224 (discussing "voluntary" merger conditions 'requiring a la carte offerings in satellite
radio).
302. Seth Abramovich, John McCain Pushesfor a la Carte Cable Options in Letter to FCC,
HOLLYWOOD REP. (June 12, 2013, 3:55 PM), http://www.hollywoodreporter.com/news/
john-mccain-pushes-a-la-567663.
303. See supra notes 54-59 and accompanying text.
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itself, and consumers. The suggestions are designed to reduce chill
principally by looking to proportionality as the key goal for the monetary
threat level of indecency rule violations for broadcasters, to improve the
FCC's internal indecency review processes, and to promote consumer
empowerment.
A.

Chill Minimization via Proportionalityin Fofeitures

The changes to the FCC processes and standards recommended above
should go a long way toward ameliorating the chilling effect of indecency
regulation on broadcasters. Nevertheless, broadcasters' expressed concerns
lead to a recommendation regarding forfeiture amounts.
The Supreme Court's opinion in Fox II specifically pointed to the very
large amount of the forfeiture imposed on ABC and its affiliates for the
nude buttocks shown during an episode of NYPD Blue, implying the extent
of the penalty.304 The Second Circuit's opinion in Fox specifically noted
that the change in the Commission's forfeiture authority "could easily run
into the tens of millions of dollars"305 and observed that the FCC, which
had imposed $440,000 in indecency fines in 2003, imposed "a record $8
million in fines" in 2004.306 It would surely reduce the potential chilling
effect of the Commission's indecency regime if the agency decided to
reduce the amounts of the fines imposed for violations of the indecency
rules. It could do so by returning to its practice of imposing fines on a perprogram, rather than a per-broadcast, basis. Even if broadcasters were not
taking the possibility of FCC indecency forfeitures seriously prior to 2005when the amount of money at risk was $32,500 per program-the ten-fold
increase in the agency's statutory forfeiture authority certainly enhances the
financial threat posed today by the threat of a violation finding. The
Commission's new approach-of treating each expletive uttered during a
program as a separate violation of the indecency rules, and of treating each
licensee's broadcast of a program containing indecency as a separate
violation-leads to a disproportionate chilling effect. Even though the
Commission's remedial flexibility should not be eliminated, there should be
restraints on the severity of the monetary and criminal sanctions for
indecency violations.307

304. Foxll, 132 S. Ct. 2307, 2319 (2012).
305. Fox Television Stations, Inc. v. FCC, 613 F.3d 317, 323 (2d Cir. 2010).
306. Id. at 322 n.3.
307. For a similar view, although one that focuses more on speech value and speaker
expectations than on the proportionality recommended in this Article, see Garfield, supra
note 198, at 633-34 ("Criminal sanctions or severe fines would be inappropriate in any
context in which the speech arguably has redeemable value and the speaker reasonably
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B. InstitutionalAdjustments-Improving the FCC'sProcesses
The second category of rule changes proposed here concerns the FCC's
internal processes-both for applying and adopting indecency policies. 308
1. Improving the Processfor HandlingIndecency Complaints
Others have criticized the FCC's approach for handling indecency
complaints, including the lack of clarity in FCC responses to
complainants. 309 This Article recommends initiatives to promote both
transparency and redundancy in the process.
a. Promoting Transparency, Consistency, and Accountability in Indecency Review
The FCC should study the institutional characteristics of its current
indecency review process in order to: 1) streamline the process and 2)
enhance the likelihood of consistency by incorporating cross-checks and
redundancy reviews. The review process should strive to be not only
efficient and timely, but also consistent and accountable. The exercise of
discretion in this area should be bounded by multiple reviews by different
could have believed that the speech would not have been actionable."); see also Amy Kristin
Sanders, 1hen Is Enough Too Much?: The Broadcast Decency Enforcement Act of 2005 and the Eighth
Amendment's Prohibition on Excessive Fines, 2 DuKE J. CONST. L. & PUB. POL'VY SIDEBAR 75
(2007); cf Michael Coenen, Of Speech and Sanctions: Toward a Penalty-SensitiveApproach to the First
Amendment, 112 CoLUM. L. REV. 991, 1014-15 (2012) (arguing for a "penalty-sensitive"
understanding of the free speech right and finding such an approach in Pacifica); Max
Minzner, iMly Agencies Punish, 53 WM. & MARY L. REV. 853 (2012) (arguing that while
agency monetary penalties are said to be a deterrent, they are actually retributive and
illegitimate because they lack the transparency and structural protections that legitimize
retribution in the criminal context).
308. As noted in Section I, the Commission has historically addressed indecency through
a combination of adjudications and "industry guidance." It would be useful, however, for
the agency to address explicitly its decision to proceed by industry guidance rather than
rulemaking or other process more open to public participation. See Campbell, supra note 43
(arguing, inter alia, that the FCC should abandon adjudication and proceed by rulemaking in
the indecency area). As part of its consideration, the Commission should consider the
effectiveness, in practice, of rulemaking in providing adequate and diverse public response.
See Cynthia R. Farina et al., Rulemaking 2.0, 65 U. MIAMI L. REV. 395 (2011); see also Peter
M. Shane, Empowering the Collaborative Citizen in the Administrative State: A Case Study of the Federal
Communications Commission, 65 U. MIAMI L. REv. 483 (2011) (discussing the FCC's attempts to
institutionalize "open, participatory, and collaborative government"); cf Jonathan
Weinberg, The Right To Be Taken Seriously, 67 U. MIAMI L. REV. 149 (2012).
309. See, e.g., Genelle I. Belmas et al., In the Dark-A Consumer Perspective on FCC Broadcast
Indecency Denials, 60 FED. Comm. L.J. 67, 108 (2007) (explaining that complainants receive a
cursory letter of an indecency denial, an insufficient response that could be ameliorated if,
"[a]t minimum, the FCC ... articulate [d] to individual complainants more of the rationale
behind its findings.").
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Commission staff members or groups, reducing the likelihood not only of
inconsistency but also of ideological skews in processing at any given staff
level.
With regard to application of the Commission's rules, the agency's
website discloses little about the process for indecency review.310 An initial
difficulty with this review process as described is its lack of detail and clear
information-which means that recommendations must necessarily be
made in a vacuum. Regardless, a few observations come immediately to
mind. For example, the process as described does not appear to have
sufficient redundancies to increase the likelihood of consistent exercise of
discretion. How many people review each complaint? What is the process
by which uncertainties are resolved? The relationship between the lawyers
and non-legal enforcement staff on these issues is also unclear. Is there a
chain of review, de jure or de facto?
Along with its lack of built-in cross-checks, the process also invites
organizational and informational difficulties. Why are there multiple
databases of indecency information managed by different parts of the
agency stafP How and by whom are the datasets accessible internally?
How does the availability of information in different agency venues, under
different jurisdictions, affect the efficiency and rigor of the review process?
Just as scholarly attention has begun to focus on the effects of interagency
relationships on regulation 31 1 query how the relationships of the various
different FCC subsections affects the application of indecency rules.
The review process also does not appear to have an articulated
timeframe to which Commission staff must hew. Even before the agency's
conscious decision to refrain from resolving many indecency complaints
during the pendency of the Fox and CBS cases, 312 broadcasters consistently

310. When complaints are received by the Commission electronically or otherwise, they
are "log[ged] ... into one of several databases managed by the Consumer and
Governmental Affairs Bureau and the Enforcement Bureau." FCC, COMPIAINT PROCESS,
http://transition.fcc.gov/eb/oip/process.html (last visited July 30, 2013). The Commission
staff "reviews each complaint" to determine whether it states a claim under the agency's
rules. Id. As ofJanuary 2010-the last time the web page was updated-the Enforcement
Bureau apparently had seventeen attorneys and sixteen "other support personnel" working
on indecency matters, but would "increasefl staffing as demand requires." FCC, WHO
HANDLES INDECENCY COMPIAINTS?, http://transition.fcc.gov/eb/oip/Handle.html (last
visited July 30, 2013).
As of 2010, the Investigations and Hearings Division of the
Enforcement Bureau handled most complaint reviews, with "senior staff... involved at all
levels of the investigative process." Id.
311. For citations to the burgeoning scholarship on interagency coordination, see Jason
Marisam, The Interagency Marketplace, 96 MINN. L. REv. 886, 886 n.2 (2012).
312. See, e.g., FCC, REGULATION OF OBSCENITY, INDECENCY AND PROFANITY,
http://transition.fcc.gov/eb/oip/ (last visitedJuly 30, 2013).
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complained of the history of delay in FCC indecency determinations.313
The failure of the Commission's website to refer to any timeframes for
resolving indecency complaints does not suggest attention to the harmful
effects of delay.
Finally, the Commission is not clear about the relationship of staff and
Commission review in the indecency context. The FCC staffs indecency
jurisprudence had historically served as both a guideline for broadcasters
and internal precedent for decisionmaking by the staff and the
Commission. 314 But in the Golden Globes case, the Commission reversed its
own Enforcement Bureau decision and indicated the non-precedential
character of staff decisions in this area.315
Rather than making micromanaging recommendations-at least partly
because sufficiently detailed information about what the Commission
actually does now is not publicly available to inform such
recommendations-this Article recommends that the Commission study its
processes. In theory, though, what could the Commission do to improve its
indecency review process? On the time front, the Commission could adopt
a timeline template to serve as a guidepost for its deliberations. With
respect to the availability of information in a variety of places, the
Commission could coordinate and centralize existing materials. With
respect to the specific review modes at the staff level, the Commission could
promote group decisionmaking or require multiple levels of review or staff
rotation. Particularly if the Commission were to adopt the staff rotation
idea, it would be important to ensure that staff members with historical
knowledge and expertise in the area be extensively consulted in
decisionmaking.

b. Counting Complaints
Another aspect of the Commission's indecency processes that deserves
attention is its approach to counting and reporting complaints. On the
chance that the existence and number of public complaints actually
influence the Commission's assessment of the problem, it should rationalize
its complaint-counting process, eliminate double counting, and find a way
to take into consideration the source and interest group affiliations of the
complaints. Another possibility would be for the FCC to return to its
previous "consolidated complaint process" 316 -the practice of counting
form complaints generated from particular websites as single complaints. If
313.

See supra note 146.

314. See supra note 156 and accompanying text.
315. See supra note 69 and accompanying text.
316. Hunt, supra note 109, at 232.
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the Commission does not make such changes, then it should not be able to
rely on these crude complaint numbers as a regulatory justification.

c.

ConditionedSettlements

While this Article is sensitive to the need for FCC remedial flexibility and
does not recommend eliminating conditioned settlements of indecency
complaints, it does recommend that the Commission revisit the particulars
of some of its prior compliance mandates with a critical eye. It reminds the
Commission that at a time when broadcast license renewals have been
delayed for years because of pending indecency complaints,3 17 broadcaster
willingness to enter into consent decrees conditioned on decency
requirements may be neither "voluntary" in the fullest sense nor fully
attributable to licensee recognitions of fault.318
Specifically, the Commission should not require Sarbanes-Oxleyinspired officer compliance certifications regarding indecency compliance
as part of license renewal settlements simply because of prior allegations of
noncompliance. Similarly, consent decrees should not trigger immediate
employee suspension upon the mere issuance of a NAL. Nor should the
Commission impose a requirement of a program monitor or effective timedelay technology when an on-air personality previously identified in an
indecency NAL is permitted to return to live programming.

2.

StandardsChanges

In addition to improving the review process institutionally, the
Commission's indecency regime would benefit from changes to substantive
standards. While the two revisions recommended here appear minor at
first glance, they would likely have significant beneficial long-term effects on
the margins.

a. Adopting a Presumption ofNo Liability in Close Cases
The Commission should adopt a tiebreaking presumption that if there is
any staff disagreement about a finding of indecency in a particular case
317. The filing of the license renewal application affords authority for continued
operation under "interim authority" pursuant to an FCC postcard accepting the renewal
application and stating that the licensee has interim authority to continue to operate. Many
stations have been operating on such "interim authority" for eight years and file renewal
applications without the previous ones having been granted. This is mostly, but not
exclusively, due to indecency complaints.

318. See, e.g., Bryan N. Tramont, Too Much Power, Too Little Restraint: How the FCC Expands
Its Reach Through Unenforceable and Unwieldy "Voluntary"Agreements, 53 FED. COMM. L.J. 49, 6368 (2000) (criticizing FCC consent decrees).
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(and particularly with regard to the second prong of the Commission's
contextual inquiry), the broadcaster will not be found liable. The benefit of
such a presumption is to serve as a counterweight to the inevitably
subjective assessment of gratuitousness.
b. Reversing the "Negligent" Indecency Approach and the Broadcaster Standards
Bootstrap
The Commission should reverse its negligent indecency approach and
not overvalue a broadcaster's failure to use technology to prevent
indecency.3 19 It should also refrain from using broadcasters' own standards
and practices policies as inculpatory evidence in indecency investigations.
c. Dismissing ComplaintsNot Submitted by Actual Program Viewers
The Commission's opinion in the Married by America case notes that the
FCC did not consider complaints made by viewers who did not assert that
they had viewed the program in question. 20 The Commission should
make a practice of this. Even if it is appropriate to censor broadcast speech
in response to the offended reactions of an actual viewer, it is another
matter entirely to make programming unavailable in a particular market
because someone from a different market, who has not even seen the
program, believes that the people in the airing market should have been
offended by it.321

319. The Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit noted in CBS Corp. that "the First
Amendment precludes a strict liability regime for broadcast indecency." CBS Corp. v.
FCC, 535 F.3d 167, 200 (3d Cir. 2008), vacated, 129 S. Ct. 2176 (2009). Thus, according to
the Third Circuit, the government would have to prove recklessness as a constitutional
minimum. Regardless of the final judicial determination of the question as a matter of
constitutional or statutory law, the Commission should reverse course on negligent
indecency as a matter of policy.
Imposing an obligation on broadcasters to adopt
technological measures to prevent indecency and ensure their effective deployment imposes
significant costs, particularly on smaller broadcasters, and raises thorny evidentiary
questions. See also Botein & Adamski, supra note 128, at 21-23 (noting the ease of "building
one evidentiary inference upon another" and criticizing the lack of clarity in negligent
indecency as a basis for liability).
320. Forfeiture Order, In re Complaints Against Various Licensees Regarding Their
Broadcast of the Fox Television Network Program "Married by America" on April 7, 2003,
23 FCC Rcd. 3222, 3236 (2008).
321. Otherwise, the public becomes simply voters rather than "victims." Brief for Amici
Curiae Former FCC Commissioners and Officials in Support of Respondents at 25, Fox I,
556 U.S. 502 (2009) (No. 07-582), 2008 WL 3539496 [hereinafter Fox I Brief for Former
FCC Officials]. This is not a major point, however, because it will often doubtlessly be easy
for groups like the PTC to generate complaints from actual viewers. Nevertheless, putting
that burden on such organizations will help in those circumstances where offended actual
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Using Context to Exculpate

To the extent that the Commission looks at the entire context of a
program to assess compliance with the second prong of its indecency
inquiry, 322 it should be restrained in the way it characterizes program
elements beyond the complained-of sexual or excretory reference.
Specifically, it should return to its prior practice of using the rest of a
complained-of program to exculpate, rather than inculpate, the
broadcaster.
e.

Adopting a News Exemption (or Reversing the Agency's News-Related Change)

The Commission's recent attempts to distinguish "real" from artificial
news, and only exempt sexual expression from liability for indecency in the
bona fide news context, are misguided. 323 Instead, the Commission should
either explicitly adopt a news exemption from the indecency rules or return
to its pre-2003 approach. 324

f

Limiting the Aesthetic Necessity Inquiy

The Commission should also scale back its recent approval of more
extensive administrative assessments of the aesthetic necessity of sexual
expression to the challenged work. 325 This is because of the extent to which
such inquiries necessarily intrude into fundamental expressive judgments
and replace creators' and producers' aesthetic judgments with those of
Commissioners.
g.

ConsideringEconomic Hardship and Whether the BroadcasterIs a Public
Station

The FCC should also study whether to consider, in indecency cases, the
public or commercial character of the broadcaster concerned. The
Commission has asserted recently that it considers the economic resources
of the station before deciding on the amount of the forfeiture penalty once
liability has been established. 326 But this consideration has been utilized to
increase forfeiture amounts based on the ownership of the broadcaster,
engendering outsized penalties for stations owned by large media
viewers are not easy to find. It will also send a message that indecency regulation is less a
morality crusade than an attempt to help "victims."
322. See supra notes7 7-79.
323. See supra notes 167-68.
324. See supra notes 165-67.
325. See supra notes 184-88.
326. See supra notes 126-27 and accompanying text..
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companies. 32 7 The Commission should more explicitly consider economic
hardship as a factor in its enforcement. Moreover, in addition to these
economic factors, the Commission might conclude-because of a
commitment to the public broadcasting system-that it should consider
whether a purportedly indecent program was aired by a public radio or
television station.328
C. Consumer Empowerment
In addition to the recommendations in this Article regarding forfeitures
and FCC processes, the FCC should also consider whether it can achieve
its goals through indecency rules designed to promote consumer
empowerment-public information and transparency.
Consumer-regarding initiatives should be tested by whether they provide
viewers with adequate information to make viewing choices. As a first step
in doing so, the FCC should focus carefully on the accuracy and adequacy
of the existing program ratings system voluntarily adopted by
broadcasters. 329 Interest groups such as the PTC have released studies
327. See supra Section V.A (recommending revision of forfeiture policy).
328. It has been suggested that the problem of broadcast indecency can be resolved
through the operation of the market, via branding. See Fairman, supra note 123; Lawrence,
supra note 298; Rakowski, supra note 298. However, the business model for broadcasting has
historically focused on providing an array of programming to satisfy a broad range of viewer
tastes. See Horst Stipp, The Branding of Television Networks: Lessons from Branding Strategies in the
US. Market, 14 INT'LJ. MEDIA MGMT. 107, 111 (2012), availableat http://www.tandfonline.
Moreover, even to the extent that
com/doi/pdf/10.1080/14241277.2012.675756.
broadcast networks use branding to differentiate themselves, it is unlikely that such branding
would focus on sexual content as the differentiating factor.
329. Broadcasters negotiated and voluntarily adopted a ratings system to be used in
connection with the V-Chip in response to the Telecommunications Act of 1996. Recently,
the broadcast networks committed to providing ratings for their programming when
streamed online. See John Eggerton, Broadcast Nets to Add Content Ratings Online, BROAD. &
CABLE (June 10, 2012, 9:21 PM), http://www.broadcastingcable.com/article/485723BroadcastNetsto Add_ContentRatingsOnline.php.
Admittedly, ratings apply only to television, not radio, and many of the indecency
actions since 2003 have concerned live programming with child-friendly ratings.
Nevertheless, the question of whether television ratings are working well is of great practical
significance. With regard to live network programming, networks will likely use time-delay
technology whenever they have reason to fear unscripted expletive use. Those expletives
escaping technological constraints will likely become subject to reasonable FCC fines. So
what will remain at issue as a practical matter is likely to be the non-expletive sexual and
excretory references in scripted programming.
In addition to assessing and regularizing the ratings system, the FCC should also
consider an information-forcing requirement that would generate and publicize information
about advertisers. See, eg., Brown & Candeub, supra note 32. This could enable the public
to protest to the advertisers rather than having the government engage in censorship.
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Program advertisers do not hide their identities, however, raising the question of precisely
what would have to be disclosed under an FCC reporting scheme. Entities like the PTC
currently provide some such listings on their web sites. See, e.g., PARENTS TELEVISION
COUNCIL, http://w2.parentstv.org/main/action/ContactSponsors.aspx (last visited July 30,
2013). Regardless, the public can complain to advertisers directly if it wishes to do so,
without the intermediation of the PTC. In considering disclosure-forcing rules of this kind,
the Commission will need to assess what more would be gained for the public by disclosure
requirements entailing not-insignificant compliance expenditures by broadcasters. It is
unclear whether this information would be provided in a sufficiently timely manner even by
broadcasters attempting to comply. There may also be additional costs to the provision of
such information that might not be worth incurring in light of its availability elsewhere. Cf
Richard Warner & Robert H. Sloan, Behavioral Advertising: From One-Sided Chicken to
InformationalNorms, 15 VAND.J. ENT. & TECH. L. 49, 53-54 (2012) (explaining how, in the
behavioral advertising context where consumers engage in pay-with-data exchanges, game
theory suggests that the prevalent approach of "notice and choice" cannot ensure informed
consent and harms of behavioral advertising cannot be eliminated through appropriate
collective action such as a consumer boycott). Some also cast doubt on the desirability of the
kind of private pressure and advertiser boycotts indulged in by the PTC. See, e.g., Matthew
S. Schneider, Note, Silenced: The Searchfor a Legally Accountable Censor and Why Sanitization of the
BroadcastAirwaves Is Monopolization, 29 CARDOZO L. REV. 891, 898-99 (2007) (suggesting that
advertiser boycotts should be considered violative of antitrust laws); Matasar-Padilla, supra
note 141, at 139-40 (remarking on relationship between networks and conservative
advocacy groups). The Commission will also have to address the concern that involving
advertisers in the process of closely monitoring programs could lead to very bad program
outcomes-itself an important social cost.
Finally, the FCC might wish to explore the viability of a rule requiring all indecency
complaints and Commission responses to be uploaded onto the FCC website in searchable
form as soon as they are received. Such a rule could have significant benefits. For those
individuals or media groups accessing such information, this process would not only identify
the programs particularly triggering concern but would also reveal whether the complaints
were form filings generated by particular interest groups via their websites. A broader
public conversation could be generated which could in turn inform the FCC about public
sentiment. It would also prevent the FCC bureau double-counting that has in the past been
criticized as a feature of the Commission's generalizations from complaints. On the other
hand, requiring such information would impose extensive costs. There are doubtless privacy
concerns in releasing indecency complaints, and redaction of identifying information is likely
to be very labor-intensive and time-consuming for the FCC staff. To the extent that the goal
is to empower parents, the specific structure of disclosure chosen by the Commission-the
way in which the information is organized and presented-would probably be the most
significant factor in whether such a disclosure scheme would meet that goal. It is unclear
that anyone other than organized, ideological interest groups would use the information
provided, and they could certainly publicize the complaints filed by their members with the
FCC via their websites without the need for government to do so. Parents already have
private options for gathering information about programming content. It is unclear whether
they would find it either practical or beneficial to process all the indecency complaints in the
Commission's inbox. Perhaps most importantly, there are reasons to question whether
public complaints are as significant to the FCC's decisionmaking in this area as has been
claimed. If not, then imposing administrative costs on the FCC to publicize would be a
pointless and distracting exercise.
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making strong empirical claims and purporting to show that the current
ratings system is not adequate either in design or application.s33 The PTC
asserts that current program ratings are both inconsistently applied and
minimally understood by parent viewers. 331 Such claims should be
carefully and extensively examined. 332 As noted above, the Commission
has not concluded its 2009 inquiry into ratings and blocking mechanisms.
Nor does the Commission's Notice of Inquiry directly address the question
of whether the current voluntary rating system is adequate.
The
Commission should conclude its pending docket, with particular attention
paid to the "open V-chip" and the possibility of cross-platform blocking
solutions. 333 In addition, the FCC could promote consumer education and
330. See Douglas A. Gentile et al., Parents' Evaluation of Media Ratings a Decade After the
Television Ratings Were Introduced, 128 PEDIATRICS 36 (2011), available at
http://pediatrics.aappublications.org/content/128/1/36.full.pdf. On the other hand, the
Monitoring Board has filed comments with the FCC purporting to show that parents are,
overall, satisfied with the television ratings system. See Hart Research, Research Public Opinion
Strategies Research, Key Findings from TV Ratings Research (filed May 2, 2012), available at
http://apps.fcc.gov/ecfs/document/view?id=7021916367. These conflicting data must be
analyzed and rationalized.
331. See supra notes 271-73. But see E-mail fromJane Mago to William Lake et al., (Apr.
6, 2012, 2:43 PM), available at http://apps.fcc.gov/ecfs/document/view?id=7021916367
(attaching results of studies commissioned by the TV Parental Guidelines Monitoring Board
and asserting parental satisfaction with ratings).
332. It might be questioned whether that kind of inquiry, if undertaken by the FCC or
under its auspices, would itself improperly require government to engage in censorious
assessments of speech. The Commission would have to structure the assessment process
with sensitivity to this issue.
333. Empowering Parents and Protecting Children in an Evolving Media Landscape, 74
Fed. Reg. 61,308, 61,314-15 (Nov. 24, 2009), available at http://www.gpo.gov/fdsys/pkg/
FR-2009-ll-24/html/E9-27664.htm. The Commission, in its pending inquiry, "identified
five areas for further study with respect to parental control tools across media platforms: (i)
level of consumer awareness of such tools; (ii) pace of adoption; (iii) ease of use; (iv)
familiarity with and understanding of ratings systems; and (v)pace of innovation." Id
Two of the possibilities mentioned in the Commission's pending notice of inquiry are
particularly attractive. First, the Commission has noted the problem that "content that
parents may block via the V-chip on the home television set, such as a program that is rated
TV-14, may be freely accessible to their children on the Internet." Id. at 61,313. The FCC
has found that "no single parental control technology available today works across all media
platforms." Id. at 61,314. Available technologies also "vary greatly" along various matrices
even within each media platform. Id. So one possibility would be exploring "the creation of
Id. The other
a uniform rating system that would apply to various platforms .....
interesting possibility relates to whether the current V-Chip technology can support an
"'open V-chip' that would allow parents to select from multiple ratings systems." Id. at
61,315. The Commission asks, "What steps, if any, should Congress, the Commission, or
industry take to give parents access to multiple content ratings for television in addition to
ratings assigned by content producers?" Id.
Further study, rather than immediate adoption, is recommended here regarding the

2013]

"SMuTAADNOTHING BuT"

607

media literacy by helping parents understand and navigate the broadcast
rating system. The Commission should also actively undertake its promised
inquiry and provide for transparency regarding ratings and the Oversight
Monitoring Board's processes.334
Ultimately, these suggestions for ways to promote FCC restraint are
merely recommendations for further exploration.335 Most importantly, one
open V-chip and cross-platform ratings systems because of some flaws identified in the
context of web ratings. See, e.g., Jonathan Weinberg, Rating the Net, 19 HASTINGS COMM. &
ENT. L.J 453 (1997); see also Balkin, supra note 199, at 1165 (discussing coarseness and
political character of ratings); Derek E. Bambauer, Orwell's Armchair, 79 U. CHi. L. REv. 863,
917 (2012); Robinson, supra note 50, at 953 ("The attempt to create an effective ratings
scheme presents numerous problems, not least of which is a high risk of classification errors
that will cause the ratings to fail to satisfy their intended purpose."). As the Commission
noted, "Is further investment in the V-chip warranted, given the relatively low use of the Vchip and the increasing number of alternative parental control tools available to pay TV
subscribers?" Empowering Parents and Protecting Children in an Evolving Media
Landscape, 74 Fed. Reg. 61,308, 61,315. More generally, is the low level of V-chip
acceptance by parents due to lack of awareness, confusion, or difficulty of use, or is it due to
a lack of concern about the content of television programming over the air? Given the
expense of producing and maintaining comprehensive open third-party ratings systems, and
the fact that only closed, proprietary versions emerged on the web, what could help promote
more successful developments in the broadcast context? And will the public greet the
enhanced blocking system "with a collective yawn?" See United States v. Playboy Entm't
Grp., 529 U.S. 803, 816 (2000) (quoting Justice Kennedy's description of the blocking
regulation at issue in the case).
334. In addition to inquiring into what steps would help increase the adoption of the Vchip by parents, the FCC's pending inquiry asks whether "improvements in the operation
and visibility of the industry's Oversight Monitoring Board, which fields complaints about
ratings, (would] be helpful" in addressing possible parental "doubts affect[ing] parents'
interest in using V-chip technology." Empowering Parents and Protecting Children in an
Evolving Media Landscape, 74 Fed. Reg. at 61,314.
The TV Parental Guidelines Monitoring Board is a private entity that describes itself
as being "responsible for ensuring there is as much uniformity and consistency in applying
the Parental Guidelines as possible." See TV Parental Guidelines Monitoring Board, TV
Ratings Oversight, http://www.tvguidelines.org (last visited July 30, 2013). The Board "is
comprised of experts from the television industry and public interest advocates." Id. It "also
reviews complaints about specific program ratings to help ensure accuracy." Id.
335. Such exploration must focus on possible drawbacks. For example, with regard to
changes that would presumably decrease the chilling effect of the current rules, reducing
forfeiture amounts might well lead to the pre-2003 climate, in which indecency fines were
seen by broadcasters as reasonable costs of doing business. Precluding indecency-related
settlement conditions could reduce both FCC and broadcaster flexibility. Dismissing the
negligent indecency approach would permit broadcasters who could well afford to use
technology to help avoid indecency from doing so.
Similarly, with regard to the proposed improvements to the FCC's processes, each
proposal admittedly raises questions. For example, increasing process redundancies might
lead not to consensus and clarity but to delay and paralysis at the Commission. Adopting a
presumption of liability in close cases might well undermine the application of the indecency
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might question the entire project of attempting to reform this deeply flawed
policy. Can these suggestions in fact succeed in rolling back the indecency
doctrine to make it sensible? Is there really a case for attempting to do so
when broadcasting is no longer the dominant medium, and when indecent
broadcasts are no longer principally the work of a handful of radio talk
show hosts or their guests? Worse yet, would inconsequential reforms
ironically provide the illusion of regulatory effectiveness for a policy that, if
ever sensible, has in fact outlived its time? Simply put, doesn't the critique
in Sections III and IV above necessarily stand in tension with any such
attempts at reform?
The best justification for this exploration of the regulatory second-best is
the likelihood that the Court will not rush to overturn Pacifica, and that
continuing congressional and interest group pressure on the FCC will lead
to some activity on the indecency front. Under these circumstances, it is
not realistic to expect the dismantling of the entire regulatory edifice. It is
also the case that the enforcement regime of the past decade has deepened
the underlying flaws of the prior indecency policy. The improvements that
this Article commends to the Commission for exploration are not simply
designed to promote the efficiency of the existing regime. Even if
regulatory tinkering, as suggested here, does not eliminate the fundamental
flaws of the core indecency policy, it focuses attention on how to mitigate
the excesses of the past decade. Proportionality in forfeitures and the
rollback of negligent indecency could achieve a de facto sunset for
indecency regulation which political reality would not permit to occur
today.336
CONCLUSION

In the past nine years, the Supreme Court twice had the opportunity to
reverse Pacifica or to reject the differential First Amendment treatment of

policy to innuendo. As for the administrative process used by the Commission to adopt
indecency policies, there is at least some possibility that a rulemaking alternative would be
little more than a sham. Adopting a clear rule regarding how to count complaints might be
deemed to silence real complainants, particularly if the Commission went back to its original
counting approach.
336. This Article does not present each category of suggested reform as equally
consequential or effective. It may well be that changes to the forfeiture regime would far
more effectively reduce the threat of indecency regulation than the structural and consumeroriented suggestions would improve the operation of the regime. Even so, promoting
consumer self-help might foster the underlying goals of the indecency policy, and injecting
more accountability into the FCC's internal processes might both improve the results and
enhance acceptance of FCC action in the exceptional cases in which the Commission is
likely to act.
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broadcasters. It did neither. Nor, however, did it explicitly affirm the
entirety of the FCC's approach to indecency on the air. Two justicesJustices Thomas and Ginsburg-indicated that they would vote to overrule
Pacifica. On the other hand, the Court's opinion in Fox Il floated-without
discounting-a revival of FCC regulatory power under a newly expansive
regulatory rationale that could justify not only indecency regulation but a
more expansive regulatory footprint for the FCC than has been in vogue
since the deregulatory turn in the 1980s.
Now the Commission is faced with an invitation from the Court to
review its indecency policy with a view to the public interest. The current
regime is deeply flawed in its standards, application, and reframed
justifications. Yet, since the evidence does not suggest either that the Court
will reverse Pacifica or that the FCC will dismantle its indecency system in
toto, the most we can hope for is to convince the Commission to scale back
its current approach and adopt an indecency regime, going forward, that is
restrained in both analysis and enforcement.
This Article suggests practical changes that would enable the
Commission to juggle its perceived political obligations to Congress, the
expressive interests of broadcasters and the unoffended, and even the
concerns of parents. In order to lessen the chilling effect of indecency
regulation on broadcasters-and, particularly, on non-profit licensees and
small local concerns-this Article suggests that the Commission engage in
careful analysis of proportionality in forfeitures. In order to promote
consistency and predictability at the Commission, this Article proposes a
series of procedural and substantive revisions to FCC indecency review.
Procedurally, it calls for the Commission to improve the transparency and
accountability of its indecency review process, including increased
redundancy in staff review to promote consistency and control for
ideological bias. It also suggests exploring revised ways of counting and
reporting indecency complaints, and revising the provisions of its consent
decrees in indecency cases. Substantively, this Article recommends that the
Commission consider the following standards changes: adopting a
presumption of no liability in close cases; reversing the new "negligent
indecency" approach and the broadcaster standards bootstrap; dismissing
complaints not submitted by actual program viewers; using context to
exculpate; adopting a news exemption (or reversing the recent changes to
the Commission's historical approach to news indecency); limiting the
aesthetic necessity inquiry; and considering economic hardship and
whether the broadcaster is a public station. Finally, in order to promote
consumer empowerment, this Article calls for the Commission to explore
an improved and more transparent ratings system. Such solutions, while
admittedly imperfect, could help the Commission discontinue its dangerous
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and almost certainly ineffective "Victorian crusade"337 against smut on
broadcast television.

337. John Eggerton, Former FCC Chairs Slam Commission' 'Vsctorian Crusade', BROAD. &
CABLE (Nov. 10, 2011, 11:02 AM), availableat http://www.broadcastingcable.com/article/
476529-FormerFCCChairsSlam_Commission s Victorian Crusade_.php (last visited
July 30,, 2013); see also Brief for Former FCC Officials, supra note 4, at 3; Fox I Brief for
Former FCC Officials, supra note 321, at 3.

